dissenting:
In tine original consideration of this case, I concurred with the majority opinion in affirming the judgment of the court below, granting compensation to appellee for his injuries. My conclusion at that time was based very largely on the peculiar contract of employment disclosed by this record. It appears that, although appellee, Kemp, was employed on an annual basis at a monthly salary by the partnership, which operated a cotton gin, yet his contract provided for the performance of duties disconnected from the gin in the off-season, when the gin was not in use. It, therefore, seemed to me that he was employed by the partnership for whatever duties might be assigned to him away from the gin, as fully and completely as he was for those activities connected with- the gin. It was reasoned that, since the partnership was covered by the compensation act, though nominally as a cotton gin company and so designated in the insurance policy, Kemp, being an employee of the partnership and being obliged under his contract to do whatever work the individual partners directed during the off-season, was acting in the course of his employment during all working time, regardless of the nature of the work done. In other words, the covered partnership was not a gin company only, but a company for operating a cotton gin and for furnishing general services to the members of the firm.
Having concluded that the partnership was liable to appellee under the act, in this particular situation, because of the special contract of employment, I next considered the position of appellant, National Surety Corporation, which insured the partnership under a policy expressly limited to ginning operations. If we look to the policy alone, of course, the insurance company cannot be liable for an injury incurred in the process of putting up political signs for an individual partner and entirely disconnected from operation of the gin. But the compen*563sation act provides (Sec. 33(a), Chap. 354, Laws of 1948; Sec. 6998-39, Code of 1942) that insurance contracts thereunder “shall be deemed to he made subject to the provisions of this act, and provisions thereof inconsistent with the act shall be void”; and that such contracts ‘ ‘ shall be construed to grant full coverage of all liability of the assured under and according to the provisions of the act, notwithstanding any agreement of the parties to the contrary unless . . . ” If the assured, the partnership, is liable to appellee, then it seems to follow that appellant is deemed to have granted full coverage of that liability.
It follows, in my view, that, regardless of what rights, if any, appellant might have, as against the insured partnership, to recoup its loss, by virtue of the contract between it and the partnership expressly covering gin operations only, the claimant, by the statutory provision, is empowered to collect from the insurance company whatever compensation he may be entitled to receive from his employer, the partnership.
My conclusion on the original consideration being the result of the reasoning outlined above, I did not give particular weight in this connection to the line of cases cited in the opinion. I felt that appellee had not been directed to turn aside from the scope of his usual duty to perform an incidental, private service for his employer, as in those cases, but that he was injured while performing his usual off-season duties, they being whatever work the individual partners desired.
It now appears to me, in the light of appellant’s suggestion of error, that, even on the basis which has been discussed herein, there is no liability of the partnership to appellee for his injury. It is true that he was employed to work at the gin in the ginning season, and to work at whatever tasks the individual partners assigned him in the off-season, and that his entire compensation was paid by the partnership. However, it now seems *564clear to me, on this record, that the partnership, which was covered by and subject to the compensation act, was actually engaged in the gin business only. It employed appellee in that business; but, as it was necessary to employ appellee on an annual basis and as there was no work for him to do at the gin in the off-season, the partnership arranged for the partners to use him during that time.
While Kemp, the appellee, was working at the gin or doing any work whatever that had some connection with the partnership business, he was, of course, covered. But, when the end of the season came, and there was nothing further for him to do in furtherance of the firm business, then he left that employment for a time, and entered into the performance of designated services for the persons who were members of the partnership. It cannot be, to my mind, that, when Kemp, the appellee, set forth on the project of hanging the large political banners or signs over the streets of various towns for Kent, an individual, who was a partner in the gin firm and who was at the time a candidate for sheriff, he, Kemp, was in the course of employment with the partnership. He was being paid by the firm, it is true, but he was working for, and was in the employment of, Kent, the candidate for sheriff. He had been loaned to Kent by the partnership, which had paid for appellee’s services, but did not need them at that period of the year. It was Kent who received the benefit of appellee’s services; who instructed him what to do, and where and when; and who had supervision and control over Kemp in the performance of his duties, while he was engaged in aiding the political campaign. During that time Kemp was completely severed and separated from the course and scope of his work with the partnership.
