concurring and dissenting.
I would reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the entire judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court. Thus, while I concur in the part of the majority opinion which holds that the trial court properly set aside the property settlement agreement and reconsidered property division issues in light of evidence of Appellee’s overreaching, I dissent from the part of the majority opinion that remands the case to the trial court for it to “reconsider” the $200,000.00 it awarded to Appel-lee as separate, nonmarital property.
The majority simply ignores its role as a reviewing Court1 — as well as the trial court’s factual finding that the $200,000.00 in question represented Appellee’s separate, nonmarital investment — and reaches its own conclusions as to witness credibility. The majority’s view of the evidence is conspicuous — “Thus, the trial court erred in setting aside the $200,000.00 as Tom’s separate property based upon the evidence presented.”2 Instead of labeling the trial *822court’s findings as clear error and remanding the case for the trial court to treat the $200,000.00 as marital property and to reconsider its previous division of marital property, however, the majority distances itself from its fact-finding and compounds its errors.
Unable to explain the fact that the trial court, after reviewing the evidence, reached a different conclusion, the majority rationalizes the trial court’s findings as “the result of a misconception by the trial court of the tracing requirements, rather than a finding that Tom Terwilliger was more credible than Judith Terwilliger in their conflicting testimony over the origin of the $200,000.00.”3 Of course there is not a shred of evidence in the record to support this assertion, and the primary authority from this Court addressing the tracing of assets is not particularly prone to “misconceptions” about the process because it removed hypertechnical proof requirements and vested trial courts with the discretion to determine the adequacy of evidence tracing nonmarital assets to assets owned at the time of dissolution.4 The majority’s “solution” is to create unnecessary complexity by suggesting that trial courts must examine tracing evidence using a “sliding scale” approach that apparently requires trial courts to adjust proof requirements to account for a party’s business acumen and financial position. Having done everything but actually nudge and wink, the majority then remands the case to the trial court for it to “reconsider the issue of whether the claimed nonmarital share is sufficiently established.” 5
Because I recognize both our position as a reviewing court that, particularly in cases such as this, should give due deference to the trial court’s findings when they are supported by substantial evidence,6 I accordingly dissent from this second part of the majority opinion.
Contrary to the majority’s characterization, the trial court’s Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order do not equivocate or express any doubts regarding Appellee’s proof as to his $200,000.00 nonmarital investment in Mid-America Cable. In fact, the trial court found, by clear and convincing evidence,7 and after “considerpng] the evidence presented, the arguments of counsel, and being otherwise sufficiently advised,” that (1) “Prior to the marriage the instant Petitioner was also the petitioner in litigation taking place in Michigan and which later was settled for $275,000.00”; (2) “[T]he money he received in settlement of his Michigan tort claims, $200,000.00, became the initial investment in the corporation. This investment is the *823undisputed non-marital property of Petitioner” (emphasis added); and (3) “[T]he marital interest of the parties in the sale is $938,383.00, with the non-marital investment of $200,000.00 being restored to the petitioner” (emphasis added). Later, in the “conclusions of law” section, the trial court recognized — and cited — the KRS 403.190(3) presumption that all property acquired during the marriage is marital and correctly observed that a party seeking to overcome the presumption bears the burden of proving that he or she acquired the property pursuant to an exception listed in KRS 403.190(1). The trial court then concluded that “Petitioner made an initial non-marital investment of $200,000.00 in the corporation.”
Although the majority opinion characterizes these findings as the result of the trial court’s improper application of the tracing requirements, this assertion is inextricably intertwined with the majority’s own factual determinations. Specifically, the majority concludes that the trial court could not possibly have found credible Ap-pellee’s testimony regarding the $200,000.00 invested in the corporation because the trial court clearly found Appellant’s testimony more credible than Appel-lee’s when it determined that the original property settlement agreement resulted from overreaching on Appellee’s part.8 This overly myopic view illustrates why appellate courts should not make credibility determinations and, more importantly, overlooks the fact that a fact-finder can believe portions of a witness’s testimony without endorsing that testimony whole-cloth. Perhaps the best evidence that the trial court properly performed its fact-finding function is the fact that it rejected Appellee’s claims that other funds — e.g., an additional portion of the purchase price of the corporation and the down payment on the parties’ residence — and tangible property — e.g., a speedboat and some tools — also constituted his nonmarital property. In doing so, the trial court found the evidence as to each item of claimed nonmarital property insufficient to overcome the KRS 403.190(3) presumption.
