¶ 53. (concurring in part, dissenting in pari). I agree with the majority that the circuit court erred in sua sponte granting summary judgment in Rutherford's favor because it failed to give the notice required by Wis. Stat. §§ 806.07(1) and 802.08(2) before granting summary judgment to a defaulting party who never appeared in the action. See majority op., ¶¶ 23-26, 37-44. However, I disagree with the majority's holding that the circuit court did not also err in sua sponte vacating the default judgment against Rutherford pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1), despite the lack of prior notice to the parties before vacating the default judgment. See id., ¶¶ 20-29. With Rutherford never appearing as a party and no advance notice being given by the court prior to vacating the default judgment, I find the court's order vacating default judgment without prior notice to be just as erroneous as its order granting summary judgment without prior notice.
¶ 54. The majority correctly cites Gittel v. Abram, 2002 WI App 113, ¶ 27, 255 Wis. 2d 767, 649 N.W.2d 661, as holding that before a circuit court grants relief *355from its own orders sua sponte under Wis. Stat. § 806.07, it must provide parties with requisite notice of its actions, along with an opportunity to be heard. Majority op., ¶¶ 20, 22. However, I cannot go along with the majority's attempt to distinguish Gittel by contending that because in the case at hand Larry had an opportunity to be heard ex post facto, the requirements identified in Gittel were met. See majority op., ¶¶ 27-29.
¶ 55. The majority glosses over the fact that notice was not given by the judge before sua sponte vacating the default judgment. The majority states that " [although giving prior notice to a sua sponte action by a circuit court under Wis. Stat. § 806.07 is preferable, Larry does not argue that she was prejudiced by the late notice." Majority op., ¶ 27. This description of prior notice as merely "preferable" contradicts the majority's acknowledgement that notice is a requirement, with Gittel stating that "a court has the authority to raise an issue sua sponte if it gives the litigants notice that it is considering the issue and an opportunity to argue." Gittel, 255 Wis. 2d 767, ¶ 24 (citing State v. Holmes, 106 Wis. 2d 31, 40-41, 315 N.W.2d 703 (1982)). A requirement is not just "preferred." A requirement is required.
¶ 56. Furthermore, Gittel establishes that when a court acts on its own motion under Wis. Stat. § 806.07, "parties must have [both] notice and the opportunity to be heard." Gittel, 255 Wis. 2d 767, ¶ 27 (emphasis added). The majority incorrectly collapses these two requirements into one, arguing that because the parties in this case had what the majority describes as "opportunity to be heard," then the notice requirement was satisfied as well. See majority op., ¶ 27 & n.13.
*356¶ 57. Not only is this an incorrect articulation of the rule described in Gittel, but in attempting to distinguish Gittel, the majority misportrays the facts of both Gittel and the present case. The majority suggests that in this case, but not in Gittel, the parties were given the opportunity to brief the issue, which then sufficed as notice. Majority op. ¶ 27 & n. 13. However, a careful reading of Gittel leads to a different conclusion. In both this case and in Gittel, any "opportunity to be heard" took place only after the parties filed motions for reconsideration objecting to the court's sua sponte order that had already been issued without notice or opportunity to be heard at that point in time.
¶ 58. In Gittel, the court held that the specific reason Gittel's right to notice was violated was "because the court did not refer to [Wis. Stat.] § 806.07 until the written order denying Gittel's motion for reconsideration without a hearing." Gittel, 255 Wis. 2d 767, ¶ 29. Similarly, in this case, it was not until after the order had already been vacated and Larry herself brought the requirements of Wis. Stat. § 806.07 to the attention of the circuit court through her letter brief and reconsideration motion that the court denied Larry's motion for reconsideration without a hearing.
¶ 59. Finally, the majority treats the individual parties in this case as interchangeable, implying that because advance notice was given by the circuit court that it was considering summary judgment against Harris, then such notice included vacating default judgment as to Rutherford as well, even though the notice did not mention Rutherford. See majority op., ¶ 27 & n.13. Although the alleged conduct of two parties may be the same, that does not mean that every legal filing, notice or order mentioning one automatically incorporates another party not named, particu*357larly when the unnamed individual has never made a single appearance in court. See Estate of Otto v. Physicians Ins. Co., 2008 WI 78, ¶¶ 9, 13, 311 Wis. 2d 84, 751 N.W.2d 805. If notice is given that summary judgment will be considered as to Harris, but the notice is silent as to vacating default judgment with respect to Rutherford, requiring Larry to assume that the notice was also meant to refer to others not mentioned hardly constitutes "adequate notice."
¶ 60. The majority's statement that "Larry does not argue that she was prejudiced by the late notice," majority op., ¶ 27, does not remedy the problem. Whether or not Larry has specifically argued that any prejudice resulted from the late notice, this court should not undermine the legal requirements of prior notice along with an opportunity to he heard as prerequisites for a court to sua sponte vacate a default judgment order, or any other order under Wis. Stat. § 806.07.
¶ 61. For the above reasons, although I agree the majority's mandate reversing the court of appeals, rather than remand for further proceedings consistent with the default judgment against Rutherford being vacated, this court should instead reinstate the default judgment. I therefore respectfully concur in part, and dissent in part.