Spahn v. Eisenberg

DONALD W. STEINMETZ, J.

¶ 1. Betty Spahn (Spahn) seeks review of a decision by the Circuit Court for Wood County, Judge Dennis D. Conway, denying her request to withdraw artificial nutrition from her sister, Edna M.F. The court held that it was without authority to grant Spahn's request because Edna is not *560in a persistent vegetative state. This case presents this court with two issues:

¶ 2. 1) Whether the guardian of an incompetent person who has not executed an advance directive and is not in a persistent vegetative state has the authority to direct withdrawal of life-sustaining medical treatment from the incompetent person; and

¶ 3. 2) Whether in this case, notwithstanding the fact that she is not in a persistent vegetative state, there is a clear statement evidenced in the record of Edna's desire to die rather than have extreme measures applied to sustain her life under circumstances such as these.

¶ 4. Relying on this court's previous decision in In re Guardianship of L.W., 167 Wis. 2d 53, 482 N.W.2d 60 (1992), we hold that a guardian may only direct the withdrawal of life-sustaining medical treatment, including nutrition and hydration, if the incompetent ward is in a persistent vegetative state and the decision to withdraw is in the best interests of the ward. We further hold that in this case, where the only indication of Edna's desires was made at least 30 years ago and under different circumstánces, there is not a clear statement of intent such that Edna's guardian may authorize the withholding of her nutrition.

¶ 5. Edna M.F. is a 71-year old woman who has been diagnosed with dementia of the Alzheimer's type. She is bedridden, but her doctors have indicated that she responds to stimulation from voice and movement. She also appears alert at times, with her eyes open, and she responds to mildly noxious stimuli.1 According to these doctors, her condition does not meet the defini*561tion of a persistent vegetative state. In 1988, a permanent feeding tube was surgically inserted in Edna's body. Edna currently breathes without a respirator, but she continues to receive artificial nutrition and hydration. Edna's condition is not likely to improve.

¶ 6. Edna's sister and court-appointed guardian, Betty Spahn, seeks permission to direct the withholding of Edna's nutrition, claiming that her sister would not want to live in this condition. However, the only testimony presented at trial regarding Edna's views on the use of life-sustaining medical treatment involves a statement made in 1966 or 1967. At that time, Spahn and Edna were having a conversation about their mother, who was recovering from depression, and Spahn's mother-in-law, who was dying of cancer. Spahn testified that during this conversation, Edna said to her: "I would rather die of cancer than lose my mind." Spahn further testified that this was the only time that she and Edna discussed the subject and that Edna never said anything specifically about withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining medical treatment.

¶ 7. In October of 1994, the Ethics Committee at the Marshfield Nursing and Rehabilitation, the facility where Edna lives, met to discuss the issue of withholding artificial nutrition from Edna. The committee approved the withholding of the nutrition if no family member objected. However, one of Edna's nieces refused to sign a statement approving the withdrawal of nutrition.

¶ 8. On January 12, 1995, Spahn filed a petition in Wood County Circuit Court as guardian of an incompetent person, Edna M.F., asking the court to issue an order confirming Spahn's decision to withhold nutrition from Edna. On January 13, 1995, the court *562appointed Mark Wittman (Wittman) as the guardian ad litem. The court denied Spahn's petition. The case is now before this court on a petition to bypass the court of appeals. However, because both Spahn and Wittman are arguing to withhold nutrition, this court has appointed Attorney Howard Eisenberg as respondent-designate to argue for sustaining the life of Edna M.F.

¶ 9. The issue of the right to terminate life-sustaining medical treatment first came to the national forefront in the controversial case In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976), cert. denied sub nom., 424 U.S. 922 (1976). In Quinlan, Joseph Quinlan petitioned the court to be appointed guardian of his 21-year old daughter, Karen. Karen was in a chronic persistent vegetative state2 and her father sought the express power to authorize "the discontinuance of all extraordinary medical procedures now allegedly sustaining Karen's vital processes and hence her life. . . ." Id. at 651. Because Karen existed in a persistent vegetative state, and there was no hope of her ever recovering from this state, the court granted Joseph Quinlan's requests. Id. at 671-72.

¶ 10. Fourteen years later, the United States Supreme Court considered whether the state of Missouri could require clear and convincing evidence of an incompetent's wishes before authorizing the withdrawal of life-sustaining medical treatment, including *563nutrition and hydration, when the incompetent is in a persistent vegetative state.3 Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). In making its decision, the Court determined that the states have an interest in protecting the lives of their citizens and that that interest is demonstrated, among other ways, "by treating homicide as a serious crime." Id. at 280. On the other hand, the Court notes that ”[i]t cannot be disputed that the Due Process Clause protects an interest in life as well as an interest in refusing life-sustaining medical treatment." Id. at 281. The Court concludes that the rights of the state and the individual must be balanced: "we think a State may properly decline to make judgments about the 'quality' of life that a particular individual may enjoy, and simply assert an unqualified interest in the preservation of human life to be weighed against the constitutionally protected interests of the individual." Id.

