Dissenting:
¶ 1 I respectfully, but vigorously, dissent.
¶2 I agree with the majority that the verdicts, as to John and Margaret Wallace, were not inconsistent. If anything, Margaret’s efforts on behalf of her children were heroic. They were assuredly not criminal and indeed not culpable in the civil sense. I also agree that the court did not err in permitting the evidence, without expert qualification, of Mr. Holler. The witness testified as to matters within the knowledge of an adult layperson.
¶ 3 However, I believe the conviction of John Wallace is the result of an abuse of prosecutorial discretion by the district attorney in seeking a criminal solution for circumstances which are properly the subject of civil court remedies. This ill-considered prosecution has led to a conviction where the evidence is insufficient.
*495¶ 4 I certainly agree that when Officer Rivera entered the Wallace rental home, he found conditions which were unspeakably squalid. As described, the state of the household would be revolting to even one with the most hardened sensibilities. As the apparently physically-capable parent of the eight children and the responsible adult on the premises, it is appropriate that John Wallace be called to task for his dereliction. However, the horrific state of the Wallace household was such that any attempt at explanation in the criminal forum by Wallace, or on his behalf, is to invite responsive ridicule and all but certain rejection.
¶ 5 The majority would fix criminal responsibility on Wallace since, it concludes, that his failures make it “practically certain to result in the endangerment of his children’s welfare.”
¶ 6 The majority today renders criminal the failure of a parent to provide a suitable household free from perceived safety hazards to children. The court disregards the underlying rationale for the imposition of criminal sanctions, undermines the proper role for civil authorities in our communities, and ignores substantial precedent of the courts of this Commonwealth.
¶ 7 The majority recognizes that “no case law of which we are aware presents a factual scenario similar to what has occurred in the case presently before us.” The majority further acknowledges that the factual circumstances on which the courts have held evidence sufficient to support a conviction under § 4304 have always included either physical abuse or sexual abuse committed by the defendant or a defendant’s failure to intervene in circumstances that resulted in physical or sexual abuse, death, or a reasonably imminent threat of death.
¶ 8 We review the precedents comprehensively. See Commonwealth v. Mackert, 781 A.2d 178, 187 (Pa.Super.2001) (finding evidence sufficient where children were physically abused and one child had lost twenty percent of her body weight in two weeks although vacating judgment of sentence on other grounds), appeal denied, 568 Pa. 696, 796 A.2d 980 (2002); Commonwealth v. Passarelli, 789 A.2d 708 (Pa.Super.2001) (finding evidence sufficient where child had a bump on the head, a skull fracture, brain swelling and hemorrhaging and bruises consistent with “shaken-impact syndrome”); Commonwealth v. Foster, 764 A.2d 1076 (Pa.Super.2000) (finding evidence sufficient where parents refused to take their child for treatment of his cancer and he was within twenty-four hours of death by the time treatment was received), appeal denied, 566 Pa. 658, 782 A.2d 542 (2001); Commonwealth v. Vining, 744 A2d 310 (Pa.Super.1999) (en banc) (finding evidence sufficient where child was under care of babysitter and suffered severe burns and internal injuries consistent with abuse); Commonwealth v. Bishop, 742 A.2d 178 (Pa.Super.1999) (finding evidence sufficient where five year old victim’s stepgrandfather sexually abused her while she was in his care); Commonwealth v. Kellam, 719 A.2d 792 (Pa.Super.1998) (finding evidence sufficient where appellant boyfriend assumed care of girlfriend’s child and failed to feed it which resulted in the child’s death), appeal denied, 559 Pa. 714, 740 A.2d 1145 (1999); Commonwealth v. Fewell, 439 Pa.Super. 541, 654 A.2d 1109 (1995) (finding evidence sufficient where appellant mother placed plastic bag over her son’s head to stop him from crying which resulted in his death by asphyxiation); Commonwealth v. Davis, 437 Pa.Super. 471, 650 A.2d 452 (1994) (finding evidence sufficient where victim testified that stepfather forced him to have oral and anal sex beginning at the age of 6 although vacating and remanding on other *496grounds), aff'd, 543 Pa. 628, 674 A.2d 214 (1996); Commonwealth v. Cottam, 420 Pa.Super. 311, 616 A.2d 988 (1992) (finding evidence sufficient where parents starved one child to death and caused another to suffer severe malnutrition because of their religious beliefs), appeal denied, 535 Pa. 673, 636 A.2d 632 (1993); Commonwealth v. Pankraz, 382 Pa.Super. 116, 554 A.2d 974 (1989) (finding evidence sufficient where defendant inserted knife and screwdriver into the vagina of his 4 year old daughter), appeal denied, 522 Pa. 618, 563 A.2d 887 (1989); Commonwealth v. Ogin, 373 Pa.Super. 116, 540 A.2d 549 (1988) (en banc) (finding evidence sufficient where parents threw their child against the wall, violently struck her in the face and forced hot food into her face that caused burns); Commonwealth v. Cardwell, 357 Pa.Super. 38, 515 A.2d 311 (1986) (finding evidence sufficient where mother did not act to remove her 11 year old daughter from then-house when she knew stepfather was having sexual intercourse with her that resulted in two pregnancies); Commonwealth v. Taylor, 324 Pa.Super. 420, 471 A.2d 1228 (1984) (finding sufficient evidence where father took teenage daughter and friend to hotel, exposed himself, forced girls onto bed, grabbed their genitalia and made sexually explicit remarks although vacating and remanding on other grounds).
