(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I agree with so much of the majority view that holds plaintiff’s challenge to N.Y. Election Law § 131 (McKinney 1971) does not present the Court with a substantial constitutional claim and should be dismissed.
I must respectfully dissent, however, from the decision of my brethren that Judge Moritt has no standing to attack the constitutionality of N.Y. Election Law § 136, subd. 5 (McKinney 1971). If we were faced with a challenge to section 136, subd. 5 solely on the ground it creates an unreasonable burden on the candidate and if by way of relief Judge Moritt were seeking to have his name placed on the Democratic primary ballot for June 20, 1972, I would be more inclined to accept the argument that since plaintiff did not tender at least the 12,000 signatures, he concedes the state could constitutionally require, he has no standing to assert his rights as a candidate. But cf. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 28, 89 S.Ct. 5, 21 L.Ed.2d 24 (1968). Judge Moritt, however, in his prayer for relief does not seek to have his name placed on the ballot, and his amended complaint at ¶¶[ 17, 18 and 19 makes it clear that a second and separate basis for his suit is that section 136, subd. 5 runs afoul of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment because it violates the one-man, one-vote doctrine by diluting the value of the franchise of a large number of voters. Under the circumstances, I do not think we can allow the rights of all the voters to turn on whether Judge Moritt filed the necessary signatures to grant him standing as a candidate to attack the law.
Furthermore, it is clear that a candidate or a political party has standing to assert the rights of the voters. See Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 89 S.Ct. 1493, 23 L.Ed.2d 1 (1969); Socialist Workers Party v. Rockefeller, 314 F. Supp. 984 (S.D.N.Y.) aff’d mem. 400 U. S. 806, 91 S.Ct. 65, 27 L.Ed.2d 38 (1970). Although Judge Feinberg attempts to distinguish Moore on the ground the candidates in that case had filed nominating petitions containing the required number of signatures, those candidates brought their action long before the election and apparently sought an order placing their names on the ballot. Thus, the filing of the nominating petitions would have been a legitimate prerequisite to granting them the desired relief. The Supreme Court, however, refused to expedite Moore and its decision came long after the election, by which time the filing of the petitions had become irrelevant. The Supreme Court, nevertheless, did proceed to the merits of the one-man, one-vote argument since there had been a long history of state enforcement of the challenged law and there was a great likelihood it would continue, despite the fact the candidates could be granted no relief. Accord Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 375-376, 83 S.Ct. 801, 9 L.Ed.2d 821 (1963). We are faced with a similar state policy, see Socialist Workers Party, and the problem will reoccur every time *40an insurgent candidate in one of the political parties seeks nomination. Furthermore, for purposes of standing plaintiff can be viewed as a voter vis-avis a candidate whose franchise has been seriously diluted by section 136, subd. 5 and who is seeking relief. In any event, I think that Judge Moritt either as a candidate suing on behalf of the voters or as a voter, has standing since he has alleged sufficient “personal stake in the outcome of the controversy [so] as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions[.]” Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204, 82 S.Ct. 691, 703, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962); accord, Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968).
Turning then to the merits, Judge Moritt argues that the distributional or geographical requirements of section 136, subd. 5 violate the one-man, one-vote doctrine, Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964); Baker v. Carr, supra, in the same manner as the statutes held unconstitutional in Moore and Socialist Workers Party. Although the figures for all of the 39 congressional districts in the state are not available to the court, the Board of Elections of New York City has been able to compile accurate figures reflecting the number of registered Democrats, Republicans, Liberals and Conservatives for those 16 districts that lie within New York City, and they are set forth and analyzed in the appendix to footnote 1. These figures demonstrate overwhelmingly that the number of registered party members in at least these 16 districts varies widely, and that accordingly registered voters in some districts have considerably more power than voters in other districts.1 While it is true that each' congressional district has approximately 476,725 residents, that figure bears little relation to the number of registered Democrats (or Republicans, Liberals or Conservatives) residing in each district. “Mathematical exactness or precision is hardly a workable constitutional requirement, but deviations from population equality must be justified by legitimate state considerations. Because voting rights require highly sensitive safeguards, this Court has carefully scrutinized state interests offered to justify deviations from population equality.” Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182, 185-186, 91 S.Ct. 1904, 1906, 29 L.Ed.2d 399 (1971) (citations omitted) ; accord, Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 92 S.Ct. 849, 31 L.Ed.2d 92 (1972). Without passing on the question whether a state can constitutionally require a showing of statewide support rather than a purely numerical showing, it is *41clear and defendants concede that “a ‘distribution’ requirement becomes suspect . . . when it gives a voter in one locality greater power than a voter in another part of the States [sic].”2 The justification offered by defendants for section 136, subd. 5 is that the law insures the party’s right to reasonable order and stability. Certainly that is not a compelling state interest which will permit it to quantitatively dilute the votes of part of the electorate to the extent done by section 136, subd. 5. Compare Socialist Workers Party, supra 314 F.Supp. at 990 mth Abate v. Mundt, supra. Clearly if the requirement in Socialist Workers Party, supra, that a party obtain the signatures of 12,000 registered voters of whom at least 50 of each must reside in each of the counties of the state violates the one-man, one-vote doctrine because it invests voters in less populous counties with equal veto power over the nomination of a candidate as that power held by the voters in the more populous counties, then a fortiori section 136, subd. 5 is violative of the equal protection clause since it too makes the franchise of certain voters—registered Democrats residing in districts with relatively low Democratic registration— worth more than that of other voters— those residing in districts with relatively high Democratic registration. Cf. Gray v. Sanders, supra 372 U.S. at 379-380, 83 S.Ct. 801. Since the signatures of registered Democrats play an integral part in the state scheme of public elections and are in fact the sine qua non of an insurgent candidate within the Democratic party who wishes to be placed on' the primary ballot, the equal protection clause mandates voter equality and thus requires in effect a one-Democrat, one-vote principle be applied to a process whereby a candidate petitions to be placed on the ballot. See Seergy v. Kings Republican County Comm., 308 F.2d 459 (2d Cir. 1972).3
Thus, I think Judge Moritt does have standing to attack the constitutionality of section 136, subd. 5 on the grounds it violates the one-man, one-vote doctrine, and in light of the overwhelming evidence that section 136, subd. 5 does deprive voters throughout the state of an equal voice in the acceptance and rejection of insurgent candidates within the political parties, I think the distributional or geographical requirements of section 136, subd. 5 are unconstitutional. See Socialist Workers Party.4
*42APPENDIX TO FOOTNOTE 1
. Section 136, subd. 5 of the election law requires that a candidate obtain the signatures of either 20,000 or 5%, whichever is less, of the voters enrolled in his party in the state. Using the figures supplied by the State, it would appear that this first 5% figure would be applicable only to the Liberal and Conservative Parties since they have less than 400.000 enrolled members in the state. (Democrats : 3,663,201; Republicans : 2,891,716; Liberals: 137,318; Conservatives : 129,017).
There is then a second requirement that provides the candidate must obtain geographical as well as numerical support, i. e., the candidate must obtain the signatures of at least 100 or 5% of the enrolled party members in each of one-half of the congressional districts in the state. Based upon the figures supplied by the Board of Elections, it again appears that the 5% figure applies only to the Liberal and Conservative Parties since they appear to be the only ones with less than 2,000 members in any district. Thus, while a requirement that a candidate obtain a straight percentage of the enrolled party members in each district would not appear to run afoul of the equal protection clause, as far as the Democratic and Republican parties are concerned, an insurgent candidate must obtain 100 signatures in each of one-half of the districts since the 5% figure never comes into play. Inasmuch as there are at least some districts where the 100 signatures requirement is applicable to the Liberal and Conservative Parties as well, the law would not even appear to be valid when limited to the minor parties.
See Appendix to footnote 1.
. Defendants’ Memorandum of Law at 12 (dated May 19, 1972).
. These arguments obviously apply to the Republican Party as well, and to the Liberal and Conservative Parties in those districts where they have in excess of 2,-000 members.
. Judge Moritt also contends that the requirement that a candidate obtain the signatures of at least 20,000 voters enrolled in the candidate’s party is unconstitutional because it unreasonably abridges the right to vote or associate. To avoid confusion, deception and frustration of the democratic process in an election, a state can require some preliminary showing of a significant modicum of support before printing the name of a political organization’s candidate on the ballot. Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 442, 91 S.Ct. 1970, 29 L.Ed.2d 554 (1971) ; accord, Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 92 S.Ct. 849, 31 L.Ed.2d 92 (1972). Similarly the state can require a showing of support for an insurgent candidate within one of the major parties, provided the standards set by the state are reasonable. Cf. Socialist Workers Party, supra 314 F.Supp. at 989. Since Judge Moritt was attempting to have bis name placed on the ballot in the Democratic primary, it was reasonable that he be required to show some support among registered Democrats. New York State having 3,-663,201 voters enrolled in the Democratic Party, a requirement that a candidate obtain the signatures of only 20,000 voters enrolled in the Party would not appear to be an unreasonable burden, especially in light of the approval by the Supreme Court of a Georgia statute that required minority parties to obtain the signatures of 5% of the registered voters in the state in order to place a candidate on the ballot. Jenness v. Fortson, supra. Thus, plaintiff’s challenge to the 20,000 signatures as being so great as to impose an unreasonable burden on the rights of the voters and of the candidates seems without merit.