In summary of the line of cases cited in our original opinion, we quoted from Larson’s Workmen’s Compensation Law and from American Jurisprudence on the *565same subject. We quoted from tbe former text (Sec. 27.40) as follows: “When any person in authority directs an employee to run some private errand or do some work outside bis normal duties for tbe private benefit of tbe employer or superior, an injury in tbe course of that work is compensable.” But, note tbe paragraph of tbe text immediately following that language:
“Two questions closely related to this one must be distinguished, since they turn upon principles basically different. Tbe first is tbe question of dual employment. An employee may, as a regular thing, work alternately as a janitor in a printing shop and as a yardman at tbe emplojmr’s residence. Tbe question here is one of dual status, with tbe possibility of separating tbe two jobs and bolding that one of them is not under compensation coverage. This problem differs from tbe present problem, in that here tbe employee is regularly employed at only one job, and tbe private task is an unusual incident.”
Now let us see what Larson has to say about dual employment. His comment on this subject (Sec. 48.50) is as follows:
“When there is a true dual employment, and tbe particular industry in which tbe injury occurs can be clearly identified, it is only logical, under compensation theory, that that industry should bear tbe compensation cost. So, when a watchman was hired by two companies (although in form tbe contract was made only by one), tbe company in whose service he was acting at tbe time of tbe injury was held liable exclusively for tbe cost of that injury. But if be bad been on bis way between buildings, the impossibility of identifying a single employer as tbe one being served would necessitate a finding of joint liability. ' Similarly, a deliveryman engaged to deliver packages for two employers was held to be in tbe exclusive service of one, when, having completed deliveries for tbe other, be was devoting himself entirely to tbe interests of tbe first employer by delivering bis packages. But, *566obviously, a deliveryman going along the street with the packages of both employers would have to be held a joint employee. The dual-employment role should be resorted to only when the complete identification of the employee’s activities at the time of injury with a single employer is beyond dispute. There should be no weighing of relative value of particular services to different employers, or quibbling about borderline activities, since, if there is any evidence of joint service, added to the conceded fact of employment of both employers, there can be no great unfairness in imposing shared liability on the employers.”
It is my view of this case and its facts that there is a complete identification of Kemp’s activities at the time of the injury with Kent’s political campaign, and not with the business of the partnership, Skene Grin Company. This is no “quibbling about borderline activities,” such as Larson excludes.
Our original opinion also quoted language from American Jurisprudence (58 Am. Jur., Workmen’s Compensation, Sec. 231, p. 738). Note the last paragraph of that section:
“In the case of injury to an employee of a business or industrial enterprise while performing, by direction of his employer or superior, some service primarily for the private or individual benefit of such employer or superior, or of some other person, rather than for the benefit of such enterprise, some authorities take the view that such an injury may, under some circumstances, be com-pensable as arising out of and in the course of the employment, while others hold to the contrary, and the right to compensation has usually been denied where the particular services are entirely unrelated to the business enterprise. ’ ’
It seems to me that Kemp’s services being rendered at the time of his injury were “entirely unrelated to the business enterprise” of the insured partnership.
*567Tlie act requires that an injury, in order to be compen-sable, must be one “arising out of and in the course of employment.” Obviously, the provision means that it must arise out of and be in the course of the employment by the person to be charged with payment of the compensation. In this case, appellee was injured while he was in the course of employment by Kent, and not while he was in the course of employment by Skene Gin Company. He was hanging political banners for Kent; he was not performing any service for the gin company. I do not think that the legislature ever intended the result reached in our original opinion.
Therefore, it is my judgment that the suggestion of error should be sustained, and, accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the majority decision.