¶ 24. (dissenting). On July 28, 2004, Stanley Jezeski and his brother, Thomas, entered into a real estate contract with the sole and intentional purpose of hiding an asset from a Wisconsin family court during Stanley's divorce from his spouse, Rosalie. The contract, accompanied by a quitclaim deed from Stanley to Thomas, vested title to the asset in Thomas "until such time as [Stanley's] divorce .. . becomes finalized." The divorce was finalized on September 11, 2006. The sole and specific purpose of the contract being satisfied, Stanley then demanded that Thomas honor the contract and return the concealed asset to him. Thomas refused. Because Thomas failed to honor the terms of the contract, Stanley sued for breach of contract in the same Wisconsin court system.1
*191¶ 25. After a bench trial, the trial court found that "the purpose of the transfer on a temporary basis to Thomas was to avoid consideration of this property in the divorce proceeding." The trial court then held in relevant part:
I am not going to enforce a contract that I think is intended to protect real estate from [Rosalie]... because the purpose [of the real estate contract] was to hide assets [from a Wisconsin circuit court].
¶ 26. In spite of the trial court's tacit finding that the purpose of the contract was to fraudulently hide an asset from Rosalie and a Wisconsin court of record, and contrary to the court's admonition that it would not enforce such a contract, the trial court entered a decision resulting in the enforcement of the illegal contract in favor of Thomas, Stanley's co-conspirator in imposing a fraud upon the Wisconsin family court. The trial court dismissed Stanley's complaint by addressing only the allegation of breach of contract; it did not address the illegality of the contract itself.
¶ 27. The majority agrees with the trial court's findings:
The contract itself establishes that Stanley wanted to keep the parcel out of the potential reach of the family court. The contract recites that the sole purpose is so Thomas can temporarily own the parcel "until such time as [Stanley's] divorce from Rosalie [] becomes finalized. Once [the] divorce becomes finalized, I Thomas E Jezeski do hereby agree to transfer the [parcel], back [to Stanley]."
Majority, ¶ 9.
¶ 28. The majority presents the appellate issue as to whether or not a contract to hide a substantial asset from a spouse and the family court during a divorce is *192enforceable. I agree. The majority concludes that "[t]he contract is invalid and unenforceable because it assists Stanley in violating a civil statute to which a penalty is attached." Majority, ¶ 14; see Abbott v. Marker, 2006 WI App 174, ¶ 6, 295 Wis. 2d 636, 722 N.W.2d 162. Again, I agree. Inexplicably, the majority opinion then proceeds to resolve the issue by fashioning an equitable basis upon which to enforce the results of the invalid, unenforceable, illegal agreement in favor of Thomas, a participant in the fraudulent act. In this, I cannot agree.
¶ 29. "A contract is considered illegal when its formation or performance is forbidden by civil or criminal statute . . . ." Abbott, 295 Wis. 2d 636, ¶ 6. Each party in a divorce action has a statutory obligation to disclose all assets, no matter how acquired. Wis. Stat. § 767.127(1). Stanley and Thomas knowingly and intentionally entered into an illegal contract forbidden by law. That being undisputed, I dissent from the enforcement of the real estate contract in any and all respects. The outcome must not favor Thomas, a co-conspirator in the fraud perpetrated against our courts.
¶ 30. In support of their enforcement of the contract, the majority acknowledges the general rule applicable to illegal agreements: "The general rule is that both at law and in equity a court will not aid either party to an illegal agreement, whether executory or executed, but leaves the parties where it finds them." Venisek v. Draski, 35 Wis. 2d 38, 50, 150 N.W.2d 347 (1967) (emphasis added). This general rule also has its exceptions, one being "where the parties are not in pari delicto." Id. In pari delicto means equally at fault. Black's Law Dictionary 806 (8th ed. 2004).
¶ 31. In spite of its acknowledgment that the contract is illegal ab initio, the majority then balances *193the culpability of Stanley and Thomas, and applies in pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis, which directs that in the case of equal fault, the position of the defendant is stronger. See Evans v. Cameron, 121 Wis. 2d 421, 426-27, 360 N.W.2d 25 (1985). The majority applies the doctrine to the benefit of Thomas, concluding that "Stanley's guilt is far greater in degree than Thomas' guilt." Majority, ¶ 20. The majority does so by becoming an advocate for Thomas and providing an analysis and conclusion not raised or argued in the trial court.2
¶ 32. I disagree with the majority's conclusion that the degree of guilt between the brothers is distinguishable. The fraud upon our system of law could not have occurred without Thomas' involvement. Evans addressed whether a plaintiff client was in delicto with *194her retained attorney when she followed his advice to lie during her bankruptcy proceeding. Evans, 121 Wis. 2d at 426, 427. The court explained that even where two people "are in delicto concurring in an illegal act, it does not always follow that they stand in pari delicto; for there may be, and often are, very different degrees in their guilt." Id. at 427 (citation omitted). Evans concluded that the client was in pari delicto with the defendant attorney; in other words, the lawyer and the client were equally at fault for the client's perjury. Id. Although the court recognized that fault may be a matter of degree, where the "wrongfulness of [an act] ... is apparent," all participants in that act stand in pari delicto. See id. at 428.
