concurring.
Richards essentially argues that the absence of a statute waiving sovereign immunity as to A & M amounts to a denial of equal protection because the legislature has waived sovereign immunity for workers’ compensation retaliation suits under Texas Labor Code Chapter 451, for all state agencies other than the University of Texas and Texas A & M University. I agree to affirm the trial court’s judgment of dismissal for want of jurisdiction.
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
It is axiomatic that sovereign immunity protects the State of Texas, its agencies and its officials from lawsuits for damages, absent legislative consent to sue the State. Federal Sign v. Texas Southern University, 951 S.W.2d 401, 405 (Tex.1997).
Richards asks us to do something we cannot do: write a statute that waives sovereign immunity for employees of A & M who want to sue for wrongful discharge after filing a compensation claim. See Lynch v. Port of Houston Auth. 671 S.W.2d 954, 957 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ ref d n.r.e.) (“Such a drastic and fundamental change [as to abrogate the doctrine of sovereign immunity] should be made, if at all, by the legislature or the Supreme Court.”); see also Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 118 S.Ct. 1428, 140 L.Ed.2d 575 (1998) (Scalia,- J. concurring) (“[T]he Court has no power to provide the relief requested.”).
Richards’ complaint should be addressed to the legislature. Because the legislature has not abrogated sovereign immunity in this context and the Supreme Court has not addressed it, it remains intact.1 The trial court’s dismissal was correct.