¶ 9 Indeed, as the majority also recognizes, even in those cases where the sufficiency of the evidence was not raised on appeal or the court found the evidence insufficient to sustain the conviction, the underlying facts included physical or sexual abuse by the defendant or the defendant’s failure to intervene in circumstances that resulted in actual physical or sexual abuse, death or a reasonably imminent threat thereof. See Commonwealth v. Chapman, 763 A.2d 895 (Pa.Super.2000) (reversing in part and affirming in part trial court’s exclusion of Commonwealth’s evidence where mother of child and acquaintance who was babysitting were charged' after eight-month old child drowned in bathtub), appeal denied, 565 Pa. 636, 771 A.2d 1278 (2001); Commonwealth v. Brown, 721 A.2d 1105 (Pa.Super.1998) (holding that live-in boyfriend could be convicted as a person supervising the welfare of a child for not reporting girlfriend’s ongoing abuse of her own child that led to the child’s death); Commonwealth v. Martir, 712 A.2d 327 (Pa.Super.1998) (holding that offense did not merge with reckless endangerment where defendant convicted for scalding child with hot water); Commonwealth v. Halye, 719 A.2d 763 (Pa.Super.1998) (finding insufficient evidence where appellant engaged in sexual abuse of child while visiting home but was not in role of caretaker and had no duty to protect child), appeal denied, 560 Pa. 699, 743 A.2d 916 (1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1012, 120 S.Ct. 1287, 146 L.Ed.2d 233 (2000); Commonwealth v. Pahel, 456 Pa.Super. 159, 689 A.2d 963 (1997) (finding evidence insufficient to prove that mother knew that her failure to take child to doctor for two days after noticing injury caused by boyfriend’s abuse created a risk to her child’s welfare); Commonwealth v. Miller, 411 Pa.Super. 33, 600 A.2d 988 (1992) (finding evidence insufficient to prove that mother “knowingly” left her child at home alone where father promised that someone would look after child and building fire caused child’s - death); Commonwealth v. Campbell, 398 Pa.Super. 116, 580 A.2d 868 (1990) (affirming grant of motion in arrest of judgment where parents were convicted for not intervening in sexual activity where 13 year old daughter became pregnant by 18 year old boyfriend); Commonwealth v. Barnhart, 345 Pa.Super. 10, 497 A.2d 616 (1985) (affirming conviction where parents did not seek medical treatment for their son because of *497religious beliefs and he died of treatable cancer but vacating sentence on double jeopardy grounds), appeal denied, 517 Pa. 620, 538 A.2d 874 (1988), cert. denied 488 U.S. 817, 109 S.Ct. 55, 102 L.Ed.2d 34 (1988); Commonwealth v. Moore, 261 Pa.Super. 92, 395 A.2d 1328 (1978) (affirming conviction where father physically abused his seven year old stepson by beating him with a stick although sufficiency of evidence not raised on appeal).
¶ 10 Notwithstanding its acknowledged inability to reference even one case imposing criminal liability on facts similar to those presently before us, the majority does not address its departure from precedent other than to state that the “common sense of the community” should guide the decision. I agree that the “common sense of the community, as well as the sense of decency, propriety and the morality which most people entertain is sufficient to apply the statute to each particular case, and to individuate what particular conduct is rendered criminal by it.” Commonwealth v. Mack, 467 Pa. 613, 359 A.2d 770, 772 (1976) (internal citation omitted) (quoting Commonwealth v. Marlin, 452 Pa. 380, 305 A.2d 14, 18 (1973)). The “common sense of the community,” however, must be exercised in light of past precedent and the purposes of the criminal law. The majority observes, “Allowing children to live with such filth and vermin, with no working furnace for heat, and with water running into the electrical box creating a fire hazard, cannot be condoned.” While I unequivocally agree with this conclusion, it ignores the question of whether such conditions warrant subjection of a parent to criminal liability.
¶ 11 The plain facts instantly are that the Wallaces lived in a rental premises. The record suggests that the owner lives in Florida and is, thus, an absentee owner. The County of Lehigh has a children and youth agency and the City of Allentown has a housing authority. Since we have only a criminal court record, we do not know why either agency did not earlier intervene. The record manifests that they have now done so. The house has been condemned and the children are in custodial control of the county. The criminal conviction of John Wallace almost certainly will act as a preemptive termination of his parental rights to eight of his eleven children. When the county moves to terminate his parental rights, one cannot suppose any effective defense by a parent who has been convicted of endangering the welfare of the subject children. I submit that it is patent that the children and youth and housing authorities should have been more vigilant and sooner acted to: A) have the children declared dependent and, B) condemn the structure where they lived.
¶ 12 Since, at the time of this criminal trial, the eight children were within the control of the Commonwealth, we may be assured that the children have suffered no physical harm or mental illness because of their father’s neglect, or, most certainly, the evidence would have been produced at trial. They are no longer ill-housed and their future care, custody and control are subject to judicial order. As to John Wallace, since this is a criminal proceeding, we receive only glimpses as to what ails him. We do not have the benefit of juvenile custody proceedings where his mental and physical status would be investigated and, if necessary, remedial and counseling services provided. As it is, we are left with a picture of either a parent who is overborne by grandiose ideas incapable of practical fruition or one who is simply slothful. In either case, the situation will not be ameliorated by a devastating criminal conviction and the one-year services of a probation officer.
*498¶ 13 I would reverse and vacate the conviction and leave this tragic matter to civil authorities.