Barbara Montgomery, as personal representative of the estate of Harold Edward *526Montgomery, brought suit against John Michael Montgomery, Harold’s son. In the suit, Barbara claimed that John Michael had violated Harold’s common-law and statutory right of publicity by using Harold’s voice and likeness in a music video. The trial court granted summary judgment in John Michael’s favor. The Court of Appeals affirmed. We conclude that the right of publicity does not apply in this case and, therefore, affirm.
FACTS
Harold E. Montgomery was a musician in and around Garrard County in Central Kentucky. He wrote several songs that were recorded in small recording studios. Harold performed alone and with other musicians over a period of years at festivals in his local area. While he rarely appeared outside the Commonwealth of Kentucky, he did twice venture to Nashville, Tennessee, where he recorded a song entitled, “Let Me Be Young Again,” and appeared on a local television show.
John Michael Montgomery, Harold’s son by Harold’s first wife, is a nationally-known country music star. With Harold’s encouragement, John Michael took an early interest in country music. The two formed an extraordinary bond.
Harold married Barbara Rogers in 1988. About the same time, John Michael began to rise to the apex of country music, both in song writing and performance. While his fame and success eclipsed his father’s, apparently his efforts at achieving it did not. By all accounts, Harold passionately pursued his music career, but never made it to the top. It was through his son that Harold realized his dreams of stardom.
Harold was diagnosed with cancer in 1993 and died in 1994. Barbara was the sole beneficiary of his estate under his will and was named as executrix thereof. She settled the estate informally and expeditiously.
In February 1997, John Michael released his fourth album, which contains the song entitled, “I Miss You a Little.” The song is a tribute to Harold. Additionally, a music video of the song was released shortly afterwards. The video lies at the center of the controversy in this case. As found by the trial court, the music video is four minutes and twenty-seven seconds (4:27) long and Harold Montgomery’s “likeness” appears in approximately thirty (30) seconds of the video as follows: (1) Harold is heard singing, “Let Me Be Young Again”; (2) Harold’s gravestone appears; (3) a forty-five rpm record of “Let Me Be Young Again” bearing Harold’s name appears; (4) a picture of Harold and John Michael performing together appears; (5) an article headed “John Michael is living out his father’s dream” appears; (6) a picture of Harold performing appears; (7) Harold’s gravestone appears a second time; (8) a second picture of John Michael and Harold performing together appears; and (9) the closing dedication states, “This song is written in memory of my father, Harold E. Montgomery.” John Michael did not get permission from his father’s estate to reproduce Harold’s images or vocalizations contained in the music video.
The music video first aired nationally on or about March 3, 1997. Thereafter, Barbara, as executrix of Harold Montgomery’s estate, filed suit claiming among other allegations that the use of Harold’s likeness in the video violated his estate’s common-law and statutory right of publicity.
The trial court granted summary judgment in the defendants’ favor on October 5, 1998. In so doing, the trial court found in pertinent part that the common-law right of publicity is not inheritable and that Harold was not a “public figure” with*527in the meaning of KRS 391.170. Specifically, the trial court concluded that a “public figure” was a person who had attained “national celebrity status” within his lifetime.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s finding that the common-law right of publicity is not inheritable. But instead of examining whether there is a common-law right of publicity that is distinct from the common-law right of privacy established by this Court in McCall v. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times,1 the Court of Appeals assumed that the right of publicity was subsumed in the appropriation prong of the right of privacy, which provides: “The right of privacy is invaded by ... appropriation of the other’s name or likeness....”2 The Court of Appeals held that the common-law right of privacy is not inheritable.
The Court of Appeals rejected the trial court’s definition of a “public figure” as too narrow. Still, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling. It formulated its own definition and held that Harold’s name and likeness did not have “significant commercial value.”
On appeal to this Court, Barbara has abandoned her common-law claims. Her arguments focus solely on allegations of error in interpreting KRS 891.170 by the courts below. Thus, Barbara’s common-law claims are not at issue in this case. Therefore, we do not address or decide in this opinion: (1) whether there exists in the Commonwealth a common-law right of publicity that is distinct from the common-law right of privacy; (2) whether the common-law right of publicity (if it exists) is inheritable; or (3) whether any or all of the rights embraced by the right of privacy are inheritable.
STATUTORY RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
The only issue before us concerns the proper construction of KRS 391.170, which creates a posthumous right of publicity and provides:
(1) The General Assembly recognizes that a person has property rights in his name and likeness which are entitled to protection from commercial exploitation. The General Assembly further recognizes that although the traditional right of privacy terminates upon death of the person asserting it, the right of publicity, which is a right of protection from appropriation of some element of an individual’s personality for commercial exploitation, does not terminate upon death.