¶ 11. The Court upheld the decision of the Missouri Supreme Court to require that a guardian meet a "clear and convincing" standard before terminating an incompetent's life-sustaining medical treatment, including artificial nutrition and hydration.4 The Court explained that these life-and-death decisions *564have great consequences, and that an erroneous decision to terminate cannot be remedied:

An erroneous decision not to terminate results in a maintenance of the status quo; the possibility of subsequent developments such as advancements in medical science, the discovery of new evidence regarding the patient's intent, changes in the law, or simply the unexpected death of the patient despite the administration of life-sustaining treatment at least create the potential that a wrong decision will eventually be corrected or its impact mitigated. An erroneous decision to withdraw of life-sustaining treatment, however, is not susceptible to correction.

Id. at 283-84.

¶ 12. Two years after the Cruzan decision was rendered, this court was faced with a similar case, In re Guardianship of L.W., 167 Wis. 2d 53, 482 N.W.2d 60 (1992). In L.W., this court considered the issue of whether an incompetent individual in a persistent vegetative state has the right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment, including nutrition and hydration. The court further considered whether a court-appointed guardian may exercise that right on behalf of the incompetent patient. This court began its analysis of the situation with an exploration of the possible constitutional rights implicated by these circumstances, and concluded "that an individual's right to refuse unwanted medical treatment emanates from the common law right of self-determination and informed consent, the personal liberties protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, and from the guarantee of liberty in Article I, section I of the Wisconsin Constitution." Id. at 67.

*565¶ 13. This court further concluded that the right to refuse unwanted treatment applies to both competent and incompetent individuals, and that the right of the incompetent to refuse may be exercised by his or her guardian. Id. at 73, 76. The court in L.W. then faced the choice of what standard the guardian should apply in determining whether to continue life-sustaining medical treatment. The guardian argued for a subjective test considering the ward's past values, wishes, and beliefs (the "substituted judgment" standard), and the guardian ad litem argued in favor of the standard upheld in Cruzan requiring "clear and convincing evidence" of the ward's desires. Noting that this court has rejected the substituted judgment standard in the past5 and that the clear and convincing evidence standard would be too strict, this court concluded that an objective "best interests" standard was the appropriate standard to apply when deciding whether to withdraw life-sustaining medical treatment from an incompetent ward in a persistent vegetative state. Id. at 76, 78, 81. The only thing that matters in the decision-making process is what would be in the ward's best interests. Of course, the court noted, if the wishes of the ward are clearly evidenced, then it is in the best interests of the ward to have his or her wishes honored. Id. at 79-80.

*566¶ 14. In sum, this court concluded in L.W. "that an incompetent individual in a persistent vegetative state has a constitutionally protected right to refuse unwanted medical treatment, including artificial nutrition and hydration," and that a guardian may consent to withholding or withdrawal of such treatment without prior approval of the courts if to do so is in the "best interests" of the ward. Id. at 63. However, this court stressed the fact that the opinion in L.W. "is limited in scope to persons in a persistent vegetative state." Id.

¶ 15. Spahn asks this court to extend L.W. beyond its current scope to include incompetent wards who are not in a persistent vegetative state. Spahn notes that in L.W., this court concluded that the right to refuse unwanted medical treatment applies to competent and incompetent people alike, even if there has been no advance directive on the part of the incompetent ward.

¶ 16. In the case In re Guardianship of Eberhardy, 102 Wis. 2d 539, 307 N.W.2d 881 (1981), this court was faced with the request to. authorize a guardian of an incompetent to consent to the sterilization of the incompetent, a mentally disabled woman. The guardian argued that since the competent person has the right to sterilization, that right should not be withheld from the incompetent. This court explained in Eberhardy that even though all citizens have the same constitutional rights, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that "the uninhibited exercise of those rights may be hedged about with restrictions that reflect the public policy of protecting persons of a distinct class." Id. at 572. For example, this court notes that the Supreme Court has recognized that the decision by a minor to have an abortion could be *567circumscribed by action requiring a showing of maturity or "best interests" to make a decision without parental involvement. Id. at 572, citing Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979). Additionally, a state may require a physician to notify a minor's parents before agreeing to perform an abortion. Id. at 572-73, citing H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981).

¶ 17. The Eberhardy court proceeded to explain that the mentally disabled are a similar class to minors in that they are also subject to "special protections of the state" because many mentally disabled adults are "not competent to exercise a free choice." Id. at 573. The court explained that "[w]hile the Constitution would generally mandate a free choice for sui juris adults, a free choice is an empty option for those who cannot exercise it." Id.

