concurring.
I concur with the principal opinion insofar as it invalidates the provisions permitting McBride to select an arbitrator and shift costs of arbitration in an unconscionable manner. Because relators did not mention the non-enforceability of a non-mutual arbitration clause in their Points *862Relied On and the argument section of their brief contained only a short paragraph discussion of it, however, I disagree with the principal opinion’s decision to reach that issue.
While, as the principal opinion notes, a number of courts have said that mutuality of the right to choose arbitration is not necessary, many other courts have held to the contrary. See Triarch Indus., Inc., v. Crabtree, 158 S.W.3d 772, 774-75 (Mo. banc 2005) (“many state courts, and federal courts applying state law, have invalidated similar non-mutual arbitration provisions because they are so one-sided as to be illusory or unconscionable and, therefore, are unenforceable under applicable state law”); Robert Hollis et ah, Is State Law Looking for Trouble ? The Federal Arbitration Act Flexes its Preemptive Muscle, 2003 J. Disp. Resol. 463, 483-89. See also Showmethemoney Check Cashers, Inc. v. Williams, 342 Ark. 112, 27 S.W.3d 361, 366-67 (2000) (agreement lacked mutuality of obligation where consumer was bound by arbitration in every aspect, yet company could “proceed immediately to court to collect amounts due it”); Taylor v. Butler, 142 S.W.3d 277, 286-87 (Tenn.2004) (contract held to be unconscionable and void because one party had to submit all claims to arbitration, but the other reserved a right to a judicial forum); Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1172-73 (9th Cir.2003) (arbitration clause failed because employer had “unilateral power to modify or terminate” it).1
Unfortunately, the briefing does not discuss these cases or give this Court adequate guidance as to whether the mere fact some consideration was given for the contract generally is sufficient to support enforcing a non-mutual arbitration provision in light of the complete bar the provision places on the one party’s access to the courts while giving the other party an unfettered choice whether to litigate in court or before an arbitrator. Cf. Robin v. Blue Cross Hosp. Serv., 637 S.W.2d 695, 697 (Mo. banc 1982) (terms unenforceable that “unexpectedly or unconscionably limit the obligations and liability of the drafting party”); Whitney v. Alltel Communications, Inc., 173 S.W.3d 300, 313 (Mo.App.W.D.2005) (limitation on filing class action unconscionable where “the expense of pursuing” a claim “far exceed[s] the amount in controversy”).
For these reasons, I would not reach the merits of the mutuality issue. I concur in the remainder of the opinion.
. Dumais v. Am. Golf Corp., 299 F.3d 1216, 1219 (10th Cir.2002) (where one party bears the “unfettered right to alter the arbitration agreement’s existence or its scope” the agreement is illusory); Floss v. Ryan’s Family Steak Houses, Inc., 211 F.3d 306, 315-16 (6th Cir. 2000) (refusing to enforce one-sided arbitration clause under state law because employees received no consideration for their agreement to arbitrate).