(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I dissent from that part of the lead opinion upholding the admission of the complainant’s hearsay statement to his mother approximately ten hours after the alleged assault. First, I believe that the majority erroneously concluded that the statement was admissible as an excited utterance under MRE 803(2). Second, I believe that the error was not harmless under the reasoning of this Court in People v Straight, 430 Mich 418; 424 NW2d 257 (1988). For these reasons, I would reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for a new trial.
i
Hearsay is “a statement, other than the one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” MRE 801(c). Generally, hearsay evidence is inadmissible unless it fits within one of the established exceptions to the hearsay rule. MRE 802. Exceptions to the hearsay rule are based on factors *559that provide assurances of testimonial reliability sufficient to dispense with the usual means of purging testimony of error and falsehood, i.e., an oath, cross-examination, and the trier of fact’s assessment of the declarant’s veracity. McCormick, Evidence (3d ed), § 245, pp 726-727.
As the lead opinion correctly recognizes, the rationale for the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule is based on the perception that a person who is still under the “sway of excitement precipitated by an external startling event will not have the reflective capacity essential for fabrication so that any utterance will be spontaneous and trustworthy.” 5 Weinstein, Evidence (2d ed), § 803.04[1], p 803-19. The lead opinion also correctly observes that it is the lack of capacity to fabricate, not the lack of time to fabricate, that is the focus of the exception. However, I believe the majority is unfaithful to the important principles that it espouses.
The majority sets forth the following “extraordinaiy” facts to support its conclusion that the complainant’s statement was made while still under the continuing stress of the alleged sexual assault:
When he arrived home at approximately 1:45 A.M., he took an hour-long bath and let the water run that entire time. Afterward, he paced the living room and his mother observed him punching his fist into his hand. At approximately 5:30 A.M., complainant uncharacteristically slept on the couch, though his bedroom adjoined the living room. His mother observed that he appeared to have been crying. At approximately 11 o’clock the next morning, the complainant asked his father and mother separately for a weight bench. His father said maybe, and later, when his mother said yes, but not for three months, complainant broke into tears. When his mother asked what was wrong, *560complainant made the statement in question. We agree with the trial court that these circumstances describe a continuing level of stress arising from the assault that precluded any possibility of fabrication. [Ante, pp 552-553.]
I disagree that these circumstances demonstrate a level of continuing stress sufficient to satisfy the threshold for admission of the complainant’s statement as an excited utterance. While profound hysteria is not required, something more than unusual or “extraordinary” behavior must be evident before one can reasonably conclude that a hearsay declarant spoke under what Wigmore called the “immediate and uncontrolled domination of the senses . ...” 6 Wig-more, Evidence (Chadboum rev), § 1747, p 195.1 I believe the fact that the complainant took a long bath and paced for hours while slamming a fist into his hand is indicative of a person deep in thought, reflecting on the earlier assault. Moreover, the complainant was able to calm himself enough to sleep for several hours. Finally, when he did wake up, he asked his *561parents to buy him a weight bench. This simple question is persuasive evidence of a reflective thought process: if the complainant could convince his parents to buy him a weight bench, he would no longer need to work out in the same establishment as the defendant. Thus, contrary to the majority, I believe these circumstances provide overwhelming proof of the complainant’s reflective capacity.
I also believe that the majority grossly understates the importance of the ten-hour time lapse between the alleged event and hearsay statement in this case. The Court of Appeals found that, although the complainant was still under the stress of the assault, the “statement did not qualify as an excited utterance because . . . the statement was made after there was sufficient time to permit reflective thought.” Unpublished opinion per curiam, decided July 11, 1995 (Docket No. 148757). The majority concludes that this reasoning is “flawed” because “[t]hough the time that passes between the event and the statement is an important factor to be considered in determining whether the declarant was still under the stress of the event when the statement was made, it is not dispositive.” Ante, p 551.