¶ 18. This brings us to the situation at hand — whether this court should allow surrogate deci-sionmakers to decide to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining medical treatment from an incompetent adult who is not in a persistent vegetative state. This court in Eberhardy said that for the purposes of sterilization, incompetent people are to be considered "a distinct class to whom the state owes a special concern." Id. at 574. So, although incompetent adults have the same constitutional rights as competent adults, they do not have the same ability to exercise those rights. Someone must instead act in the best interests of that person to make a decision regarding whether to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment. However, if that person is not in a persistent vegetative state, this court has determined that, as a matter of law, it is not in the best interests of the ward to withdraw life-sustaining treatment, including a feeding tube, unless the ward has executed an advance direc*568tive or other statement clearly indicating his or her desires.

¶ 19, One of the main reasons that this court in L.W. limited the scope of its holdings is the fact that The American Academy of Neurology explains that people in a persistent vegetative state do not feel pain or discomfort. L.W., 167 Wis. 2d at 87, note 17. In the case at bar, Edna M.F. is not in a persistent vegetative state and could therefore likely feel the pain and discomfort of starving to death. Even a competent person cannot order "the withholding or withdrawal of any medication, life-sustaining procedure or feeding tube" if "the withholding or withdrawal will cause the declarant pain or reduce the declarant's comfort" unless the pain or discomfort can be alleviated through further medical means. Wis. Stat. § 154.03(1). See also Wis. Stat. § 155.20(4). In the case where withdrawal of life-sustaining medical treatment, including nutrition or hydration, will cause pain or discomfort, then, the competent and incompetent person have exactly the same rights.6

¶ 20. This court has established a bright-line rule in L.W. that the guardian of an incompetent ward possesses the authority to direct withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining medical treatment, including artificial nutrition and hydration, if it is in the best interests of the ward and the ward is in a persistent vegetative state. Spahn now asks this court to extend the scope of L.W. to include those incompetent patients who are afflicted with incurable or irreversible conditions of health. We decline to go down this slippery *569slope, for the consequences and the confusion may be great. One author explains as follows:

While at first euthanasia may be institutionalized only for those in terrible pain, or those who are terminally ill, or those for whom it is otherwise appropriate, the pressure of the allocation of health care resources will inevitably enlarge the class for whom euthanasia is deemed appropriate. Every society has a group who are deemed to be socially unworthy and members of that group — the uneducated, the unemployed, the disabled, for example — will become good candidates for euthanasia.

Barry R. Furrow et al., Bioethics: Health Care Law and Ethics 325 (1991). This court has drawn a bright-line in L.W., and we will not venture down the slippery slope of extending it when there is insufficient evidence of the ward's desires.

¶ 21. Even though Edna M.F. is not currently existing in a persistent vegetative state, if her guardian can demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence a clear statement of Edna's desires in these circumstances, then it is in the best interests of Edna to honor those wishes.7 See L.W., 167 Wis. 2d at 79-80. The reason this court requires a clear statement of the ward's desires is because of the interest of the state in preserving human life8 and the irreversible nature of *570the decision to withdraw nutrition from a person. This court explained the magnitude of this type of decision as compared to other, less permanent, decisions in Eberhardy.

Importantly, however, most determinations made in the best interests of a child or an incompetent person are not irreversible; and although a wrong decision may be damaging indeed, there is an opportunity for a certain amount of empiricism in the correction of errors of discretion. Errors of judgment or revisions of decisions by courts and social workers can, in part at least, be rectified when new facts or second thoughts prevail. . . . Sterilization as it is now understood by medical science is, however, substantially irreversible.

Eberhardy, 102 Wis. 2d at 567-68. Like sterilization, the decision to withdraw life-sustaining medical treatment is also not reversible, because death is not reversible. It is for this reason, then, that we require a guardian to show a clear statement of the ward's desires by a preponderance of the evidence.

¶ 22. We now turn to the case at bar to determine whether there is sufficient evidence in the record to reflect a clear statement of desire by Edna M.F. while she was still competent. The trial court did not make an explicit factual finding as to whether the guardian met this burden. However, it did mention in its memorandum decision that none of the witnesses who *571presented letters and affidavits to the court ever discussed the matter with Edna M.F., and that the only testimony as to Edna's opinions on the situation dates back to 1966 or 1967. Generally, findings of fact shall not be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous, Wis. Stat. § 805.17(2), but in a situation where there are no explicit factual findings, "this court may affirm the judgment if '[a] perusal of the evidence shows that the court reached a result which the evidence would sustain if specifically found.' " Grimh v. Western Fire Ins. Co., 5 Wis. 2d 84, 89, 92 N.W.2d 259 (1958) (citations omitted).

