dissenting. We need go no further than the plain language of RSA 262:23,1 (2004) (amended 2006) to reject the defendant’s argument. See State v. Comeau, 142 N.H. 84, 86 (1997) (‘When a statute’s language is plain and unambiguous, we need not look beyond the statute for further indications of legislative intent.” (quotation omitted)). The statute makes habitual offenders eligible for home incarceration “only . . . once per lifetime.” The defendant here pleaded guilty and was sentenced on two separate indictments. To sentence her to home confinement on both indictments would require the court to sentence her twice, not once. Thus, even though the court would have the discretion to make the sentences concurrent and could sentence her on the first indictment to home confinement, the “once per lifetime” option is no longer available on the second indictment. I respectfully dissent.