While I agree that the Court of Appeals analysis was overly simplistic, I do not believe it can be said that its analysis was “flawed.” Although not dispositive, temporal proximity is certainly the most important factor of the analysis, for, as time passes, the justification for the excited utterance exception disappears as the emotional excitement of the declarant subsides and his capacity for reflection revives. However, as Weinstein explains, “[Pjhysical factors, such as shock, unconsciousness, or pain, may prolong the *562period in which the risk of fabrication is reduced to an acceptable minimum.” Id., § 803.04[5], p 803-24. There being no evidence in the record that the complainant suffered from any of these factors, I am compelled to agree with the Court of Appeals that the statement was inadmissible because it was made after there was more than sufficient time to permit reflective thought. This is in accord with the case law of this state, from which today’s ruling drastically departs. See People v Gee, 406 Mich 279; 278 NW2d 304 (1979); People v Straight, supra; People v Creith, 151 Mich App 217; 390 NW2d 234 (1986); People v Petrella, 124 Mich App 745; 336 NW2d 761 (1983).2
Also militating against the admissibility of the complainant’s statement is the fact that the statement was made in response to his mother’s persistent questioning. Like the question of elapsed time, whether a statement made in response to questioning should be excluded under MRE 803(2) depends on the circumstances of the questioning and whether it appears *563that the statement was the result of reflective thought McCormick, supra, § 297, p 857. As was stated in Straight:
“Evidence that the statement was . . . made in response to an inquiry, while not justification for automatic exclusion, is an indication that the statement was the result of reflective thought, and where the time interval permitted such thought these factors might swing the balance in favor of exclusion.” [Id., p 426, n 6, quoting McCormick, supra, p 857.]
The record reflects the following scenario. Complainant returned home around 1:45 A.M., but seemed to have a hard time getting in the door. Once inside his mother asked, “Joel, what’s wrong?” to which he replied, “Oh, mom, leave me alone.” Moments later she asked, “Well, Joel, do you want to talk to me?” to which he responded, “No, I can’t.” A short time later she assured him that “[w]hen you want to talk, I’m here.” The following morning, after complainant asked for the weight bench, his mother once again asked him, “what’s wrong?” In response to this question complainant made the hearsay statement in issue, “Oh, mom, I had to be sucked off last night before I can [sic] even come home.”
Had the complainant blurted out the statement immediately after returning home, I might agree, as the majority put it, that the “dam simply broke.” Ante, p 554. However, this is not what happened. The complainant’s mother, observing the complainant’s apparent distress, began questioning him as soon as he got home. He was, however, sufficiently in control of himself to refuse to answer her questions. By the time he finally responded, he had had more than nine hours to formulate his eventual response to her per*564sistent questioning. His behavior during that time suggests overwhelmingly that he possessed the capacity to do so, and that his response was, therefore, the product not of the “uncontrolled domination of the senses,” but rather of reflective thought.3 Thus, I conclude that the statement did not possess sufficient *565indicia of reliability to justify its admission as an excited utterance under MRE 803(2).
n
I also disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the admission of the complainant’s statement was harmless error. The Court of Appeals concluded that the error was harmless because it was cumulative to the complainant’s in-court testimony. The majority correctly points out that the fact that a statement is cumulative, standing alone, does not result in a finding of harmless error. Rather, error requires reversal only if it is prejudicial. People v Mateo, 453 Mich 203, 215; 551 NW2d 891 (1996). The prejudice inquiry “focuses on the nature of the error and assesses its effect in light of the weight and strength of the untainted evidence.” Id., p 217.
In People v Straight, supra, the defendant was convicted of second-degree criminal sexual conduct involving a four-year-old girl. This Court held that the trial judge had erroneously permitted the parents of the four-year-old victim to testify under the excited utterance exception regarding statements made by the victim one month after the alleged assault. In evaluating the prejudicial effect of the improperly admitted hearsay, we stated:
The admission of this evidence being erroneous, we must determine whether a miscarriage of justice has resulted. MCL 769.26; MSA 28.1096. Our inquiry is to the “effect the error had or reasonably may be taken to have had upon the jury’s decision.” Kotteakos v United States, 328 US 750, 764; 66 S Ct 1239; 90 L Ed 1557 (1946). To determine whether the defendant was so prejudiced that reversal is required, we evaluate the prejudicial effect of testimony in the light of other competent evidence. People v Kregger, 335 Mich *566457; 56 NW2d 349 (1953). In light of the emphasis placed on this evidence by the prosecution, we cannot safely conclude that the error did not have substantial influence on the jury’s result. Although the child testified at trial regarding the facts related by her parents, these facts were denied by the defendant. When viewed as a one-to-one credibility contest between the child and defendant, the reinforcement provided by the people’s hearsay evidence may have tipped the scales toward a guilty verdict. In any event, upon review of the whole record, we conclude that the error was such that failure to grant the requested relief would be inconsistent with substantial justice. [Straight, supra, pp 427-428 (emphasis added).]
