concurring.
I write separately only to note my view that jury instructions, such'as those given here, which mirror the language of Section 9711(c)(l)(iv) of the Pennsylvania Death Penalty Statute, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(c)(l)(iv), impermissibly infer a requirement that any mitigating circumstance must be found unanimously by the jury in violation of Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 108 S.Ct. 1860, 100 L.Ed.2d 384 (1988).1
*89Nevertheless, I join the majority opinion in all respects for several reasons. First, the majority properly disposes of the assertion on a waiver theory, noting that such claim was previously litigated on direct appeal. Second, the majority notes the United States Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Beard v. Banks, No. 02-1608, 542 U.S. 406, 124 S.Ct. 2504, 159 L.Ed.2d 494 (2004), makes it clear that Mills does not apply retroactively to cases, such as this, that were decided prior to its issuance.2 Finally, the majority notes that, on direct appeal, this Court, in upholding the instruction at issue, relied on our decision in Commonwealth v. Frey, 520 Pa. 338, 554 A.2d 27, 31 (1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1038, 110 S.Ct. 1500, 108 L.Ed.2d 635 (1990), holding that the language of the death penalty statute does not “state or infer a requirement that any given mitigating circumstance must be unanimously recognized before it can be weighed against aggravating circumstances in reaching a verdict.” Thus, based upon principles of stare decisis, I am bound to follow our prior precedent in this regard.
. Section 9711 (c)( 1 )(iv) provides:
[T]he verdict must be a sentence of death if the jury unanimously finds at least one aggravating circumstance specified in subsection (d) and no mitigating circumstance or if the jury unanimously finds one or more aggravating circumstances which outweigh any mitigating *89circumstances. The verdict must be a sentence of life imprisonment in all other cases
. Appellant's trial occurred in 1986, two years prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Mills.