(concurring in part, dissenting in part).
I concur in the property distribution; I dissent on the $500 alimony award unto wife.
JERRY AWARDED MARVELLA AWARDED
Divorce (irreconcilable $500 Alimony (no automatic differences) termination for remarriage, i.e., “open-ended”)
$81,731.83 gross $74,916.27 gross
$44,387.83 net $45,916.27 net
Marvella has excellent health and skills as follows: She is a competent businesswoman; she has good typing and bookkeeping skills; she can cook in a restaurant; she has displayed carpentry ability; she has participated in recent painting, ceiling work, and paneling; educationally, she possesses a high school education. Jerry’s taxable income dropped dramatically due to agricultural hard times, to $5,529 in 1985. Exhibit 9 reflects his net earnings through the first six months of 1986. This equates to $899.30 per month disposable income. With said $899.30, Jerry must pay rent, utilities, food, medical, dental, optometric, and hygiene items for normal living expenses. He has an eighth-grade education. Conclusion: Jerry, if he must pay $500 per month, will not have enough money to live on; $500 is totally unrealistic for his income. This award is not only unrealistic, it is an economic disaster.
The trial court went out of its way to make a finding that there was a general poor farm economy and that it had resulted in a reduction during the last few years of his income. Under all of the circumstances, namely, that Jerry does not have the ability to pay over 50% of his taxable income in alimony, this is a clear abuse of discretion. Goehry v. Goehry, 354 N.W.2d 192 (S.D.1984); Herndon v. Herndon, 305 N.W.2d 917, 919 (S.D.1981) (Henderson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). She is able to make a living in life and so is he. Finding of Fact 10 states: “That both Plaintiff and Defendant are able bodied, in good health, and capable of earning a living wage and both were working full time pri- or to the commencement of the action.” An alimony award here, if any, should have been a rather insignificant supplement to the defendant rather than an economic penalty of gigantic proportions simply because Jerry is of the male gender. This is another instance of “flail the male.”
Actually, Marvella’s advocacy approaches Marxism: Produce, husband, by your ability but distribute according to my (desired) need. “If you earn more, or can earn more, you pay me, proportionately, what you earn.” These quotes aforesaid are mine, not Marvella’s, and represent the depraved economic philosophy attendant. Simply that he has a possibility, through the free enterprise system, of earning more money than she (if the crops are good) in a feed business, is not an equitable or just mooring for alimony. Another domestic theory to advocate, in these divorce cases, is as follows: “Let us even up our income receipts, whatever might be our ability.” In essence, this is the antithesis of the American dream. For, indeed, we are all equal in the eyes of God, as taught to us by the Scriptures; and we are all equal in the eyes of the Law, as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, see particularly the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution (equal protection of the laws), but we are not all equal in ability. When the Declaration of Independence was issued on July 4, 1776,1 it stated, inter alia: “We *575hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.” Therefore, the courts should not become an unwitting tool to any type of Marxist economic philosophy. To do so, would be to foreswear our historical inheritance. If, as suggested by the briefs, she needs $890.50 per month to make a living, she has that ability. She is a strong, healthy, and talented woman; if he is required to pay $500 per month, then this leaves her but $390.50 to earn per month. Such an award strips from her such indefinables as pride in her own work ethic and one of the basics that this country was founded upon: self-reliance. Our constitutional heritage is rarely cited in the law. Rather, emphasis seems to be placed upon statutes and precedent in the courts. Obviously, they are both sources of the law. But any sovereign state, and its judges, if it and they are worth their salt, must refer to not only the national constitution and its express purposes, but also the state constitution which blueprints the path of the law for the lawyers, judges, and courts to follow. I particularly refer, at this time, to art. VI, § 27, of the South Dakota Constitution, which states: “The blessings of a free government can only be maintained by a firm adherence to justice, moderation, temperance, frugality and virtue and by frequent recurrence to fundamental principles.” Self-reliance is an old fundamental principle which brought the settlers and the pioneers through hard times and literally won the West. Pray tell, how does alimony, when you do not need it, fit in with self-reliance? Self-reliance carries a strong indication of independence and of trust in oneself. It suggests courage and backbone. Reliance, in contrast, suggests dependence upon another person or a lack of confidence or one’s own weakness to such extent that external support is required. Reliance implies you must have a clinging hand. Marvella need not cling to Jerry in this case. She needs no external support. It is imposed upon her by the trial court and approved by this Court. It makes her deviate from the fundamental principles that this state and nation were founded upon. Therefore, it serves her ill as a human being. So an award of alimony here is founded more upon Marxist principles than it is upon the fundamental principles of the Pounding Fathers or our state constitution.