Additionally, I must admit that I cannot discern the standard utilized or established by the majority for the “tracing” of non-marital property. While professing to follow Chenault v. Chenault9 and paying homage to Chenault’s declared relaxation of the “draconian” requirements of the tracing of nonmarital assets set forth by earlier cases,10 the majority sends a loud and clear signal to family law practitioners and the trial bench that — in a certain class of unspecified cases which, coincidentally, mirrors those cases where a majority of this court disagrees with the trial court’s factual findings — nothing less than a verified audit conducted in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles *824will suffice.11 I also see no justification for the majority’s holding that trial courts must apply different proof requirements based upon the business success, or lack thereof, and financial position of a claimant. I agree that a trial court may find the fact that a claimant has kept detailed and accurate records in the past of other similar matters relevant to its decision whether a claimant has overcome the KRS 403.190(3) presumption by demonstrating his or her right to nonmarital property. However, I cannot agree that a claimant’s wealth or business success, standing alone, imposes an additional requirement upon the claimant to produce detailed and accurate records.
In Chenault, this Court relaxed the tracing requirements because of its faith in trial courts’ ability to make factual determinations regarding the character of assets 12 and its recognition that heightened proof requirements “may promote marital disharmony by placing a premium on the careful maintenance of separate estates.”13 Today’s majority opinion gives no deference to the trial court’s finding and adopts a heightened proof requirement that is flagrantly in opposition to the Chenault holding.
KRS 403.190(3) establishes a presumption that all property acquired during the marriage is marital property.14 The marital presumption, however, is rebuttable and may be overcome “by a showing that the property was acquired by a method listed in [KRS 403.190(2)].” 15 This legislatively-created presumption is the genesis of the judicially created “tracing requirement.” 16 While a great deal of confusion has arisen regarding this “tracing requirement,” it simply means that, “[w]hen the original property claimed to be nonmarital is no longer owned, the nonmarital claimant must trace the previously owned property into a presently owned specific asset.” 17 If the claimant does so, then the *825trial court assigns the specific property, or an interest in specific property, to the claimant as his or her nonmarital property. In contrast, a claimant fails to meet the tracing requirement when he or she is able to show only that he or she brought non-marital property into the marriage because he or she has spent his or her nonmarital assets in a nontraceable manner during the marriage. Thus, the trial court will not assign the property to the claimant as nonmarital property,18 and will consider the claimant’s nontraceable, nonmarital contribution only as a factor when it makes a just division of the parties’ marital property.19
A second question which this Court must answer concerns what evidentiary standard must be met to rebut the marital presumption and successfully trace non-marital property. In a number of cases, beginning with Browning v. Browning,20 the Court of Appeals has held that the burden is on the claimant of nonmarital property to rebut the marital presumption by “clear and convincing evidence.”21 However, the Court of Appeals, itself, has expressed doubts about the validity of the clear and convincing evidence standard22 and, perhaps, even rejected it.23 I believe that this Court should also reject it.
*826The issue in Browning was whether the property in question was a gift or was received for consideration,24 and the Court, without any reasoning, discussion, or citation to authority, declared that “[t]he burden is on the [claimant] to prove by clear and convincing proof that he acquired his interest by gift.”25 However, immediately prior to its declaration of the clear and convincing evidence standard necessary to rebut the marital presumption, the Court cited to Bowman’s Adm’rs v. Bowman’s Ex’r26 in support of its definition of “gift.”27 And, this reliance on Bowman’s Adm’rs v. Bowman’s Ex’r, albeit for the ostensible purpose of defining a gift, reveals, perhaps, the reason that the Court in Browning applied a clear and convincing evidence standard to the tracing of nonmarital property.