(2) The name or likeness of a person who is a public figure shall not be used for commercial profit for a period of fifty (50) years from the date of his death without the written consent of the executor or administrator of his estate.
The trial court’s ruling turned on its interpretation of the term “public figure,” as: “one who has vigorously sought the attention of a national audience and has achieved such a level of success that he is considered a national celebrity.” The Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial court on this issue and implied that the trial court’s definition was too narrow. Rather, the Court of Appeals concluded that a “public figure” was a person whose name and likeness had a “significant commercial value” and affirmed the trial court on grounds that Harold’s name and likeness did not reach this threshold. We need not determine the correct definition of “public figure,” because, as a matter of *528law, neither Harold’s voice nor image was appropriated for “commercial profit” within the meaning of statute in the music video of John Michael’s song “I Miss You a Little.”
While the right of publicity at issue in this case is statutory, we believe that many of the principles of the common-law right of publicity can be used in reaching the proper construction of KRS 391.170.3
COMMON LAW RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
The common-law right of publicity evolved from the appropriation prong of the right of privacy.4 But “it is a distinct cause of action intended to vindicate different interests.”5 As originally postulated, the right of privacy protects one’s right “to be let alone.”6 Whereas the right of publicity protects the right to control the commercial value of one’s identity.7 The appropriation prong of the invasion of privacy originally sought to compensate for the emotional distress accompanied by the unauthorized use of one’s likeness and identity.8 But as the tort has evolved, it is clearly the commercial interests in one’s identity that the appropriation prong of tort serves to protect the most.9 Further, as is stated in KRS 391.170, the interest protected is considered a property right.10 Thus, as the torts have evolved, the main differences between the appropriation prong of the right of privacy and the right of publicity concern questions of transferability and survivability.11 Because the interests protected are nearly identical, our discussion below — which concerns the reach of the protection of one’s commercial interests provided by both the common-law rights of publicity and privacy — refers only to the right of publicity.
WHETHER BARBARA’S CLAIM IS ACTIONABLE
Both the common-law right of publicity and the statutory right created by KRS 391.170 can be read broadly to protect a wide variety of uses of a person’s (or public figure’s) identity. But the right of publicity is fundamentally constrained by federal and state constitutional protection of the freedom of expression.12 Thus, the “use of a person’s identity primarily for the purpose of communicating information or expressing ideas is not generally actionable as a violation of the person’s right of publicity.”13 In order to determine whether a person’s right of publicity has been appropriated, “the context and nature of the use is of preeminent concern.” 14
*529In this case, Harold’s name, image, and voice were used in a music video. “Music, as a form of expression and communication, is protected under the First Amendment.”15 Likewise, “[ejntertainment ... is protected; motion pictures, programs broadcast by radio and television, and live entertainment, such as musical and dramatic works, fall within the First Amendment guarantee.”16 Therefore, we have little difficultly in concluding that the music video in question is protected free expression under the U.S. and Kentucky Constitutions. Thus, under the general rule, Barbara’s right of publicity claim is not actionable. Like all rules, an exception exists, but it does not apply in this instance.
The use of a person’s name or likeness or other interest protected by the right of publicity may be actionable when used within a work that enjoys First Amendment protection, if the use is not sufficiently related to the underlying work,17 or, if the otherwise constitutionally-protected work is “simply disguised commercial advertisement for the sale of goods or services.” 18 In this case, the use of Harold’s likeness is intimately related to the underlying work (the song and music video are both a tribute to him) and the music video itself is not a disguised commercial advertisement for the sale of compact discs of either the single, “I Miss You A Little,” or the album upon which it appears. This remains true even though music videos can be and are viewed as promotional films for the sale of music.19
Most creative works are produced for sale and profit. This, of course, includes the songs that underlie music videos. While music videos are not produced primarily for the sale of the video but, rather, the underlying song, this does not strip them of their First Amendment protection. Music videos are in essence mini-movies that often require the same level of artistic and creative input from the performers, actors, and directors as is required in the making of motion pictures.20 Moreover, music videos are aired on television not as advertisements but as the main attraction, the airing of which, consequently, is supported by commercial advertisements. Simply put, the commercial nature of music videos does not deprive them of constitutional protection.
