(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. The court’s conclusion that T.B.’s out-of-court statements were not testimonial and therefore not admitted, at trial in violation of Bobadilla’s Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him is error. That conclusion is error because T.B.’s statement was a statement made as part of a police interrogation, in the presence of a police officer, to a government official who was taking the statement as a surrogate interviewer for the police.
In Crawford v. Washington, the United States Supreme Court, while not giving guidance as to what constitutes a testimonial statement; stated unequivocally that “[sjtatements taken by police officers in the course of interrogations are also testimonial under even a narrow standard.” Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 52, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). The Crawford Court was also concerned with statements given to government officers: “An accuser who makes a formal statement to government officers bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does not.” Id. at 51, 124 S.Ct., 1354. This is' because government officers “could not always be trusted to safeguard the rights of the people.” Id. at 44, 67, 124 S.Ct. 1354. Similarly, “[ijnvolvement of government officers in the production of testimony with an eye toward trial presents unique potential for prosecutorial abuse.” Id. at 56 n. 7, 124 S.Ct. 1354. Moreover, the Supreme Court specifically stated that “interrogations by law enforcement officers fall squarely” within the concerns of the Sixth Amendment and expressed doubt as to the existence of . “neutral” government officers. Id. at 53, 66, 124 S.Ct. 1354.
According to the record, T.B.’s out-of-court statement was taken as part of an interview set up by a county child-protection worker at the request of a Willmar police detective. The interview took place at the Kandiyohi Law Enforcement Center and was conducted pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 626.556, subd. 10(a) (2004), which requires that, upon receipt of a report of a “violation of a crimihal statute involving sexual abuse *' * * the local law enforcement agency and local welfare agency shall coordinate the planning and execution of their respective investigation and assess*258ment efforts to avoid a duplication of fact-finding efforts and multiple interviews.”1
T.B.’s statements generated by the interview fit squarely within Crawford’s pronouncement that “[s]tatements taken by police officers in the course of interrogations are also testimonial under even a narrow standard.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52, 124 S.Ct. 1354. With respect to the child-protection worker’s involvement, the statements constitute “a formal statement” to a government official and amount to “testimony in a sense that * • * * a casual remark to an acquaintance does not.” Id. at 51, 124 S.Ct. 1354. While it is true that part of the purpose of the child-protection worker in conducting the interview was to assess T.B.’s need for treatment and protection, it cannot be ignored that another equally important purpose was to act as a surrogate interviewer for the corresponding police investigation.
Other courts have found that police involvement in scenarios factually similar to this case gave rise to testimonial statements. See, e.g., State v. Snowden, 385 Md. 64, 867 A.2d 314 (2005) (holding statements given by children to a social worker were testimonial when police initiated social worker’s participation, requested that the interview take place, were actively involved in the investigation, and the identity of the suspect was known); see also, e.g., T.P. v. State, No. CR-03-0574, 2004 WL 2418045 (Ala.Crim.App. Oct. 29, 2004) (holding statements made to child-protection worker while police officer was present were testimonial), cert. denied (Mar. 11, 2005); People v. Sisavath, 118 Cal. App.4th 1396, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 753 (Cal.Ct.App.2004) (holding when interview occurred after prosecution began and prosecutor was present during the interview, statements made to interviewer were testimonial), revieiv denied (Sept. 15, 2004); People v. Warner, 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 419 (Cal.Ct.App.2004) (determining interview was testimonial when a detective observed and one of the interview’s purposes was use as an investigative tool for prosecutions), petition for review on other grounds granted, 18 Cal.Rptr.3d 869, 97 P.3d 811 (2004); Somervell v. State, 883 So.2d 836 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2004) (deciding statement of autistic child given to a police officer at a child advocacy center was testimonial); In re Rolandis G., 352 Ill.App.3d 776, 288 Ill. Dec. 58, 817 N.E.2d 183 (2004) (holding statements made to a child-protection worker while police officer observed through one-way glass were testimonial), appeal pending (January Term 2005); State v. Mack, 337 Or. 586, 101 P.3d 349 (2004) (holding interview with protective services, arranged by police officers with police officers present, was testimonial).2 Like many of these cases, the investigation in this case had already started, the police were involved before the interview occurred, the identity of the suspect was known, the police initiated the interview and were involved in coordinating the interview, a police officer was present at the interview, and this was the only interview of T.B. conducted by the police as a result of their effort to comply with MinmStat. § 626.556, subd. 10(a). Simply put, the interview here was intended to facilitate *259the police investigation. Thus, T.B.’s statement as given to the child-protection worker and the Willmar police detective was per se testimonial under any definition of the term.
Although I conclude that T.B.’s statement was testimonial under any definition of that term, I nonetheless feel compelled to comment on the court’s analysis in concluding that the statement was nontesti-monial.
As support for its claim that T.B.’s statement was nontestimonial, the court makes an analogy to State v. Wright, 701 N.W.2d 802 (Minn.2005). In Wright, we concluded that statements made to police officers during on-scene police questioning following a 911 call were nontestimonial. The circumstances leading to the statement in this case are clearly distinguishable from the police questioning in Wright. In Wright, the police interviews at issue occurred when the police responded to a 911 call placed by the victims of a domestic assault. The victims were interviewed on the scene immediately after the assault occurred. Id. at 813. As such, the facts in Wright supported a conclusion that the victims’ statements were not testimonial because the police were responding “to a call for assistance” and making a “preliminary determination of ‘what happened’ and whether there was immediate danger, rather than an effort to gather evidence for a future trial.” Id. at 813-14.