I have scoured the findings of fact and conclusions of law, not to mention the Divorce Decree entered herein. There are no findings of fact entered herein upon which to predicate an alimony award. Finding of Fact 17 states: “The Court finds that each of the parties being employed and receiving assets herein shall pay his or her own attorneys fees, costs and tax incurred as a result of this action.” Finding of Fact 18 states: “Each of the parties is capable of and should pay any other debts incurred by the parties after the commencement of this action.” Does this sound like an alimony award should be granted herein? I think not. Out of the blue, with no rationale or substantiation that I can find, is entered Conclusion of Law 6, which succinctly states: “That Defendant is entitled to alimony in the sum of Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00) per month.” Substantively, Conclusion of Law 9 militates against an alimony award in Conclusion of Law 6. It states: “That each of the parties herein are working full time and capable of earning a living wage, have assets and not only have the ability to pay but should pay their respective attorneys fees, costs and tax incurred as a result of this action.” (Emphasis added.) We should all remember, as I have tried to point out in the past, that this entire concept of granting alimony as an incident to divorce arose from English ecclesiastical law. It cannot be questioned that a wife’s need was greater in old England, because a husband was given great control over a wife’s property. A lack of employment existed for women when alimony was birthed. A lack of employment opportunities for married women existed. As I have written in the past, the law and social conditions have vastly changed since *576the days of the ecclesiastical court in England. For a collection of alimony writings in this Court, see Baltzer v. Baltzer, 422 N.W.2d 584, 589 (S.D.1988) (Henderson, J., concurring specially) (48 in all, spanning a period of nearly ten years).
If my previous expressions in this dissent are a form of anti-majoritarianism, with dissents and special writings as a firmament, then to sustain this dissent which is to reverse an unjust $500 alimony award, I now theoretically posit the following dissertation. Criteria have heretofore been established for an award of alimony in this state. See Guindon v. Guindon, 256 N.W. 2d 894, 898 (S.D.1977). Accord: Stubbe v. Stubbe, 376 N.W.2d 807, 808 (S.D.1985). They are: (1) length of marriage; (2) respective earning capacities of the parties; (3) respective financial condition of the parties after the property division; (4) respective age, health and physical condition of the parties; (5) the parties’ station in life and their social standing; and (6) relative fault of the parties in the termination of the marriage. Guindon, id. at 898; Stubbe, id. at 808. The trial judge fastened onto Jerry’s potential gross income as distinguished from his recent net income. There appear to be no findings of fact and conclusions of law which specifically follow the Guindon holding. Example: There is certainly no showing that either one have a certain type of social standing to maintain. It clearly appears that the trial judge determined that the respective financial condition of the parties after the property division was such that the parties had a standard of living as good as enjoyed before the divorce. Hence, this standard within the rule seems to have been violated. The good health that both enjoyed appears to have been considered, but when alimony was awarded, that factor seems to be disregarded. Need I mention that more than half of all married women are in the labor force. See Statistical Abstract of the United States 399 (1985), reflecting that in 1984, 52.8% of married women living with their husbands were in the labor force. Even more astounding figures are demonstrated: 61.1% of separated women and 74.3% of divorced women were in the labor force. 2 H.H. Clark, Jr., The Law of Domestic Relations in the United States, § 17.1, at 223 n. 21 (2d ed. 1987).
Examining the last two decades, Professor Clark points out that married women’s full legal capacity to own and control their own property (unknown when alimony was birthed in England), which has triggered an increased participation in employment outside of the home, creates doubts about the wisdom of alimony generally and particularly about its duration. Clark, supra § 17.1, at 221. I have quoted a Drake Law Review article, R.S. Sackett & C.K. Mu-nyon, Alimony: A Retreat from Traditional Concepts of Spousal Support, 35 Drake L.Rev. 297 (1985-86), before. See Lodde v. Lodde, 420 N.W.2d 20, 26 (S.D.1988) (Henderson, J., dissenting). One of the interesting sections of this law treatise concerns payment of alimony to the husband. “Receipt of Alimony by the Husband: Does Eve Pay Adam?”, Sackett & Munyon, supra, at 319. Why is it that we do not see trial judges in South Dakota awarding alimony to the husband? Is it not supposed to be equal justice under the law? See Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 99 S.Ct. 1102, 59 L.Ed.2d 306 (1979) (statutes allowing only wives to seek alimony inherently risk reinforcing stereotypes about the “proper place” of women and their need for “special protection,” and are unconstitutional). In South Dakota, we have an asexual statute referring to a “party.” SDCL 25-4-41. Legally, under this statute, husbands could secure alimony from an ex-wife. In practice, it does not happen. Why do these awards to ex-wives become automatic? Why do we continue to punish ex-husbands? Here, Marvella is not going to become an economic burden on society. Some states have curtailed or limited by statute alimony awards. Sackett & Mu-nyon, supra, at 301 n. 30 (Delaware, Indiana, Kansas).2 Texas does not authorize alimony awards. However, this Court has consistently liberalized alimony awards *577by its past decisions and it strikes me that we are going against the social conditions of the day and the flow of history itself. Therefore, I respectfully dissent on alimony-
. This historic document is not law per se, but expressed the intention of the representatives of the United States of America, in general Congress assembled, that the colonies ought have the right to be free and independent states, and *575absolved from any allegiance to the British crown.
. I appreciate that this has not been done in this state.