DISSENTING OPINION BY
Judge FRIEDMAN.I respectfully dissent. The majority concludes that the Board successfully proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Marvin L. Price (Price) violated parole condition 5(b). For the following reasons, I disagree.
The Board had the burden of proof in this case, and, to meet its burden, the Board presented the testimony of two witnesses. However, the testimony of those witnesses was internally inconsistent and contradictory. Yet, the Board denied Price’s administrative appeal by simply stating, “the Board determined by a preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Price violated the conditions of his parole specified.” (Board’s April 9, 2004 decision.) The majority then affirmed the Board in similarly conclusive fashion, simply stating, “we cannot say that the Board erred when it determined that [Price] violated condition 5(b) by having in his possession a gun.” (Majority op. at 176-77.)
I am puzzled by the Board’s and the majority’s failure to explain their statements. After my review of the evidence, I am left with more questions than I have answers. The majority is quite correct that the Board’s role is to evaluate credibility, resolve conflicts in the evidence and assign evidentiary weight. (See majority op. at 177.) However, in this case, I believe that this court needs to explore further how the Board, in performing its functions, concluded that Price violated condition 5(b).
Condition 5(b) of the conditions governing Price’s parole provides that Price shall “refrain” from “possessing” a firearm. (C.R. at 10.) The word “refrain” means to “keep oneself from doing” something; the word connotes “checking or inhibiting an inclination or impulse.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1909 (1993). Moreover, “[possession is [a culpable] act ... if the possessor knowingly procured or received the thing possessed or was aware of his control thereof for a sufficient period to have been able to terminate his possession.” Section 301(c) of the Crimes Code, 18 Pa.C.S. § 301(c) (emphasis added). Thus, a parolee violates condition 5(b) if the parolee fails to check his inclination to knowingly control a firearm for a sufficient period of time to be able to terminate possession.
I. Undisputed Evidence
Here, the undisputed evidence is as follows. On July 23, 2001, Price was released on parole to Renewal .Community Corrections Center (Renewal CCC). (C.R. at 9.) While he resided there, Price attended the Community College of Allegheny County (Community College), studying engineering. (C.R. at 15.) Price carried his books to and from the Community College in a black backpack. (C.R. at 49, 56.) Each time Price returned to Renewal CCC from the Community College, a security monitor would search Price and his backpack. (C.R. at 44, 48.)
On October 26, 2001, Price returned to Renewal CCC with a black backpack; Price thought that the backpack was his, but this backpack actually belonged to Marvin Brown. (C.R. at 55-56.) The backpack had no identifying features on the outside, but it contained: (1) papers and books belonging to Marvin Brown; (2) a pharmacy container belonging to Marvin Brown; (3) a Community College parking *179permit belonging to Marvin Brown; and (4) a receipt from the Community College belonging to Marvin Brown. (C.R. at 49, 51, 55-56.)
Lisa Tabb, the security monitor on duty, opened the backpack and saw a firearm. (C.R. at 45.) Tabb did not see Price enter Renewal CCC with the backpack, so she asked a group of residents to whom it belonged. (C.R. at 45.) Price responded that it was his, and Tabb asked if he was sure. (C.R. at 45.) Price answered in the affirmative, and Tabb repeated the question. Price again claimed ownership of the bag, but, after Tabb repeated the question another time, Price realized he was mistaken and said, “That’s not my bag, that’s not my gun. I must have picked up the wrong bag.” (C.R. at 46.) Tabb did not examine any of the other contents of the backpack to determine whether Price actually had picked up a backpack belonging to Marvin Brown at the Community College. (C.R. at 51.)
Parole agents arrested Price for possessing a firearm. (C.R. at 14.) When Renewal CCC employees later found the property of Marvin Brown in the backpack, Renewal CCC reported the matter to police. (C.R. at 53.) Detective Gerald Watkins filed a criminal complaint against Price, charging him with receiving stolen property,1 carrying a concealed weapon without a license and possession of a firearm by a former felon. (C.R. at 18-19.) A preliminary hearing was held, and the case went to court. (C.R. at 16.) On October 1, 2003, when Detective Watkins failed to appear in response to a Commonwealth subpoena, the Commonwealth petitioned the trial court for nolle prosse, and the petition was granted.2 (C.R. at 17.)
