concurring.
I join Parts I, II, III, VI, and IX of the majority opinion and write to the following.
As to Part IV, and concerning the admissibility of evidence of a knife and axe found in Appellant’s possession, the trial court appears to have read this Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Williams, 537 Pa. 1, 20, 640 A.2d 1251, 1260 (1994), as foreclosing, in the weapons-evidence context, the generally prevailing duty of a trial court to balance the probative value of evidence against its potential for unfair prejudice under Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 403, upon appropriate challenge. See Trial Court Opinion, slip op. at 8-9. Other courts, however, have not read Williams as obviating Rule 403 balancing. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Owens, 929 A.2d 1187, 1191 (Pa.Super.2007) (relying upon Williams in a weapons-evidence context, while nevertheless undertaking Rule 403 balancing); Commonwealth v. Broaster, 863 A.2d 588, 592-93 (Pa.Super.2004). In this regard, significantly, the federal *434analogue to Rule 403 has been characterized as an important safeguard to a criminal defendant’s due process right to a fair trial, at least in other evidentiary contexts. See, e.g., United States v. Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427, 1432-33 (10th Cir.1998) (finding the federal evidentiary rule governing evidence of similar crimes in sexual assault cases consistent with due process in light of the availability of a balancing of probative value versus prejudicial impact under the federal analogue to Rule 403). Thus, I would take this opportunity to clarify that Rule 403 should apply to weapons evidence, as it does to the broadest category of all other evidence. Furthermore, since the trial court failed to apply Rule 403 balancing upon Appellant’s request, I believe the outcome of his present claim should turn on a harmless error assessment.
Also pertaining to Part IV, I am not in full agreement with the statement that, “The criminal record of an accomplice alone is simply not relevant to a defendant’s guilt or innocence.” Majority Opinion at 409, 986 A.2d at 97; see also id. at 421, 986 A.2d at 105. For policy reasons, admissibility barriers have been erected to the use of propensity evidence; however, I differ with the categorical assertion that such evidence necessarily lacks relevance either to a defendant’s potential criminal culpability, or to that of another.
As to Part V, which concerns the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s requests for particular jury instructions, the majority does not reference a material aspect of the governing-standard of review — in determining whether a particular instruction is required, the Court is obliged to view the facts in the light most favorable to the defendant. See Commonwealth v. Robinson, 554 Pa. 293, 310-11, 721 A.2d 344, 353 (1998). The majority, however, appears to do the opposite. For example, although Commonwealth witness Esther Soto disavowed a pre-trial statement, indicating at trial that she never heard Appellant threaten to kill his wife or admit to the killing, the majority couches the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth by disregarding Ms. Soto’s trial testimony and crediting her pre-trial statement. See *435Majority Opinion, at 411-12, 412-13, 986 A.2d at 99-100, 100— 01.1 As the trial court applied the same approach, see Trial Court Opinion, slip op. at 15-17, I believe its rulings were in error, and the disposition of the jury-instruction claims should depend upon the outcome of a harmless error and/or prejudice assessment.
In particular, on the issue of whether a voluntary manslaughter instruction was required upon Appellant’s request, I would note that some other jurisdictions appear to be more favorable to requiring the instruction in cases in which there is at least some evidence of a spouse encountering an act of martial infidelity. See, e.g., Tripp v. State, 36 Md.App. 459, 374 A.2d 384, 392 (1977) (“It is hornbook law that if one spouse discovers another in an unexpected act of adultery, a killing of spouse or paramour in hot-blooded fury may lower the blameworthiness from the murder level to the manslaughter level.”) (quoting Bartram v. State, 33 Md.App. 115, 364 A.2d 1119, 1153-54 (1976)). Other jurisdictions, however, have been more conservative in terms of requiring the instruction, particularly where the defendant-spouse has no legal right to be on the premises where a killing occurs. See, e.g., State v. McClanahan, 254 Kan. 104, 865 P.2d 1021, 1029 (1993).
In my view, the decision in this case as to the propriety of the trial court’s refusal to issue a voluntary manslaughter instruction should depend on a close analysis of all the facts taken in the light most favorable to Appellant, as opposed to a post-hoc, appellate-level crediting of aspects of the Commonwealth’s case which were factually disputed.2 I also believe that, in close cases, it would be preferable to simply issue the instructions explaining what the law is, thus allowing the jury to determine the relevant facts within the guiding legal frame*436work, as opposed to taking the decision away from the finder of fact. I am in a concurring posture on this claim, although I regard it as being a close one, only in light of the uncontradicted evidence that Appellant had been excluded from the victim’s apartment for approximately one month prior to the killings. See, e.g., N.T., January 13, 2000, at 455, 458-59, 461-62.
Regarding the claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, I note in the first instance that such claims are very briefly stated in Appellant’s brief. Candidly, I am unable to distinguish Appellant’s treatment of various of the issues from other instances in which the Court has found claims of deficient stewardship to be waived due to inadequate development, and I have indicated my belief elsewhere that the Court has an ongoing difficulty with consistency in this area which should be specifically addressed and remedied.
Finally, the majority invokes Commonwealth v. Bomar, 573 Pa. 426, 826 A.2d 831 (2003), to justify review of claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct review. See Majority Opinion, at 398-99 n. 5, 986 A.2d at 91 n. 5. The scope of Bomar, however, has been a subject of recent discussion in the cases. See Commonwealth v. Liston, 602 Pa. 10, 20-31, 977 A.2d 1089, 1095-1101 (2009); Commonwealth v. Wright, 599 Pa. 270, 320 n. 22, 961 A.2d 119, 148 n. 22 (2008). I support the majority’s decision to consider the claims of deficient stewardship presented here, at least in the first instance, solely on account of this Court’s pre-Grant order remanding the case for that specific purpose. It seems to me that such circumstance warrants an independent and discrete exception to Gh'ant.
. For purposes of this issue, I follow the majority’s approach of characterizing Appellant and the victim as husband and wife. The record appears to me to be unclear as to their actual legal status — according to the Commonwealth, Appellant and the victim had been in a common-law marital relationship. See, e.g., N.T., January 13, 2000, at 457.
. Indeed, the majority's approach is in apparent conflict with its recognition that it is reviewing the trial court's rulings as of the time they were made, and not against the overlay of subsequent developments. See Majority Opinion, at 404 n. 7, 986 A.2d at 94 n. 7.