(dissenting).
I concur with the majority on all issues presented, with the exception of the con-elusion that denies Officer Duerksen and the City of Bloomington official immunity from suit. On that issue, I respectfully dissent.
The majority’s analysis focuses solely on the act of loading a shotgun. This narrow focus fails to consider the nature of the act leading up to and resulting in deployment of less-lethal and lethal rounds, i.e., Duerk-sen’s exercise of judgment in deciding whether to use force, and the degree of that force. In my opinion, his acts are discretionary and immune from suit.
In determining whether an act is discretionary or ministerial “the crucial focus is upon the nature of the act.” Elwood v. Rice County, 423 N.W.2d 671, 677 (Minn. 1988). As recognized by the district court, police officers who often work in uncertain circumstances generally act discretionarity. They are afforded “a wide degree of discretion precisely because a more stringent standard could inhibit action.” Elwood, 423 N.W.2d at 678.
In its findings of fact, incorporated from the federal proceedings, the district court properly applied the facts of the defendant-officers’ actions in responding to a rapidly changing, dangerous circumstance of a unique domestic-abuse situation. The district court noted that Duerksen arrived at Brown’s residence within four minutes of the emergency 911 call, unloaded his shotgun while walking up to the residence, loaded a confirmed less-lethal round, and then loaded two slug rounds “thinking they were less-lethal rounds.” When Brown did not comply with the command to drop the knife, Duerksen fired twice in rapid succession, the second shot coming as she was falling and dropping the knife. The district court stated that Duerksen was *526aware of the 21-foot zone in which a knife-wielding suspect could stab another person and “[t]he fact that one round was not less-lethal [did] not alter [its] analysis.” The emergency nature of the specific act of loading the shotgun — not the act itself but its quality' — was properly characterized by the district court as part of a “response to a highly volatile and unpredictable domestic situation.”
Duerksen’s incorrect loading of the shotgun certainly seems to have been negligent. But the simplicity of this specific action is not what we must consider. In considering whether he was performing a ministerial duty or exercising discretion, we must conclude that he was properly exercising his judgment and this was a proper exercise of his discretion. Duerk-sen was responding to a request, not a command or order, of a fellow officer. Per his training he certainly at that time could have exercised his discretion not to comply with the request. The request clearly cannot be what makes his actions ministerial, and the majority incorrectly concludes that a Bloomington Police Department procedure rigidly guided Duerksen’s hand.
The Bloomington Police Department’s use-of-force policy states that an officer shall have discretion to use less-lethal force, but does not govern the loading of a firearm. In his affidavit testimony, Du-erksen described the department’s procedure for implementing less-lethal ammunition not as a “policy” but as a part of his training. He also stated that it was a department “suggestion” that he transition from lethal to less-lethal rounds at a location away from the incident. “Suggestion” indicates that he had discretion as to when he should implement that change. Duerk-sen clearly states that he did rely on his training in loading the shotgun, the umbrella of training that he and his fellow officers received for responding to such emergencies: “I went back to what they call relying on training where you don’t think about what you do, you just act.” Given the intensity of Duerksen’s situation, we should expect an officer to rely on his training, even when that path precedes the mistake of extracting rounds from the wrong sleeve on the shotgun.
Our caselaw strongly favors immunizing the actions of civil servants in emergency situations. Leonzal v. Grogan, 516 N.W.2d 210, 213 (Minn.App.1994) (“An officer responding to a report of an armed person threatening the life of a neighbor must weigh many factors and exercise significant independent judgment and discretion.”), review denied (Minn. July 27, 1994). It is a tragedy whenever any citizen must confront such circumstances. While it is especially tragic that Kelly Brown was wounded during the response, the law provides official immunity from suit in an emergency situation that requires protection of the public from imminent harm. This sound jurisprudence encourages an officer’s mindful implementation of the tools and strategies designed to avert such tragedies. Citizens are afforded a reliable safeguard in the denial of immunity to an officer whose actions are willful or malicious. Elwood, 423 N.W.2d at 678.
The decision to use force, whether lethal or non-lethal, is probably the gravest discretion an officer must exercise. I do not see the sense of reintroducing the specter of liability to cloud an officer’s judgment once that decision is implemented. If Du-erksen subsequently erred by misloading the shotgun, as found by the district court, we should not, as a society, hold him civilly liable in any capacity for that error. Accordingly, I would affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment.