Petitioners are the Helena-West Helena School District, the District’s Interim Superintendent, Rudolph Howard, and Lisa Baker, Principal of West Side Elementary School. They are seeking either a writ of prohibition or, alternatively, certiorari, to prevent the Respondent, the Circuit Court of Phillips County, Arkansas, from further exercising jurisdiction in the instant matter. In support of their petition, they assert that the trial court acted wholly without jurisdiction when it entered a temporary restraining order in this case, because the parties seeking that restraining order failed to first exhaust their administrative remedies. As Petitioners are seeking a writ of prohibition or certiorari, our jurisdiction is pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. l-2(a)(3). We deny the petition.
The facts underlying this case indicate that Jimmy and Coretta Brown filed a complaint in the Phillips County Circuit Court on October 24, 2006, alleging that their two minor children, J.B., age nine, and Y.B., age eleven, both students at West Side Elementary, had been verbally abused and attacked by the school’s principal, Ms. Baker, on or about October 18, 2006, in a confrontation that resulted in the children being escorted from the building and placed under arrest by the West Helena Police Department.1 The complaint further alleged that the Browns were subsequently notified that their two children had been expelled from the Helena-West Helena School District for the remainder of the year. Plaintiffs averred that the expulsion would cause irreparable harm to their minor children and further that they would be denied due process, as they alleged that there was no school board within the Helena-West Helena School District. The Browns requested the trial court to intervene and issue a temporary restraining order enjoining the Petitioners from expelling their children.
On October 31, 2006, the trial court entered an order granting the request for the temporary restraining order, prohibiting any further action related to their expulsion. In addition, the order required that the children be immediately transferred and placed into appropriate classes at Beechcrest Elementary School.
This court issued a stay of the trial court’s October 31 order, pending review of Petitioners’ request for extraordinary relief. On December 7, 2006, this court ordered the parties to this matter to submit simultaneous briefs by December 21, 2006. Petitioners are the only party to have submitted a timely brief.2 We now consider the merits of the instant petition.
As their first point on appeal, Petitioners contend that a writ of prohibition is warranted in this matter, as the Browns failed to exhaust their administrative remedies before seeking redress in circuit court. Specifically, Petitioners contend that no final action has been taken in the matter, as only a recommendation of suspension has been made, and that the Browns failed to avail themselves of the opportunity of two separate hearings before the school board. Thus, according to the Petitioners, the trial court was without jurisdiction to hear the Browns’ complaint. Petitioners further point out that the school district, pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 6-18-507 (Repl. 1999), has the right to expel a student, and that a trial court’s right to review the ultimate decision of expulsion is on an abuse-of-discretion standard, not on a de novo basis, as would be the case here if the Browns were allowed to proceed.
In their initial response to this petition, the Browns argued that extraordinary relief was not warranted, as Petitioners have another adequate remedy available at law, namely an appeal of the trial court’s order granting the temporary restraining order. The Browns are correct. Because an order granting a temporary restraining order is immediately appealable, Petitioners should have filed an appeal from the trial court’s order, as opposed to seeking a writ of prohibition or certiorari.
It is well settled that a writ of prohibition is an extraordinary writ that is only appropriate when the lower court is wholly without jurisdiction. Jordan v. Circuit Court of Lee County, 366 Ark. 326, 235 S.W.3d 487 (2006); Ouachita R.R., Inc. v. Circuit Court of Union County, 361 Ark. 333, 206 S.W.3d 811 (2005); Patterson v. Isom, 338 Ark. 234, 992 S.W.2d 792 (1999). Jurisdiction is the power of the court to hear and determine the subject matter in controversy between the parties. Ulmer v. Circuit Court of Polk County, 366 Ark. 212, 234 S.W.3d 290 (2006); Conner v. Simes, 355 Ark. 422, 139 S.W.3d 476 (2003). In Conner, we thoroughly explained our standard of review for a writ of prohibition and stated:
The writ is appropriate only when there is no other remedy, such as an appeal, available. Prohibition is a proper remedy when the jurisdiction of the trial court depends upon a legal rather than a factual question. This court confines its review to the pleadings in the case. Moreover, prohibition is never issued to prohibit a trial court from erroneously exercising its jurisdiction.
355 Ark. at 425-26, 139 S.W.3d at 478 (citations omitted). In Ulmer, 366 Ark. at 215-16, 234 S.W.3d at 294, we further explained that “writs of prohibition are prerogative writs, extremely narrow in scope and operation; they are to be used with great caution and forbearance.” Simply stated, writs of prohibition should issue only in cases of extreme necessity. Id.
Petitioners concede that they have sought a writ of prohibition even though our case law dictates that a writ of prohibition cannot be invoked to correct an order already entered, see Bates v. McNeil, 318 Ark. 764, 888 S.W.2d 642 (1994), but argue that a writ of certiorari is warranted for the reasons set forth in Conner, 355 Ark. 422, 139 S.W.3d 476. There, we reiterated the standards for determining the propriety of a writ of certiorari and stated as follows:
A writ of certiorari is extraordinary relief, and we will grant it only when there is a lack ofjurisdiction, an act in excess ofjurisdiction on the face of the record, or the proceedings are erroneous on the face of the record. In determining its application, we will not look beyond the face of the record to ascertain the actual merits of a controversy, or to control discretion, or to review a finding of fact, or to reverse a trial court’s discretionary authority. A writ of certiorari lies only where it is apparent on the face of the record that there has been a plain, manifest, clear, and gross abuse of discretion, and there is no other adequate remedy.
Id. at 428, 139 S.W.2d at 479-80 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Thus, it appears from Petitioners’ brief that they realize that they are not entitled to a writ of prohibition, as the trial court has already entered the order granting the temporary restraining order, but instead attempt to avail themselves of a writ of certiorari.
This court has explained that certiorari is available in the exercise of this court’s superintending control over a tribunal that is proceeding illegally where no other adequate mode of review has been provided. Beverly Enters.-Ark., Inc. v. Circuit Court of Independence County, 367 Ark. 13, 238 S.W.3d 108 (2006); Lenser v. McGowan, 358 Ark. 423, 191 S.W.3d 506 (2004). As previously explained, it applies where the proceedings are erroneous on the face of the record and where it is apparent on the face of the record that there has been a plain, manifest, clear, and gross abuse of discretion. Arkansas Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Mainard, 358 Ark. 204, 188 S.W.3d 901 (2004). A manifest abuse of discretion is discretion exercised improvidently or thoughtlessly and without due consideration. Jones Rigging & Heavy Hauling, Inc. v. Parker, 347 Ark. 628, 66 S.W.3d 599 (2002).
While Petitioners’ argument that the trial court was without jurisdiction to entertain the Browns’ complaint because of their failure to exhaust their administrative remedies seems well taken, it is not enough to establish entitlement to extraordinary relief, either in the form of prohibition or certiorari. This court has repeatedly held that prohibition and certiorari will only lie in cases where there is no other adequate remedy available to a party. See Conner, 355 Ark. 422, 139 S.W.3d 476. It is axiomatic that where an appeal is available, another adequate remedy exists. Manila Sch. Dist. No. 15 v. Wagner, 357 Ark. 20, 159 S.W.3d 285 (2004).
In the present case, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order preventing the children from being expelled from school. Such an interlocutory order is specifically appealable under Ark. R. App. P. - Civ. 2(a)(6). See also AJ&K Operating Co., Inc. v. Smith, 355 Ark. 510, 140 S.W.3d 475 (2004) (rejecting the appellees’ contention that the appellants’ interlocutory appeal from the grant of a temporary restraining order was not cognizable under our appellate rules); Three Sisters Petroleum, Inc. v. Langley, 348 Ark. 167, 72 S.W.3d 95 (2002) (holding that an interlocutory appeal from a temporary restraining order is permissible under this court’s rules). Because the relief requested by Petitioners is available through an appeal of the trial court’s order, they are not entitled to extraordinary relief.
A similar result was reached by this court in Weaver v. Simes, 365 Ark. 289, 229 S.W.3d 15 (2006). There, petitioner Johnny Weaver sought a writ of prohibition, mandamus, or certiorari after the trial court entered a temporary restraining order reinstating the former chief of police to his job. This court denied the requested relief, noting that “each of these three extraordinary writs are not available when (1) there is another adequate remedy, such as an appeal.” Id. at 293, 229 S.W.3d at 18 (quoting Wagner, 357 Ark. at 26, 159 S.W.3d at 290). In so ruling, the court noted that the petitioner could raise all the issues he asserted in his emergency petition in an appeal.3
Accordingly, as Petitioners may raise the issues regarding the propriety of the trial court’s order granting the temporary restraining order in an appeal, we deny their request for a writ of prohibition or certiorari.
Before concluding, we note that Petitioners additionally argue that the order entered by the trial court is also deficient on its face, as it fails to comply with Ark. R. Civ. P. 65. Specifically, Petitioners contend that the trial court’s order is deficient in that it makes no finding that Petitioners are likely to succeed on the merits as required by Rule 65.
Again, any issue regarding the sufficiency of the temporary restraining order or its compliance with Rule 65 is one that may be addressed in an appeal. See Smith, 355 Ark. 510, 140 S.W.3d 475 (holding that this court reviews the two essential components of a preliminary injunction: irreparable harm, and likelihood of success on the merits, under an abuse of discretion standard).
Petition denied.
Hannah, C.J., and Brown, J., dissent.Disciplinary records from the school that are included in the record reveal that on the morning of October 18, Ms. Baker encountered YB. and J.B. in the hallway and instructed them to go to the cafeteria. Once in the cafeteria, YB. and another student engaged in a verbal disagreement. Y.B. and J.B. then left the cafeteria and proceeded to Ms. Baker’s office. According to the report filed by Ms. Baker, J.B. slapped her across the face. Y.B. tried to take a tape recorder from her hand and then placed her open palm on Ms. Baker’s nose. The report concluded that the children, who were cursing and yelling, left the office, kicked the emergency bar on an exit door, and left the school building.
Counsel for the Browns tendered a “Second Response and Objection to issuance of Writ of Certiorari” on December 27,2006. As the time for filing briefs had already elapsed, this second response was not timely filed and will not be considered by this court.
In Weaver, this court noted that the petitioner, prior to seeking extraordinary relief, filed a notice of appeal on May 17, 2005, from several orders entered by the trial court, including the January 3,2005, order granting the temporary restraining order, in support of its conclusion that petitioner had an adequate remedy at law available. In the present case, Petitioners have not yet filed their notice of appeal, as this court issued a stay of all proceedings on November 9, 2006. The lack of a notice of appeal does not negate the fact that an adequate remedy at law exists to resolve the issues raised by Petitioners.