In Bowman’s Adm’rs v. Bowman’s Ex’r, the Court stated the burden of proof and the evidentiary standard for proving an inter vivos gift:28
Were the appellants here asserting that the money loaned, as evidenced by the notes, were gifts, the burden of showing same certainly rests upon them. In Bell’s Ex’r et al. v. Lawrence et al., 272 Ky. 439, 114 S.W.2d 517, we held that evidence of a gift inter vivos must be clear, convincing and free from reasonable doubt.29
Apparently, the Court in Browning merely took the evidentiary standard for an inter vivos gift as stated in Bowman’s Adm’rs v. Bowman’s Ex’r and adopted it as the standard for rebutting KRS 403 .190(3)’s martial presumption. It does not appear from the opinion itself that the Browning Court gave any independent consideration to the appropriate evidentia-ry standard with respect to the marital presumption. Accordingly, I believe that this Court should give little or no prece-dential weight to the standard adopted by the Court of Appeals in Browning and perpetuated, but questioned, in its subsequent decisions.
While a clear and convincing standard may be necessary with respect to inter vivos gifts because of the substantial risk of fraud,30 nonmarital claims generally do not present a substantial risk of fraud, and the clear and convincing standard is inappropriate in the tracing context. The primary issue in the tracing of nonmarital property is not whether the claimant originally owned, or acquired, nonmarital prop*827erty but rather whether the nonmarital property can be traced into presently owned specific property. Accordingly, I see no reason to impose an unnecessary burden upon nonmarital claimants.
Like the Court in Chenault, I have confidence that Kentucky’s trial courts will be able to detect fraudulent claims of nonmar-ital property and deny them.31 Additionally, I would observe that KRE 301 requires that we give the marital presumption the effect intended by the statute,32 and KRS 403.190(3) places the burden of going forward with the evidence and the risk of nonpersuasion on the nonmarital claimant.33 Placing the full burden of proof on the nonmarital property claimant adequately reduces the risk that a fraudulent claim will escape the fact-finder’s detection. If a claimant fails to satisfy the trial court by a preponderance of evidence that the claimant’s previously owned nonmari-tal property34 is now represented, in whole or part, by a presently owned specific asset, the claimant has not met his or her burden and accordingly will not be assigned nonmarital property.
Although I do not believe KRS 403.190(3) requires a claimant to demonstrate the character of an asset by clear and convincing evidence, I find it significant to this Court’s review of the trial court’s findings that the trial court applied this heightened evidentiary standard in this case. While it is difficult to precisely define any evidentiary standard, “this approach requires the party with the burden of proof to produce evidence substantially more persuasive than a preponderance of evidence, but not beyond a reasonable doubt.”35 Thus, the trial court was clearly convinced by the evidence that Appellee sufficiently established his entitlement to the claimed nonmarital share. As the trial court’s findings are supported by substantial evidence, I would affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respects, including its assignment of nonmarital property to the Appellee.
Finally, I would note that the majority opinion appears to remand the ease to the trial court only for the limited purpose of “reeonsider[ing] the issue of whether the claimed nonmarital share is sufficiently established.” Of course, if the trial court ignores all of the hints in the majority opinion and again finds that Appellee sufficiently established his claim, the trial court would have no reason to reconsider its division of marital property. If, upon reexamination, however, the trial court finds that Appellee failed to rebut the KRS 403.190(3) presumption that the $200,000.00 in question is marital property, it would need to reconsider its previous division of marital property.36 According*828ly, at the very least, if the majority wishes to impose its findings of fact upon the trial court, it should broaden the scope of its remand to allow the trial court to properly divide the marital estate.
LAMBERT, C.J., joins this opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
. See CR 52.01:
In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury ... the court shall find the facts specifically and state separately in its conclusions of law thereon and render an appropriate judgment ... Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of witnesses ....
(emphasis added). See also Largent v. Largent, Ky., 643 S.W.2d 261, 263 (1982) ("The trial court is the finder of fact ..., and the judgment of the trial court may not be reversed unless the findings are clearly erroneous.”).
. Majority Opinion at 64 S.W.3d 821 (2001).
. Id. at 821.
. Chenault v. Chenault, Ky., 799 S.W.2d 575, 579 (1990):
Accordingly, we shall adhere to the general requirement that nonmarital assets be traced into assets owned at the time of dissolution, but relax some of the draconian requirements heretofore laid down. We take this position, in part, in reliance upon the trial courts of Kentucky to detect deception and exaggeration or to require additional proof when such is suspected.
Id.
. Majority Opinion, supra note 2 at 821.
. See Marcum v. Marcum, Ky., 779 S.W.2d 209, 212 (1989) ("[D]omestic cases require a greater degree of deference to the determinations made by trial courts.”).
. Although the trial court evaluated the evidence under a "clear and convincing evidence,” standard, I believe that KRS 403.190 requires only that the trial court be convinced of an asset’s character by a preponderance of the evidence. See infra notes 20-34 and accompanying text.
. Majority Opinion, supra note 2 at 821 ("Based upon the trial court's finding of fraud by Mr. Terwilliger, it appears that Tom was not found to be a credible witness.”).
. Supra note 4.
. Id. at 577:
This Court granted discretionary review of the decision of the Court of Appeals which imposed stringent requirements upon appellant, Ruby E. Chenault, who sought to "trace” the proceeds of nonmarital property at the time the marriage was dissolved. In effect, the Court of Appeals held that at the time of dissolution, a party undertaking to prove the nonmarital character of property must do so by documentary evidence and with near mathematical precision. We believe such a requirement is beyond the mandate of KRS 403.190 and contrary to sound public policy.
Id.
. See Majority Opinion, supra note 2 at 820 ("[Tom Terwilliger] would be expected and/or required to keep detailed and accurate records, and it is certainly reasonable to require him to maintain and to produce records to establish his claims of nonmarital property being injected into the business, beyond backdated notes and unexplained deposit slips for varying amounts.”). It should be noted that Tom Terwilliger's nonmarital claim stems from a settlement he received in a civil case prior to his marriage to the Appellant. The parties were married in 1976 and the final hearing on the division of the parties’ marital property was held in 1997. Thus, after a lapse of time of more than twenty-three (23) years, the majority requires Tom Terwilliger to produce detailed and accurate records to prove his nonmarital property claims. How many people can meet this onerous requirement? Very few, I would posit.
. See Chenault v. Chenault, supra note 4.
. Id. at 578.
. KRS 403.190(3) ("All property acquired by either spouse after the marriage and before a decree of legal separation is presumed to be marital property, regardless of whether title is held individually or by the spouses in some form of co-ownership such as joint tenancy, tenancy in common, tenancy by the entirety, and community property.” Id. (emphasis added)).
. KRS 403.190(3) ("The presumption of marital property is overcome by a showing that the property was acquired by a method listed in subsection (2) of this section.” (emphasis added)); Underwood v. Underwood, Ky.App., 836 S.W.2d 439, 441 (1992) (“This presumption may be rebutted by clear and convincing proof that the property was acquired by, amongst other means, 'gift, bequest, devise, or descent.’ ” (emphasis added)).
. 15 L. Graham & J. Keller, Kentucky Practice, Domestic Relations Law § 15.10 (2nd ed. West Group 2000) (hereinafter “Graham & Keller”).
. Id.
. See Brunson v. Brunson, Ky.App. 569 S.W.2d 173, 176 (1978). See also American Law Institute Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations, § 4.03, Comment (c) (Proposed Final Draft, Part I, February 14, 1997) ("When tracing yields only ambiguous results the property is typically treated as marital.”).
. See Angel v. Angel, Ky.App., 562 S.W.2d 661, 664-665 (1978) ("[W]hen the nonmarital property of one spouse is expended as a part of the ‘team effort’ for the benefit of the marriage, that amount should be considered by the trial court in measuring the contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of the marital property.”); Graham & Keller, supra note 16 at § 15.11.
