concurring.
I concur in the result only. In my view, the majority improperly creates an equitable exception to the PCRA, contrary to our decision in Commonwealth v. Eller, 569 Pa. 622, 807 A.2d 838 (2002).
The Superior Court below determined that Hernandez should have been allowed to appeal nunc pro tunc given his reliance on Superior Court precedent which pre-dated this court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Lantzy, 558 Pa. 214, 736 A.2d 564 (1999). The majority approves of that rationale, concluding that “Hernandez reasonably relied upon the decisions of the Superior Court [... ] in which the Superior Court explained that the PCRA is not available for those seeking reinstatement of appellate rights nunc pro tunc unless they are asserting actual innocence, a standard not required for a direct appeal.” Majority Opinion at 482-83 (citations omitted).
*486Yet in Eller, we expressly repudiated such a rationale. The appellant in Eller similarly argued that he should not be “penalized” for his reliance on the Superior Court’s preLantzy case law. The Superior Court in en banc decisions agreed, finding that it would be “unjust” to apply Lantzy to post-conviction petitioners who had improperly filed nunc pro tunc petitions, since they may then be time-barred from invoking the PCRA by operation of its one-year time limitation. We disavowed this reasoning, stating that “[t]his perceived injustice cannot warrant the judicial creation of an extra-PCRA remedy for claims exclusively reserved by the statute.” Eller, 807 A.2d at 845. That is because “[t]he PCRA confers no authority upon this Court to fashion ad hoc equitable exceptions to the PCRA time-bar in addition to those exceptions expressly delineated in the Act.” Id.1
The majority’s creation of an equitable exception in this case is all the more extraordinary since the court in Eller envisioned the very circumstances present here, and set forth the proper resolution: “given the courts’ liberal construction of pro se pleadings, including pleadings under the PCRA [...], a non-PCRA petition filed unthin one year of the judgment becoming final could and should be treated as one sounding under the PCRA, and appropriate amendment permitted.” 807 A.2d at 845 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). As Hernandez filed his petition to appeal nunc pro tunc within one year of the date on which his judgment of sentence became final, the proper resolution would be to remand this matter so that he could amend his petition. However, as Hernandez did not appeal from the lower court’s decision, I concur in the majority’s result.
Justice CASTILLE joins this concurring opinion.. Our decision in Eller affirmed that the plain language of the PCRA must apply “irrespective of whether appellant sought extra-PCRA review before or after the decision in Lantzy was announced.” Id. at 842. Thus, contrary to the majority’s statement (Majority Opinion at 482), it is irrelevant that Hernandez filed his petition prior to our decision in Lantzy.