dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I would affirm the trial court’s increase in maintenance from $400 to $600 a month rather than remand this case to the trial court for the second time.
Repetitive remands cost the parties to a dissolution several hundred to a few thousand dollars more in additional fees and costs, and should be done sparingly and only for situations that cannot be handled adequately by a review of the record. I do not find this second remand warranted. I find no abuse of discretion by the trial court.
The majority finds it reversible error that the trial court found respondent’s disposable income available for maintenance to be $600 rather than $743. I do not see the need for the expense of a remand because of a simple mathematical calculation that can be done by this court as well as the trial court. Whether respondent’s disposable income is $600 or $743 a month, the issue before a court of review remains whether the $600 a month granted by the trial court is so clearly an abuse of discretion as to require reversal. The majority’s conclusion appears to be premised on the belief that appellant will receive all of respondent’s disposable income as maintenance. I find no law stating that every dollar of disposable income, after deducting net expenses, has to be paid by an obligor to an obligee.
In weighing the factors as to whether the trial court abused its discretion in awarding $600 a month maintenance, it is meaningful that respondent asked for child support, that appellant resisted paying child support, and that the trial court agreed with appellant. The trial court did not have to. The record would support a finding that appellant had the health and capabilities of working full-time for something between $4.00 and $5.00 an hour, as she had in the past. Concededly, that is not a lot of money. However, based on the child support guidelines, the court could have required appellant to pay 17 percent of her net income to respondent as child support. Minn.Stat. § 518.551, subd. 5. Further, the court would have been justified in finding that, even though she chose to go to school, it would still impute to her a reasonable amount of income. See Ulrich v. Ulrich, 400 N.W.2d 213, 217 (Minn.Ct.App.1987); Hopp v. Hopp, 279 Minn. 170, 175-76, 156 N.W.2d 212, 217-18 (1968); Doherty v. Doherty, 388 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Minn.Ct.App.1986). In other words, appellant’s voluntary decision not to work, her resistance to paying child support, and her desire to go on to school, is not binding on a trial court.
The trial court’s acceptance of appellant’s claim that she did not want to be burdened by child support was legitimate, in view of her reasonable efforts to go back to school. But now the trial court’s decision to relieve appellant, the noncustodial parent, of the normal obligation to contribute something to child support is a factor for the trial court to balance in how much monthly maintenance is reasonable. Neither Nardini nor any other case in the State of Minnesota states that if a parent voluntarily relinquishes custody of minor children, voluntarily stays out of the job market, and successfully resists paying child support because of a desire to go back to school, as a matter of law, the custodial spouse must contribute 100 percent to a noncustodial spouse’s living expenses. Depending on the facts and circumstances and how a trial court weighs the evidence, it would be within a trial court’s discretion to grant an obligee 100 percent of those living expenses while going to school. But, I know of no case that says a trial court is required to. However, that is what the majority implies.
The majority attempts to portray appellant as a “Nardini” spouse. I disagree. *233Mrs. Nardini was 56, there had been a 31 year marriage, and she was “ * * * possessed of only a high school education and without special employment skills of any kind.” Nardini v. Nardini, 414 N.W.2d 184, 197 (Minn.1987). Here, appellant is 43, the marriage lasted 23 years, and she is working toward a nursing degree which she will complete at the age of 46. Appellant was so confident of her ability to complete her schooling toward an RN degree that, at the initial dissolution hearing, her chief concern was the amount of temporary maintenance while she returned to school, not its permanency. Both parties wére satisfied that appellant would be self-supporting after graduation. With the nursing job market showing a critical nationwide shortage, appellant will graduate with a truly employable professional skill. None of these facts were present in Nardini.
The facts in this case parallel Hall v. Hall, 417 N.W.2d 300 (Minn.Ct.App.1988), in which this court affirmed a trial court which granted appellant spouse temporary maintenance of $300 per month for 36 months rather than the requested permanent maintenance of $500 per month. Mrs. Hall appealed, claiming it was error not to grant her request for permanent maintenance. In Hall, appellant was 39 years old at the time of the dissolution, had been married for 18 years, and, although employed at the time of the dissolution with a net monthly income of $978.24, the trial court found that appellant Hall had a limited earning ability, and that she wanted to obtain a four-year bachelor degree. Hall at 301.
There was a division of assets in Hall similar to the ease before us. Like this case, the father in Hall had physical custody of the one minor child, and Mrs. Hall was not required to pay any child support, that issue being reserved by the court.
This Court of Appeals in Hall found that Mrs. Hall was entitled to only temporary rehabilitation maintenance, that “there was no evidence that appellant is unlikely to become self-sufficient,” and went on to distinguish Mrs. Hall from Mrs. Nardini. Id. at 303. I also find Nardini distinguishable, and Hall controlling, particularly in view of our limited role as a court of appellate review in scrutinizing the discretion of a trial court on the amount and duration of maintenance. The record here, like the record in Hall, is devoid of evidence that Mrs. Reif “is unlikely to become self sufficient.”
In essence, it appears the majority retried the facts and assessed weight and credibility to the evidence on a de novo basis. Under our accepted standard of review, I do not find the trial court abused the wide discretion accorded to it in assessing the amount and duration of maintenance. Erlandson v. Erlandson, 318 N.W.2d 36, 38 (Minn.1982).