That is not what happened here. Here, while T.B. was examined by a doctor at the hospital on Sunday, May 4, 2003, he was not interviewed by either the police or child-protection personnel until Friday, May 9, 2003, at the law enforcement center. Thus, there was no exigency here as there was in Wright. Moreover, because section 626.556, subdivision 10(a), gave the police only one opportunity to question T.B. directly, the questioning had to serve two functions: preliminary fact-finding and the collection of evidence for a future trial. Because of those, distinguishing facts, there is nothing in the Wright analysis that causes T.B.’s statement to become nontestimonial.
The court also relies on section 626.556, subdivision 10(a), for support, contending that T.B.’s interview was conducted for the purpose of child protection and that the method chosen was consistent with the legislative intent underlying' that section. The court further contends that any law enforcement purpose in participating in the interview was incidental 'to the child-protection purpose. The record before us belies these contentions. The record is clear that the child-protection worker arranged T.B.’s interview at the request of the Willmar police, that the interview took place at the law enforcement center, that a police detective was present during the interview, and that the interview was conducted to facilitate the police investigation, as well as assess the child’s need for protective services.
The court states: “Given the clear need to limit a child’s exposure to stressful and confusing interviews, and the accompanying need to accurately assess risks to the child, there is a compelling need for a single recorded assessment interview.” But the issue here is not the fact that the interview took place or even the manner in which the interview was conducted. The issue is whether the statements T.B. made during the interview were admissible at trial when T.B. was unavailable to testify and not subject to cross-examination. While the interview here was, in part, conducted for the purpose of protecting the health and welfare of the child, that purpose does not change the fact that the police involvement in requesting and participating in the interview was solely for *260the purpose of collecting potential evidence for a future trial.
In its effort to support the conclusion that the purpose of section 626.556 is to protect the health and welfare of the child, the court attempts to distinguish the factually similar Maryland case, Snowden. In Snowden, a Maryland statute allowed social workers to interview children suspected of having been the victim of sexual abuse and then, under certain circumstances, testify in place of the child using statements obtained during the interview. Snowden, 867 A.2d at 321. The Snowden court held that these statements were testimonial. Id. at 330. The facts of Snow-den are virtually indistinguishable from the facts in this case. The social worker in Snowden became involved in the case only after the police investigation had begun and only at the behest of law enforcement. Id. at 326-27. The police were present during the interview, which took place in a “[e]ounty-owned and operated facility unfamiliar to the children and used for the purpose of investigating and assessing victims of child abuse.” Id. at 327. Similarly, here, the child-protection worker only became involved after she was contacted by a police detective, a police officer was present during the interview, and the interview took place at the law enforcement center, in a child-friendly room unfamiliar to T.B., which was specifically designed for interviewing children alleged to have been abused. The only significant difference between the two statutes is that Minn.Stat. § 626.556, subd. 10(a), does not expressly authorize the admission of the statements obtained during interviews in a subsequent trial.
Thus, while it is true, as the court states, that the express purpose behind the statute in Snowden was to prepare testimony for possible use at a future trial, in the end the situation here is not substantially different. Section 626.556, subdivision 10(a), requires that a child sexual abuse victim be interviewed only once and that “the local law enforcement agency and local welfare agency * * * coordinate the planning and execution of their respective investigation and assessment efforts to avoid a duplication of fact-finding efforts and multiple interviews.” (Emphasis added.) Because of the limitations of section 626.556, subdivision 10, the joint interview of T.B. was law enforcement’s only opportunity to develop testimony from T.B. for possible later use at trial. T.B.’s statements were used in court against Bobadilla in the same manner that the statement in Snowden was used against that defendant. Here, as in Snowden, “[t]he interview questions posed by [the child-protection worker], and the responses elicited, were in every way the functional equivalent of the formal police questioning discussed in Crawford as a prime example of what may be considered testimonial.” Snowden, 867 A.2d at 325. Like the testimonial statements in Snowden, T.B.’s statements are also testimonial.
Because the child-protection worker and police detective worked in conjunction with one another and conducted a joint interview of T.B. pursuant to section 626.556, subdivision 10(a), and because T.B. was unavailable at trial and Bobadilla had no opportunity to cross examine T.B., admission of T.B.’s statements at trial constitute a per se violation of Bobadilla’s Sixth Amendment rights. While the statute itself is not unconstitutional, the admission of T.B.’s statements obtained pursuant to the statute is unconstitutional.
Finally, the court states that “in this case, neither T.B. nor the child-protection worker were acting, to a substantial degree, in order to produce a statement for trial, and therefore T.B.’s statements in the assessment interview were not testi*261monial.” This statement is more than a little troubling in that it assumes that the only government actor involved in T.B.’s interviews was the child-protection worker. That assumption, however, is not supported by the record. The statement wholly ignores the Willmar Police Department’s request for and participation in T.B.’s interviews.
In its opinion, the court eloquently articulates the need to, and importance of, protecting children. On the facts of this case, that important need conflicts with the Sixth Amendment, which, under our system of justice, must prevail.
Therefore, I dissent.
. Under a plain reading of this statutory language, it is clear that the "investigation” referred to is the police investigation and that the "assessment” referred to is the one being conducted by the social welfare agency.
. Büt compare cases in which medical per-sonnfel, and not government officers or police officers, were in charge of taking the statement' — some of these cases hold that statements to medical professionals are nontesti-monial due to the medical purpose of the interview. See, e.g., State v. Vaught, 268 Neb. 316, 682 N.W.2d 284 (2004); State v. Fisher, 130 Wash.App. 1, 108 P.3d 1262 (2005).