(concurring in part, dissenting in part).
I concur in the judgment insofar as it concludes Gleason’s allegations are insufficient to state a claim against the supervisor and, therefore, dismisses the supervisor from the suit. I also concur with this court’s decision that the driver is not immune from suit on the false imprisonment count, but I respectfully dissent from this court’s decision with respect to the remainder of the bus driver’s conduct, which is entitled to official and statutory immunities.
A public official loses the protection of official immunity by committing an act that violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights. Baker v. Chaplin, 517 N.W.2d 911, 914 (Minn.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1077, 115 S.Ct. 723, 130 L.Ed.2d 628 (1995); see Rico v. State, 472 NW.2d 100, 107 (Minn.1991) (concluding official could not have committed willful or malicious wrong because no clearly established law or regulation prohibited actions). This exception to official immunity contemplates more than an intentional act that is subsequently found by a jury to constitute a wrong; instead, it requires an intentional act the official has reason to believe is prohibited. Rico, 472 N.W.2d at 107; see State by Beaulieu v. City of Mounds View, 518 N.W.2d 567, 571-72 (Minn.1994) (inquiring whether official had reason to believe given conduct was proscribed); Stone v. Badgerow, 511 N.W.2d 747, 751 (Minn.App.1994) (recognizing statutory or constitutional right alleged to have been violated must be clearly established such that a “reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right”) (citation omitted), review denied (Minn. Apr. 19,1994).
Gleason alleges the driver falsely imprisoned her by refusing to assist her in exiting the bus. Public officials are not immune from suit in actions on intentional torts because such acts willfully violate another’s clearly established rights. See LeBaron v. Minnesota Bd. of Pub. Defense, 499 N.W.2d 39, 41 (Minn.App.1993) (noting willful nature of intentional torts and concluding they are not protected by official immunity), review denied (Minn. June 9, 1993); see also Blaz v. Molin Concrete Prods. Co., 309 Minn. 382, 385, 244 N.W.2d 277, 279 (1976) (enumerating elements of cause of action for false imprisonment); Durgin v. Cohen, 168 Minn. 77, 79, 209 N.W. 532, 533 (1926) (defining false imprisonment). While the driver alleges the harsh winter weather outside prompted him to refuse to assist Gleason’s exit, Gleason states the driver imprisoned her on *322the bus out of personal animosity. Because Gleason has alleged facts sufficient to raise a genuine issue of the driver’s commission of an intentional tort, the driver is not entitled to immunity from suit on the false imprisonment count in Gleason’s complaint.
Gleason also alleges the driver made belittling comments, failed to secure her wheelchair, refused to transport passengers until a proper tie-down had been accomplished, and called his supervisor for assistance. It is undisputed that the Metropolitan Council Transit Operations (MCTO) regulations provided no guidance on the securing of nontraditional wheelchairs and forbade movement of the bus unless wheelchairs were secured. Therefore, the driver had no reason to believe his waiting for a supervisor to assist with the tie-down was prohibited. Although the driver’s demeanor was allegedly offensive, Gleason’s allegations of ill will cannot defeat immunity where the conduct at issue is an objectively reasonable, authorized act. See City of Mounds View, 518 N.W.2d at 571 (holding analysis of “malicious wrong” requires objective inquiry into legal reasonableness of official’s actions rather than subjective inquiry into malice). Because the driver violated no clearly established law or regulation, his conduct is shielded by official immunity.
The driver is also entitled to statutory discretionary function immunity because, despite Gleason’s complaints about the driver’s conduct, her real disagreement is with the MCTO policies concerning the securing of wheelchairs. See Pletan v. Gaines, 494 N.W.2d 38, 44 (Minn.1992) (concluding plaintiffs claim against school constituted challenge to district’s formulation of bus transportation policy, which is protected by immunity). We cannot second-guess the MCTO’s policy decisions, made on the basis of economic and safety considerations, to provide only for the securing of traditional wheelchairs or to forbid drivers from moving buses before wheelchairs are secured. See Watson by Hanson v. Metropolitan Transit Comm’n, 553 N.W.2d 406, 412 (Minn.1996) (refusing to review MTC’s policy-level decisions concerning security on city buses). Under these circumstances, the trial court erred as a matter of law. I would reverse the trial court’s decision and grant the driver immunity from suit on all counts except the one alleging false imprisonment.