. Ky.App., 551 S.W.2d 823 (1977).
. Id. at 825 ("The burden is on the Appellant to prove by clear and convincing proof that he acquired his interest by gift.”); Brosick v. Brosick, Ky.App., 974 S.W.2d 498, 502 (1998) ("We recognize that KRS 403.190(3) creates a presumption that all property acquired during the marriage is marital. This presumption must be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence.”); Underwood v. Underwood, supra note 15 at 441 ("According to KRS 403.190(3), ‘[a]ll property acquired by either spouse after the marriage and before a decree of legal separation is presumed to be marital property....' This presumption may be rebutted by clear and convincing proof that the property was acquired by, amongst other means, 'gift, bequest, devise, or descent.' ”); Munday v. Munday, Ky.App., 584 S.W.2d 596, 598 (1979) ("We believe, under the circumstances, it is incumbent on the appellee to furnish convincing evidence that the appellant received the $17,300 or otherwise it will be considered premarital property.”); Adams v. Adams, Ky.App., 565 S.W.2d 169, 171 (1978) ("The question of whether property is considered marital or nonmarital is dependent on whether the property was a gift or was received as a result of consideration. To overcome the presumption that the property is marital, clear and convincing proof must be presented to show that the property was given as a gift.”).
. Underwood v. Underwood, supra note 15 at 445 n. 1 ("The 'clear and convincing evidence’ standard, as used in this context, apparently originated with the Browning case and has since been cited in numerous opinions of this Court.Although we recognize that this standard has been applied in Kentucky for quite some time, we question its validity." (citations omitted) (emphasis added)).
. Id.:
We are unable to see why the division of property in a dissolution of marriage proceeding warrants such a high standard of proof, arising to the same level of importance as the termination of parental rights. Surely the most important issue in any divorce case is the custody of children; yet, we do not require a party to show by clear *826and convincing evidence that living with that individual would be in the child’s best interest. It seems unreasonable then to require a party to rebut the presumption that property is marital by producing clear and convincing evidence.[W]e believe that requiring "clear and convincing evidence” to rebut the "marital property” presumption is improperD....
. Browning v. Browning, supra note 20 at 825 ("The question of non-marital or marital property rests on whether or not the Harkins property was a gift or was received as a result of a consideration.”).
. Id.
. 301 Ky. 694, 192 S.W.2d 955 (1946).
. Browning v. Browning, supra note 20 at 825.
. An "inter vivos gift” is "[a] gift made during the donor’s lifetime and delivered with the intention of irrevocably surrendering control over the property.” Black’s Law Dictionary 697 (7th Ed. 1999).
. Bowman's Adm'rs v. Bowman's Ex’r and Adm’r, supra note 26 at 957.
. Hale v. Hale, Ky. 189 Ky. 171, 224 S.W. 1078, 1079 (1920) ("It is equally true that, since gifts of this character furnish a ready means for the perpetration of fraud, the evidence necessary to establish all of the essentials to complete them must be clear and convincing....”).
. See supra note 4.
. Robert G. Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook § 10.05 at 549 (3rd Ed.1993).
. Id. ("[KRS 403.190(3)] is a clear indication of legislative intent to shift to the party against whom the presumption operates a full burden of proof — the burden of going forward with the evidence and the risk of nonpersua-sionO.”)
. Of course the claimant will first be required to satisfy the trial court of the original ownership of nonmarital property; otherwise, there is no nonmarital property to trace. See KRS 403 .190(2) & (3).
. Fitch v. Burns, Ky., 782 S.W.2d 618, 622 (1989).
. See KRS 403.190(1); Graham & Keller, supra note 16 at § 15.1 ("KRS 403.190(1) requires a trial court to assign each spouse the nonmarital property belonging to him or her. The court may divide marital property between the parties only after that assignment.”); Id. at § 15.11 ("At best, Mrs. Brun-son’s assertion that she made a significant monetary contribution to the marriage would increase her share of marital property.”).