¶ 23. The record speaks very little to what Edna's desires would be under the current circumstances. We know from the record that she was a vibrant woman, a gifted journalist, and a devout Roman Catholic. We know that she was and is loved dearly by her family and friends, and that the majority of them feel that she "would not want to be kept alive" in this condition. We know that in 1966 or 1967 during a time of family crisis, she said that she "would rather die of cancer than lose [her] mind." But we do not have any clear statement of what her desires would be today, under the current conditions. Her friends and family never had any conversations with her about her feelings or opinions on the withdrawal of nutrition or hydration, and she did not execute any advance directives expressing her wishes while she was competent.

¶ 24. There is a presumption that continuing life is in the best interests of the ward. L.W., 167 Wis. 2d at 86. The only evidence in the record of Edna's desires is the general statement she made to her sister in 1966 or 1967. We understand how difficult Edna's illness has been on her loved ones, and we sympathize with their plight, but the evidence contained in the record is sim*572ply not sufficient to rebut the presumption that Edna would choose life. A perusal of the record and the insufficiency of the evidence contained therein supports the result the trial court reached, even though there was no explicit factual finding by the trial court on this issue.

¶ 25. In conclusion, this court declines to extend the scope of L.W. beyond those incompetent wards who are currently in a persistent vegetative state; we will not apply L.W. to those with incurable or irreversible conditions. As such, we re-affirm the decision of this court in L.W. that the threshold at which this court will authorize the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining medical treatment is the point at which trained medical doctors diagnose a patient as being in a persistent vegetative state.

¶ 26. Whether or not a patient is in a persistent vegetative state is a medical, not legal, determination. If Edna M.F.'s doctors determine she is now in a persistent vegetative state and the guardian determines that it is in the best interest of Edna, she may be authorized to withhold nutrition and hydration. As it now stands, however, the facts of this case do not support a finding that Edna M.F. is in a persistent vegetative state. That is the rule of L.W. and we decline to extend that rule.

¶ 27. Consequently, we hold that a guardian may only direct the withdrawal of life-sustaining medical treatment, including nutrition and hydration, if the incompetent ward is in a persistent vegetative state and the decision to withdraw is in the best interests of the ward. We further hold that in this case, where the only indication of Edna's desires was made at least 30 years ago and under different circumstances, there is *573not a clear statement óf intent such that Edna's guardian may authorize the withholding of her nutrition.

By the Court. — The decision of the Wood County Circuit Court is affirmed.

In his testimony at trial, Dr. John Przybylinski, one of Edna M.F.'s doctors, described the mildly noxious stimuli as "either pinching her arm or her leg or rubbing her sternum."

Dr. Fred Plum, the doctor who created the term, defined a person in a persistent vegetative state "as a subject who remains with the capacity to maintain the vegetative parts of neurological function but who. . .no longer has any cognitive function." Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 654. Cognitive function can be best understood as "either self-awareness or awareness of the surroundings in a learned manner." See In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 438 (N.J. 1987).

The Court in Cruzan defined persistent vegetative state as "a condition in which a person exhibits motor reflexes but evinces no indications of significant cognitive function." Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 266 (1990).

We note here that the Cruzan Court did not decide that the liberty interest in refusing life-sustaining medical treatment includes the right to refuse nutrition and hydration. The Court merely assumed so for the purposes of ruling on the proper evidentiary standard in the case. See In re Guardianship of L.W., 167 Wis. 2d 53, 71, 482 N.W.2d 60 (1992).

In the case of In re Guardianship of Pescinski, 67 Wis. 2d 4, 7—8, 226 N.W.2d 180 (1975), this court held that a guardian must act under the "best interests" standard with respect to the ward, and the court explicitly declined to adopt the "substituted judgment" standard.

In the case of In re Guardianship of Eberhardy, 102 Wis. 2d 539, 307 N.W.2d 881 (1981), the court again chose to apply the "best interests" standard to the guardian-ward relationship. See Id., at 566, 567.

Of course, a competent and incompetent person always have the same rights. See generally In re Guardianship of L.W., 167 Wis. 2d 53, 73-74, 482 N.W.2d 60 (1992).

We stress that this right has been limited by the legislature in Wis. Stat. § 154.03(1), which does not permit withdrawal of life-sustaining medical treatment, including nutrition and hydration, if it would cause pain or discomfort unless the pain or discomfort can be alleviated through further medical means.

This court has set out the four relevant state interests that must be considered in making decisions about medical treat*570ment decisions for incompetent people. These are 1) preserving life, 2) safeguarding the integrity of the medical profession, 3) preventing suicide, and 4) protecting innocent third parties. In re Guardianship of L.W., 167 Wis. 2d 53, 90. Preserving life is the most significant state interest at issue here. See id.