The fact that a person’s likeness is used in a constitutionally-protected work to create or enhance profits does not make the use actionable.21 Nor does the use of that person’s name or likeness in an advertisement or promotion for the underlying work infringe upon a person’s right of publicity.22 To put it another way, John *530Michael — -without either the consent or approval of Harold’s estate — could have produced a film biography of his father23 and promoted the film using Harold’s name and likeness24 without violating Harold’s estate’s right of publicity (assuming it exists under the statute). He can do the same in a music video. Accord, Parks v. LaFace Records.25
In Parks, the music group Outkast included a song entitled “Rosa Parks” on one of its albums, without Ms. Parks’ permission.26 In 1955, Parks made a famous and heroic stance against racial inequality by refusing to give up her seat to a white person and move to the back of a bus. This single act of defiance sparked a bus boycott that ended segregation on public transportation in Montgomery, Alabama, which in turn was an important precursor to the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s. Parks brought suit alleging inter alia that the use of her name violated her common-law right of publicity.27
After concluding that both the song and the song’s title were entitled First Amendment protection, the district court stated, “The right of publicity is ... inapplicable under the First Amendment if the content of an expressive work bears any relationship to the use of a celebrity’s name.”28 Upon review of the song, the district court found that there was an obvious metaphoric and symbolic relationship between the lyrics of the song, which contained numerous references to going to the back of the bus, and its title, “Rosa Parks.”29 The district court then found, as a matter of law, that Parks’ right of publicity claim was not applicable.30 The district court further concluded the fact that Outkast profited from the sale of the song and album and heavily promoted the single, “Rosa Parks,” did not affect this result.31
Like the song title “Rosa Parks” and its lyrics, there exists a genuine connection between the use of Harold’s name likeness in the music video “I Miss You a Little” and the song of the same name. Thus, we hold as a matter of law that Barbara Montgomery’s right of publicity claim, which was brought under KRS 391.170 on behalf of Harold Montgomery’s estate, is inapplicable in this case.
For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the Court of Appeals.
LAMBERT, C.J.; COOPER, GRAVES, and WINTERSHEIMER, JJ., concur. KELLER, J., dissents by separate opinion, with STUMBO, J., joining that dissenting opinion.. Ky., 623 S.W.2d 882(1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 975, 102 S.Ct. 2239, 72 L.Ed.2d 849 (1982). 2. Id. at 887.
. See Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 46 comment a.
. Id. at comment b.
. Steven M. Fleischer, The Right of Publicity: Preventing an Identity Crisis, 27 N. Ky. L.Rev. 985, 988 (2000) (emphasis added).
. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandéis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L.Rev. 193, 195 (Dec. 15, 1890).
. Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 Law & Contemp. Probs. 203-04 (1954).
. See, e.g., Foster-Milbum Co. v. Chinn, 134 Ky. 424, 120 S.W. 364, 365 (1909).
. Restatement (Second) of Torts 652C comment a.
. Id.
. Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 47 comment b.
. See, e.g., Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F.Supp. 426, 430 (S.D.N.Y.1978).
. Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 47 comment b.
. Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Productions, 25 Cal.3d 860, 160 Cal.Rptr. 352, 603 P.2d 454, 457 (Ca.1979) (Bird, C.J., concurring).
. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 2753, 105 L.Ed.2d 661, 674 (1989).
. Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65, 101 S.Ct. 2176, 2180, 68 L.Ed.2d 671, 678 (1981).
. Titan Sports, Inc. v. Comics World Corp., 870 F.2d 85, 87-88 (2nd Cir.1989).
. Frosch v. Grosset & Dunlap, 75 A.D.2d 768, 427 N.Y.S.2d 828, 829 (1980).
. Brittanica.com at http://www.brittani-ca.com/seo/m/music-video (May 31, 2001).
. See Deborah Rouse, The Artistic Realm of Music Video, American Visions, June, 2000, available at htte://www.findarti-cles.com/cL0/ml546/3_15/ 62724398/ print.jhtml.
. See, e.g., Stephana v. News Group Publications, Inc., 64 N.Y.2d 174, 485 N.Y.S.2d 220, 474 N.E.2d 580, 585 (1984).
. See, e.g., Guglielmi, 160 Cal.Rptr. 352, 603 P.2d at 462 (“It would be illogical to allow respondents to exhibit the film but effectively preclude any advance discussion or promotion of their lawful enterprise.”)
. See, e.g., Seale v. Gramercy Pictures, 949 F.Supp. 331, 338 (E.D.Pa.1996) (Use of Bobby Seale’s name and likeness in the film "Panther” did not violate Seale's right of publicity.).
. See, e.g., Guglielmi, 160 Cal.Rptr. 352, 603 P.2d at 462.
. Parks v. LaFace Records, 76 F.Supp.2d 775 (E.D.Mich.1999).
. Id. at 778.
. Id. at 779.
. Id. at 780, citing Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1004 (2nd Cir.1989).
. Id.
. Id.
. Id. at 781.
. Id.