dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the portion of the Majority’s decision, which remands this case to the PCRA court for preparation of a more detailed opinion regarding that court’s grant of a new trial on Appellee’s Brady1 claim. While the *591PCRA court’s opinion2 lacks a comprehensive discussion of the individual components of a Brady claim, further elaboration is unnecessary because it is self-evident that the PCRA court believed Appellee was prejudiced by the Commonwealth’s failure to disclose evidence impeaching the testimony of two jailhouse informants. The PCRA court found that the jailhouse informants’ testimony, which established that Appellee confessed to the murder, was the “crux of the Commonwealth case” against Appellee, and that the credibility of such witnesses was, consequently, of “grave importance.” PCRA Court Findings of Fact, 10/31/2007, at No. 6. It described the Commonwealth’s withholding of impeachment evidence as “outrageous,” and concluded, “without any hesitation,” that Appellee was entitled to a new trial. PCRA Court Opinion, 7/31/2007, at 1-2. Thus, it is clear that the PCRA court believed that, had the Commonwealth disclosed the impeachment evidence to the defense, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different. A remand for the PCRA court to state expressly what is obvious from its ruling is simply unwarranted.
Moreover, while emphasizing that our Court “express[es] no view as to the merits of Appellee’s Brady claim,” Op. at 587, 986 A.2d at 817, the Majority nevertheless proceeds to find that the PCRA court’s conclusion that the informants’ testimony was the crux of the Commonwealth’s case “is erroneous as it is not supported by the record.” Id. at 586, 986 A.2d at 816. Further, it opines that the damaging testimony against Appellee from Sharon Pearson3 “would not be impacted by disclosure of the impeachment evidence casting doubt on the reliability of [jailhouse informants] Wright and Tribuiani.” Id. Upon review of the record, I disagree with these assessments. *592As explained in detail infra, I believe that the evidence presented at trial was equally consistent with both the prosecution’s theory of the case and the defense asserted by Appellee. Thus, the jailhouse informants’ testimony that Appellee had confessed to the murder became of paramount importance. Accordingly, as the PCRA court’s ruling on Appellee’s Brady claim is supported by the record and is free of legal error, under this Court’s well-established standard of review, the lower court’s grant of a new trial should be affirmed. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 600 Pa. 329, 966 A.2d 523, 532 (2009) (holding that we must affirm the order of the PCRA court if the facts as found by the court are supported by the record, and the legal conclusions drawn therefrom are free from legal error).
“[T]o establish a Brady violation, a defendant is required to demonstrate that exculpatory or impeaching evidence, favorable to the defense, was suppressed by the prosecution, to the prejudice of the defendant.” Commonwealth v. Ly, 980 A.2d 61, 75 (Pa.2009) (citing Commonwealth v. Gibson, 597 Pa. 402, 951 A.2d 1110, 1126 (2008)). “To satisfy the prejudice inquiry, the evidence suppressed must have been material to guilt or punishment.” Id. at 76 (citing Gibson, 951 A.2d at 1126-1127 (Pa.2008)). Materiality, in turn, “extends to evidence affecting the credibility of witnesses, rather than merely to purely exculpatory evidence.” Id. Finally, “[fjavorable evidence is material, and constitutional error results from its suppression by the government, if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. (citing Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433-34, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Here, the record establishes that jailhouse informants Samuel Tribuiani and Kermeth Wright actively sought favorable treatment in exchange for their testimony that Appellee confessed to murdering Barbara Bruzda. The record further establishes that, in accordance with their request, the prosecutor made phone calls and sent letters to various state authorities seeking favorable treatment on their behalf, and sent copies of these letters to Tribuiani and Wright prior to Appel*593lee’s trial. Notwithstanding a pre-trial request for those communications among the jailhouse informants, the Commonwealth, and the various entities and individuals to whom the Commonwealth reached out on behalf of the jailhouse informants, the Commonwealth did not disclose any of this evidence to the defense. Then, remarkably, at Appellee’s trial the Commonwealth presented evidence that neither Tribuiani nor Wright had asked for or received any favorable treatment in exchange for their testimony. Thus, it is clear that the Commonwealth suppressed evidence that was exculpatory in that it reflected on the credibility of the Commonwealth’s witnesses. Our inquiry therefore focuses on whether Appellee was prejudiced by the Commonwealth’s failure to disclose, ie., whether there is a reasonable probability that if the evidence had been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Commonwealth v. Strong, 563 Pa. 455, 761 A.2d 1167, 1171 (2000).