I believe that our reasoning in Straight applies with equal force to the present case. First, like Straight, this case came down to a one-against-one credibility contest, there being no corroborating evidence of the alleged sexual assault independent of the complainant’s testimony. The majority concludes that the statement was merely cumulative because “the mother’s testimony . . . was replete with evidence of the complainant’s distress upon his arrival home.” Ante, p 555. However, the statement was not offered to prove that the complainant was distressed when he arrived at home. Instead, it was offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, that is, that the sexual assault actually occurred. The complainant’s mother was not present and thus could not testify about the circumstances surrounding the alleged assault. Thus, the statement was not merely cumulative to the rest of her properly admitted in-court testimony.
Second, also as in Straight, the prosecution in the present case used the hearsay testimony to bolster *567the complainant’s credibility.4 The majority concludes that the statement was merely corroborative of the complainant’s in-court testimony because he “had already testified regarding the escalating threats and forced fellatio.” Ante, p 555. However, it is well established that the rule of harmless error with respect to hearsay statements is in no way related to the availability of the hearsay declarant as a witness at trial. People v Hallaway, 389 Mich 265, 278; 205 NW2d 451 (1973); People v Kregger, supra. Rather, the harmless error rule is applied only in those instances where the out-of-court statement has no significant bearing on a disputed question of fact. Hallaway, supra, p 278.
*568When viewed as a pure credibility contest, it strains reason to suggest that the complainant’s hearsay statement had no significant bearing on the main disputed question of fact in this case — the occurrence or nonoccurrence of the alleged sexual assault. The majority’s conclusion that “the defendant’s theory, his denial of the threats and forced fellatio, was [not] eroded by admission of the statement,” ante, p 555, discounts the sensationally prejudicial nature, as well as the likely effect on the jury, of a statement by a sixteen-year-old boy to his mother that “I had to be sucked off last night before I can [sic] even come home.”5 This graphically descriptive statement converted the case from a one-against-one credibility contest into a two-against-one contest, the second witness being the complainant’s mother who, by sole virtue of her motherhood, took the stand cloaked with an aura of reliability that likely moved the jury to conclude that, if the complainant told his mother that the defendant assaulted him, then it must be true. The reinforcement provided by the people’s hearsay evidence likely tipped the scales in favor of a guilty verdict, especially in light of the fact that excited utterance statements are likely to have greater evidentiary value to the trier of fact than in-court statements to the same effect. In holding that the excited utterance exception does not violate the federal Confrontation Clause, Chief Justice Rehnquist made this very point:
*569But those same factors that contribute to the statements’ reliability cannot be recaptured even by later in-court testimony. A statement that has been offered in a moment of excitement — without the opportunity to reflect on the consequences of one’s exclamation — may justifiably carry more weight with a trier of fact than a similar statement offered in the relative calm of the courtroom. [White v Illinois, 502 US 346, 355-356; 112 S Ct 736; 116 L Ed 2d 848 (1992).]
Upon review of the entire record, I cannot safely conclude that complainant’s statement did not have a substantial effect on the jury’s decision. I believe the error to be of a kind that the failure to grant relief has resulted in a miscarriage of justice, and, thus, would reverse the defendant’s conviction and remand for a new trial.
Cavanagh and Kelly, JJ., concurred with Brickley, J.The classic statement of the reason underlying this exception is that of Wigmore:
This general principle is based on the experience that, under certain external circumstances of physical shock, a stress of nervous excitement may be produced which stills the reflective faculties and removes their control, so that the utterance which then occurs is a spontaneous and sincere response to the actual sensations and perceptions already produced by the external shock. Since this utterance is made under the immediate and uncontrolled domination of the senses, and during the brief period when considerations of self-interest could not have been brought fully to bear by reasoned reflection, the utterance may be taken as particularly trustworthy (or at least as lacking the usual grounds of untrustworthiness), and thus as expressing the real tenor of the speaker’s belief as to the facts just observed by him; and may therefore be received as testimony to those facts. Id.