I submit that, based on the undisputed evidence, the only reasonable conclusion the Board could have reached is that Price picked up the wrong backpack at the Community College without knowledge of the firearm. It is absolutely clear that: (1) the backpack belonged to Marvin Brown; (2) Price owned a similar backpack; (3) police never charged Price with theft of the backpack; (4) Price returned to Renewal CCC from the Community College with only one backpack; (5) the Board presented no evidence regarding the whereabouts of Price’s own black backpack containing his school books; (6) Price knew that the security monitor at Renewal CCC would search his backpack; (7) Price made no attempt to prevent the security monitor from searching his backpack; (8) Price initially did not hesitate to assert his ownership of the backpack, but, when the security monitor persisted in asking if he was certain of his ownership, Price recognized his error and immediately stated that he must have picked up the wrong backpack; and (9) Price never acknowledged ownership of the firearm.
II. Other Evidence
A. Tabb’s Testimony
In addition to the undisputed testimony, Tabb presented seemingly inconsistent *180testimony suggesting that Price had knowledge of the firearm in the backpack.
Tabb testified that “[sjomebody else” at Renewal CCC found a name tag in the backpack with Price’s name and picture. (C.R. at 51-52.) However, Tabb admitted that she told the police that Price’s name was not found inside the backpack. (C.R. at 53.) Tabb did not explain this contradiction,3 and I cannot determine how the Board resolved this conflict. It seems likely that the Board believed “somebody” found Price’s name tag in the backpack. However, because Tabb did not have personal knowledge about the discovery of the name tag, Tabb’s testimony about the name tag is mere hearsay.
Moreover, even if “somebody” found Price’s name tag in the bag, it would not establish that Price knew about the gun in the bag. Tabb testified that the backpack contained several pockets, including side pockets and a zippered main area, (see C.R. at 51), but Tabb did not identify which part of the backpack contained the name tag. If Price put his name tag in a side pocket on the outside of the backpack, Price would not have seen the firearm inside the zippered main area of the backpack. Thus, Tabb’s testimony, by itself, does not establish that Price violated condition 5(b).
B. Troy’s Testimony
In determining that Price did violate condition 5(b), the Board also relied on the testimony of Roberta Troy, a parole supervisor who questioned Price after his arrest.
Troy testified that she asked Price if his fingerprints were on the gun, and Price replied that his fingerprints were on the firearm because Tabb allowed him to touch the gun when she took it out of the bag. (C.R. at 60.) Moreover, Troy admitted that a police officer testifying at Price’s preliminary hearing confirmed that there were no fingerprints on the gun.4 (C.R. at 64.) Troy did not even attempt to explain why Price would claim his fingerprints were on the gun when she knew that the police found no fingerprints on the gun.5
Accordingly, unlike the majority, I believe there is no evidence from which the Board could meet its burden of proving that Price knowingly possessed a firearm; therefore, I would reverse.
. It is not clear to me why Detective Watkins charged Price with receiving stolen property. If Price received stolen property, then Marvin Brown must have stolen the bag. If Detective Watkins believed that Price stole the bag from Marvin Brown, Price should have been charged with theft.
. I note that the majority erroneously states that the charges were dismissed for the Commonwealth’s failure to subpoena witnesses in connection with the preliminary hearing. (Majority op. at 174.) However, the record shows clearly that the criminal preliminary hearing was held on January 23, 2002, and that the petition for nolle prosse was filed on October 1, 2003, after Watkins failed to appear pursuant to a subpoena. (C.R. at 16-17.)
. Either Tabb lied to the police, or the person who reported the discovery of the name tag to Tabb lied about it.
. Price entered into the record specific testimony from the criminal preliminary hearing, indicating that the police checked for fingerprints and found none on the gun. (C.R. at 67.)
.Although Troy also testified that, according to Price, Tabb removed the gun from the bag and allowed him to touch it, I fail to see how this testimony, even if believed, would assist the Board in meeting its burden.