¶ 33. Likewise, Thomas stands in pari delicto with Stanley here. As in Evans, the wrongfulness of the act here was apparent to both parties. Thomas was a knowing and voluntary participant in a fraud on the family court, not to mention on Rosalie. What distinguishes this case from Evans, however, is more important than what makes it similar. In Evans, the bankruptcy trustee discovered Evans' lie about her assets and as a résult Evans faced possible prosecution for perjury. Evans, 121 Wis. 2d at 425. The bankruptcy court had the opportunity to address the initial fraud, and the only remaining dispute was between two equally culpable parties, Evans and her lawyer. Here, however, Rosalie and the family court, both of them duped in this scheme, have had no opportunity to address the fraud perpetrated by Stanley and Thomas. Thus, the equities to be weighed are not simply between the two wrongdoers. As the Evans court recognized, the doctrine of in pari delicto is "subject to qualifications," and "there may be on the part of the court itself a necessity of supporting the public interests or public *195policy," when deciding whether to invoke in pari delicto. See id. at 427 (citation omitted). Because a court should not "aid either party to an illegal agreement," and because the fraud on the family court and on Rosalie must be addressed, this case presents an exception to the rule that the court should "leave[] the parties where it finds them." See Venisek, 35 Wis. 2d at 50 (emphasis added).
¶ 34. The real estate contract is unambiguously illegal in its sole, principal and initial purpose: to impose a fraud upon the courts and laws of the State of Wisconsin. The trial court's ruling in favor of Thomas must be reversed. Stanley was obligated to disclose the asset to the family court, even if acquired as a gift. See Wis. Stat. § 767.127(1); Wis. Stat. § 767.61(1), (2)(a)l., (2)(b). Neither Stanley nor his co-conspirator Thomas should be allowed to benefit from a fraud imposed upon the courts of this State. The matter should be remanded to the trial court to take appropriate action based upon the asset belonging to Stanley now, and at the time of the divorce proceeding and judgment.3
*196¶ 35. After resolving this appeal in Thomas' favor, the majority recommends that "[t]he files should be referred to the district attorney for Green Lake county for consideration of filing perjury charges against Stanley under [Wis. Stat.] § 767.127(1)." Majority, ¶ 22. I agree that the matter should be referred to the district attorney, as well as to the family court for appropriate action under the family code. However, I disagree the referral should be limited to Stanley. Both Stanley and Thomas knowingly entered into a fraudulent, illegal act with the sole purpose of violating Wisconsin law. Neither should be able to benefit from their joint act to perpetrate a fraud upon the Wisconsin family court. Both should answer for their egregious acts.
This factual background is undisputed. I am not making it up.
Thomas did not file an appellate brief. Consequently, he concedes that Stanley's contentions that the contract was a fraudulent transfer/conveyance, that the contract is void ab initio, and that the asset must be reinstated to Stanley. See State ex rel. Blackdeer v. Levis Twp., 176 Wis. 2d 252, 260, 500 N.W.2d 339 (Ct. App. 1993); Charolais Breeding Ranches, Ltd. v. FPC Secs. Corp., 90 Wis. 2d 97, 109, 279 N.W.2d 493 (Ct. App. 1979). In proceeding as it has, the majority has acted as both judge and advocate for Thomas. When we independently develop a litigant's argument, we fail in our mandate to act as a neutral, impartial reviewing judicial body. See State v. Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d 627, 647, 492 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992); Gardner v. Gardner, 190 Wis. 2d 216, 239 n.3; 527 N.W.2d 701 (Ct. App. 1994). Applying Wis. Stat. Rule 809.83(2), the trial court order here should have been summarily reversed. Interestingly, the majority opts not to summarily reverse "because it would sanction a fraud upon the court." Majority, ¶ 1 n.l. By affirming, however, the majority not only sanctions a fraud upon the family court, but allows one perpetrator of the fraud to profit well from it.
5 The majority recommends that the file be returned to circuit court and that "[t]he trial court should advise the family court that a parcel of real property was not disclosed as required by Wis. Stat. § 767.127(1)." Majority, ¶ 22. This advice to the family court occurs after the majority has vested the legal title of the real estate in Thomas, effectively removing the asset from the reach of the family court. While the majority states that it will not speculate on how the family court might have treated the hidden parcel during the divorce proceedings, it does note that at the time of the divorce "the parties had few assets and a large number of debts." Majority, ¶ 13. While this court should not speculate, neither should we deny the family court the full opportunity to properly consider the concealed asset under the applicable family law statutes.