On June 29, 1984, this court entered an order suspending petitioner, David M. Hus-by, from practicing law in the courts of this state for a period of three years from and after March 26, 1984.1 In entering such suspension order, this court unanimously adopted the recommendation of the Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of the State of South Dakota. This court had referred the matter to the Disciplinary Board for its recommendation after learning that petitioner had pleaded guilty to the offense of unauthorized possession of a controlled substance, a felony and “serious crime” within the definition of SDCL 16-19-36.2
On August 31, 1987, petitioner, pursuant to SDCL 16-19-84, submitted a petition for reinstatement with the Disciplinary Board. The Disciplinary Board conducted a formal hearing and received various evidence in the form of testimony and affidavits. The Disciplinary Board found that petitioner, since his conviction, had “led an exemplary life” and that he had demonstrated “by clear and convincing evidence that he has the moral qualifications for admission to practice in this State.” The Disciplinary Board further found that petitioner had demonstrated, “by clear and convincing proof that he has the competency and learning of law required for admission to practice law in this State and that it will not be necessary that he submit to an examination for additional proof thereof.”
Under SDCL 16-19-84, a disbarred or suspended attorney has:
... the burden of demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that he has the moral qualifications, competency and learning in law required for admission to practice law in this state and that his resumption of the practice of law within the state will not be detrimental to the integrity and standing of the bar or the administration of the justice, or subversive of the public interest.
It is well settled that we are not bound by and need not follow the recommendations of the Disciplinary Board, but such recommendations are entitled to careful consideration. In re Hopp, 376 N.W.2d 816 (S.D.1985); In re Willis, 371 N.W.2d 794 (S.D.1985); In re Rensck, 333 N.W.2d 713 (S.D.1983); In re Kunkle, 88 S.D. 269, 218 N.W.2d 521 (1974), cert. denied 419 U.S. 1036, 95 S.Ct. 521, 42 L.Ed.2d 312 (1974). See generally In re Chamley, 349 N.W.2d 56 (S.D.1984).
We certainly do not minimize the seriousness of petitioner’s conduct prior to the time of his suspension. Arguably, this court was too lenient in adopting the prior recommendation of the Disciplinary Board that he be suspended for only a period of three years, rather than a more severe sanction.3 However, that issue is not a proper consideration at this time.
We agree with and adopt the findings and recommendation of the Disciplinary Board and conclude that petitioner has met *29his burden of demonstrating his fitness to practice law.
Having graduated from the University of South Dakota Law School in 1980 under the “diploma privilege,” petitioner has never taken a bar examination. Although we would prefer to have his legal competence further demonstrated by a successful passing of the bar examination (see Matter of Voorhees, 403 N.W.2d 738 (S.D.1987)), we cannot do so. Under SDCL 16-19-87, that requirement may only be imposed upon those who have been suspended for a period of more than five years.
Judgment will be entered reinstating petitioner to the practice of law. Reinstatement will be conditioned upon his payment of all of the costs of the proceedings involved in his suspension and reinstatement, and upon payment of his membership fees to the South Dakota State Bar as follows: the fee for an inactive member for the years 1985, 1986 and 1987, and the fee for an active member for the full year 1988.
MORGAN, J., and TAPKEN and MILLER, Circuit Judges, concur. HENDERSON, J., dissents. JAY H. TAPKEN, Circuit Judge, sitting for WUEST, C.J., disqualified. RONALD K. MILLER, Circuit Judge, sitting for SABERS, J., disqualified.. This court had entered a temporary suspension order on March 26, 1984, pending proceedings before the Disciplinary Board.
. Petitioner was never adjudicated guilty of this offense. Rather, he received a suspension of imposition of sentence under SDCL 23A-27-13 and complied with the conditions of probation. See SDCL 23A-27-17.
.This Justice was not a member of the court at that time. Justice Henderson did participate and voted for the three-year suspension.