A review of the record reveals that the prosecution’s failure to disclose information relating to Tribuiani and Wright’s credibility undermines confidence in the outcome of Appellee’s trial, and creates a reasonable probability that if Appellee had been given such evidence and employed it to impeach the jailhouse informants, a different outcome of the trial could have resulted. Initially, I point out that this was not an “open and shut case” for the prosecution. In fact, the police investigation into the identity of the perpetrator of Barbara Bruzda’s murder extended nearly 18 years. The victim’s body was discovered on March 20, 1979, and Appellee’s murder charges were not filed until February 20, 1997, significantly, after the prosecution obtained the statements from Tribuiani and Wright. Moreover, as acknowledged by the Majority, Op. at 579-81, 986 A.2d at 812-13, Appellee’s defense at trial was that he was not involved in the murder. Appellee testified that, on the night of the incident, the victim had been a passenger in his vehicle while he was driving on a remote road, and that Sharon Pearson’s brothers forcibly stopped Bruzda and him, dragged Appellee from the vehicle, and beat *594him with a club until he was unconscious. According to Appellee, when he regained consciousness, Bruzda was gone.
Thus, the evidence that Appellee had borrowed a tire iron, that the victim’s injuries were consistent with injuries inflicted by such an object, that there was blood in Appellee’s car on the morning after the murder, and that the quilt in which the victim had been wrapped was missing from the back seat of Appellee’s vehicle, is equally consistent with both the prosecution’s theory of the case (that Appellee killed Bruzda with a tire iron and wrapped her in the quilt in his vehicle) and Appellee’s defense (that Pearson’s brothers beat him until he was unconscious and proceeded to kill Bruzda with the tire iron found in Appellee’s car, and wrap her body in the quilt, also found in the car). Thus, Appellee’s confessions of guilt made to Tribuiani and Wright were, as the PCRA court found, the “crux of the case” against him.4 Had the withheld evidence regarding the informants’ deals for favorable treatment been presented at trial, there is a reasonable probability that the jury, while balancing the equally plausible theories posited by the Commonwealth and the defense, would have been swayed to make credibility determinations in Appellee’s favor, and would have concluded that there was reasonable doubt as to Appellee’s guilt.
Under these circumstances, I cannot agree with the Majority’s conclusion that there was no support in the record for the PCRA court’s finding that the informant’s testimony was the ‘crux of the case.’ Op. at 586, 986 A.2d at 816.5 Further, I cannot agree with the Majority’s assertion that “the impact of *595Sharon Pearson’s testimony regarding the quilt and her interactions -with- Appellee on the morning of October 24, 1978 [the morning after the murder], would undoubtedly have been completely unaffected by disclosure of the impeachment evidence casting doubt on the reliability of Wright and Tribuiani.” Op. at 587, 986 A.2d at 816. To the contrary, if the jury had known that the jailhouse informants who testified against Appellee sought favorable treatment from the prosecution, and that the prosecutor was actively trying to arrange such treatment with the knowledge of the jailhouse informants, the jury may well have viewed Pearson’s testimony regarding the blood and missing quilt from Appellee’s vehicle as consistent with both the Commonwealth’s and Appellee’s case. More crucially, the jury could have discounted the jailhouse confessions and found that the Commonwealth failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Whether favorable treatment was, in fact, obtained as a result of the prosecution’s efforts to assist Tribuiani and Wright is irrelevant, as it is the motive to fabricate testimony in exchange for any promise of leniency that was relevant and should have been presented to the jury.
As the PCRA court’s finding of a Brady violation is supported by the record and free from legal error, I would affirm the grant of a new trial; because the Majority’s holding to the contrary offends our standard of review applicable to PCRA proceedings, I dissent.
Justice GREENSPAN joins this opinion.. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963).
. My use of the phrase "PCRA court’s opinion,” encompasses the PCRA court's Opinion and Order dated July 31, 2007, as well as its "Findings of Fact" and "Opinion” issued pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), which were dated October 31, 2007.
. Sharon Pearson was Appellee's former wife at the time of trial. She testified that the car that she and Appellee shared had blood smeared on the back of the front seats on the morning after the murder. She further testified that the homemade quilt in which the victim's body was found was the same quilt that was kept in the back of the car.
. I recognize that there was a third individual to whom Appellee purportedly confessed. David Townsend testified at Appellee’s trial that, in 1989, Appellee told him that he killed a girl named Barb. Nevertheless, I adhere to the view that the testimony of Tribuiani and Wright were critical to the prosecution's case against Appellee as the testimony of three informants is significantly more damaging than that of one.
. I further note that the prosecutor testified at the PCRA evidentiary hearing that, in hindsight, the credibility of Tribuiani and Wright was not very important to the prosecution. As set forth by the Majority, Op. at 582, 986 A.2d at 813-14, the PCRA court expressly found such testimony to be "incredible” and "truly preposterous.” Id. (citing N.T. PCRA Hearing, 3/30/07, at 116-17).