dissenting to en banc opinion.
I join Justice Wilson’s dissenting opinion with regard to the trial court’s ruling on the plea to the jurisdiction.
I write separately simply to emphasize the standard of review we must follow in cases such as this.
This is a plea to the jurisdiction case. Our task is to take as true the allegations of fact in the plaintiffs’ pleadings, and to determine whether those allegations of fact support subject matter jurisdiction in the trial court. Texas Ass’n of Bus. v. Texas Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 446 (Tex.1993); Reyes v. City of Houston, 4 S.W.3d 459 (Tex.App. — Houston [1st Dist] 1999, pet. filed).
To establish liability against a municipality under a special defect theory, a plaintiff must plead and prove: (1) personal injury or death; (2) proximately caused by the negligence of an employee; (3) acting in the course and scope of employment; (4) the injury or death was caused by a special defect; (5) the municipality knew or reasonably should have known of the defect; and (6) the municipality failed to exercise ordinary care to protect the individual. State Dep’t of Highways & Pub. Transp. v. Payne, 838 S.W.2d 235, 237 (Tex.1992). Plaintiffs pled all of the above. The determinative issue in the present case is whether a wrecked truck blocking two lanes of traffic constitutes a “special defect.”
The Texas Tort Claims Act gives a partial definition of “special defects,” stating they include “excavations or obstructions on highways, roads or streets.” Tex. Civ. PRac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 101.022(b) (Vernon 1997). A special defect must present an unexpected and unusual danger to ordinary users of roadways. Payne, 838 S.W.2d at 238. A special defect is distinguished by some unusual quality outside the ordinary course of events. Id.; see also Harris County v. Smoker, 934 S.W.2d 714, 718-19 (Tex.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, writ denied) (providing helpful overview of cases, contrasting conditions held to be special defects and conditions held not to be special defects).
In my opinion, when plaintiffs’ petition alleged a disabled, wrecked truck was posi*918tioned “perpendicular to all three lanes of traffic on Memorial Drive and obscuring the left two lanes of traffic,” the petition described an obstruction on a road that presented an unexpected and unusual danger to ordinary users of Memorial Drive. Thus, the factual allegations describe a “special defect.” See Payne, 838 S.W.2d at 238; Smoker, 934 S.W.2d at 718-19.1
The trial court correctly ruled that it has subject matter jurisdiction of this case.
. The majority opinion indicates that the pickup truck in this case was ''temporarily'' stranded in the roadway. I respectfully point out that the plaintiffs’ petition does not indicate how long the wrecked truck was stranded in the roadway. I cannot discern whether it would make any difference to the majority if the wrecked truck remained in its position blocking two lanes of the roadway for two hours, or five hours, or longer. I also respectfully note that all of the cases cited by the majority are distinguishable. In my opinion, the majority's holding is contrary to the clear definition of "special defect” set out in the statute and case law.