The prosecution cites several cases from other jurisdictions that have upheld as excited utterances statements made quite long after the startling event. However, in each of these cases the declarant possessed certain “physical factors, such as shock, unconsciousness or pain,” which Weinstein states are a prerequisite for admission of an excited utterance after a significant lapse of time. See, e.g., State v Starcevich, 139 Ariz 378; 678 P2d 959 (1983) (a statement by a rape victim made approximately nine hours after the sexual assault was properly admitted where the victim was severely injured in the assault); State v Crowhurst, 470 A2d 1138 (RI, 1984) (a rape victim’s statement three hours after an assault was properly admitted where the victim was crying, bruised, disheveled, and in shock); Mills v State, 626 SW2d 583 (Tex App, 1981) (a prosecutrix’ statement was admissible as an excited utterance six to eight hours after a rape where the statement was made almost immediately after she had left the presence of the armed defendant). Today’s ruling is beyond the outer fringe of excited utterance cases in terms of its admission of a statement made approximately ten hours after the startling event where there is no evidence of serious physical or emotional trauma.
The majority’s attempt to distinguish Straight is unavailing: “Unlike the questioning in Straight, the mother’s inquiries of the complainant when he arrived home and the following morning were not suggestive.” Ante, p 553. However, our reversal in Straight was not predicated on the suggestiveness of the questioning, but, rather, on the one-month time lapse, and, as in the present case, the frequency of the mother’s questioning. In fact, the mother’s questioning in Straight was no more suggestive than in this case:
“Q. Could you tell us how this developed, who said what and when?
“A. First I started in on her about, ‘[R_(the child)], what is wrong with you? Why do you keep throwing up? Why do you keep waking up and shaking. Tell me what is wrong with you.’
“So she just, you know, kept on looking up at me really scared and she wouldn’t say anything and I just looked over at [her father] and I said, ‘[G_], you’ve got to do something with her. I can’t find out what’s wrong with her.’ And so he looked at her and said, ‘[R_], tell us what happened right now.’ And that is when she come out and said something and I said, ‘Did Bill do anything to you?,’ and she said yes — do you want me to go ahead and say it?
“Q. That is right. We are all adults here, we want to hear it.
“A. She said, ‘Yes, Bill put his fingers inside me,’ and I said, ‘What else did he do?,’ and she said, ‘he told [T_ (another child)], to go get a fork so that he could eat me.’ And [T_] was downstairs when I came home that night so she said that [T_] went and got a fork out of the cupboard so that he could eat [R_].
“Q. Okay. Is that basically what she told you in front of your husband?
"A. Yes.” [People v Straight, supra, p 421, n 1.]
The majority loses sight of the crucial question, which is whether the declarant was still under the stress of the event so that his statement could not possibly be the result of fabrication, intervening actions, or the exercise of choice or judgment. Whether the declarant in fact fabricated his statement, or whether he at least possessed the motive to fabricate, is irrelevant to the MRE 803(2) excited utterance determination.
Michigan law has long proscribed the use of a prior consistent statement to bolster the credibility of a witness. As Justice Brennan wrote in People v Hallaway:
Hearsay is defined as an extra-judicial statement which is offered for the purpose of proving the truth of the thing said. While some writers have suggested that the hearsay rule need not be applied to the extra-judicial statements of a declarant, who later testifies as a witness, this Court has not recognized such an exception to the hearsay rule. Of course, prior inconsistent statements of a witness can be shown for impeachment purposes. But this is not properly an exception to the hearsay rule. Prior inconsistent statements are not admissible to prove the truth of the thing said. They are offered, rather, to prove that the inconsistent statement was in fact made, irrespective of its truth, for the purpose of impeaching contrary testimony from the witness stand. Where the prior extrajudicial statement of a witness agrees with his testimony, the out-of-court remark is self-serving, and is not generally permitted under any established exception to the hearsay rule. [389 Mich 265, 275-276; 205 NW2d 451 (1973) (emphasis supplied); see also Stewart v People, 23 Mich 63 (1871).]
Where, as in the present case, the occurrence of the event described by the hearsay statement was a hotly contested issue of fact, the people should not have been permitted to bolster the testimony of their witness with his extrajudicial statement to his mother. Hallaway, supra, p 279; see also People v Cunningham, 398 Mich 514, 522; 248 NW2d 166 (1976). The admission of the complainant’s prior consistent statement was prejudicial and constituted error requiring reversal. Id.
The prosecutor conceded at oral argument that this was the single most extraordinary statement he had ever heard uttered in a criminal case.