(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. Minn.Stat. § 611A.04, subd. 1(a) (1996) allows crime victims to receive restitution for “out-of-pocket losses resulting from the crime.” I do not believe that the legislature intended this language to allow cart blanche reimbursement for any loss, however remotely associated with the crime.
Our primary objective in interpreting and construing “laws is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.” Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (1996). A fundamental rule of statutory construction is that a court should look first to the specific statutory language and be guided by its “natural and most obvious” meaning. Heaslip v. Freeman, 511 N.W.2d 21, 22 (Minn.App.1994), review denied (Minn. Feb. 24, 1994). The language of section 611A.04, subd. 1(a) limits restitution to a loss “resulting from the crime.” At a minimum, then, the loss must have a causal connection to the crime. As in no-fault automobile insurance and workers’ compensation cases, which allow receipt of benefits for injuries “arising out of’ the use of an automobile or “arising out of’ employment, the loss in the restitution context must necessarily have a causal connection to the crime. See Minn.Stat. §§ 65B.44, subd. 1 (1996) (allowing basic economic loss benefits for injuries “arising out of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle”); 176.021, subd. 1 (1996) (allowing compensation for workers’ injuries “arising out of and in the course of employment”). Here, Txawj Xiong’s voluntary participation in the Hu Plig ceremony did not “result from” the crime.
Additionally, the language allowing restitution for “out-of-pocket losses” provides a further limitation to recovery. “Out-of-pocket losses” are limited to economic losses that include “medical and therapy costs, replacement of wages and services, * * * funeral expenses.” Minn.Stat. § 611A.04, subd. 1(a). Athough the trial court found the Hu Plig ceremony to be “therapy,” the record demonstrates that only a portion of the Hmong community believes in its efficacy and that the victim, Txawj Xiong, participated in the ceremony only “to bring back the luck,” not because he believed it was therapeutic. Moreover, the Hu Plig ceremony, which involves ritualistic animal slaughter, is not recognized as “therapy” by the scientific community and therefore could not have been contemplated by the legislature in enacting the restitution statute. See School Sisters of Notre Dame at Mankato, Minnesota, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 476 N.W.2d 523, 525 (Minn.App.1991) (where statute indicates general language relating to enumeration of specific subjects, general language presumed to include only subjects similar to those enumerated); cf. Lynch v. Alworth-Stephens Co., 267 U.S. 364, 370, 45 S.Ct. 274, 275-76, 69 L.Ed. 660 (1925) (“plain, obvious and rational meaning of a statute is always to be preferred to any curious, narrow, hidden sense that nothing but the exigency of a hard *4case and the ingenuity and study of an acute and powerful intellect would discover”). Thus, I disagree with the majority’s view that the language of the restitution statute is “broad” or that the trial court may apply its discretion to allow restitution irrespective of the plain language of the statute. I would therefore reverse the district court’s decision to allow restitution for the costs of the Hu Plig ceremony.