DISSENTING OPINION BY
JOYCE, J.:¶ 11 disagree with the conclusion by the majority that both the content of the information possessed by Officer Peter Rivera and its degree of reliability were insufficient to serve as his basis for reasonable suspicion.
¶2 The Commonwealth concedes that the interaction between Officer Rivera and Appellee, Tamika Jones, was an investigative detention. Thus our inquiry must focus on whether the officer can point to specific and articulable facts that, in combination with any reasonable inferences arising from those facts, give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
¶ 3 Following the dictates of the United States Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), Pennsylvania Courts have recognized that under limited circumstances, police officers are justified in investigating a situation and may conduct brief, investiga*827tory detentions of individuals, so long as the police officers reasonably believe that criminal activity may be afoot. Commonwealth v. Cook, 558 Pa. 50, 735 A.2d 673 (1999); In re C.C.J., 799 A.2d 116 (Pa.Super.2002). In ascertaining the existence of reasonable suspicion, we must look to the totality of the circumstances. Commonwealth v. Riley, 715 A.2d 1131, 1135 (Pa.Super.1998). In order to establish reasonable suspicion, a police officer must point to articulable facts and reasonable inferences drawn from those facts in light of the officer’s experience. Commonwealth v. Jackson, 548 Pa. 484, 698 A.2d 571 (1997). A law enforcement officer who “lacks the precise level of information necessary for probable cause to arrest” but possesses reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, is not required “to simply shrug his shoulders and allow. ..a criminal to escape.” Commonwealth v. Lagamba, 418 Pa.Super. 1, 613 A.2d 1, 5 (1992). Also, “[mjerely because a suspect’s activity may be consistent with innocent behavior does not alone make detention and limited investigation illegal.” In re C.C.J., 799 A.2d at 121.
¶ 4 With respect to reasonable suspicion, our courts have recognized that “[t]o have reasonable suspicion, police officers need not personally observe the illegal or suspicious conduct, but may rely upon the information of third parties, including ‘tips’ from citizens. Commonwealth v. Wright, 448 Pa.Super. 621, 630, 672 A.2d 826, 830 (1996).” Commonwealth v. Swartz, 787 A.2d 1021, 1024 (Pa.Super.2001) (en banc). See Commonwealth v. Cullen, 340 Pa.Super. 233, 489 A.2d 929, 937 (1985) (the investigating officer need not have personal knowledge of the facts which support probable cause for arrest. The officer may reasonably rely upon radio transmissions so long as the officer issuing the information has received reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable caution in believing that the suspect has committed or is committing an offense). See also Commonwealth v. Janiak, 368 Pa.Super. 626, 534 A.2d 833 (1987) (allowing the police to make a stop of an individual suspected of intoxication based upon radio information, although the police had not personally observed unusual or criminal conduct).
¶ 5 On the issue of the source and reliability of the police officer’s information, this Court has opined as follows:
When the underlying source of the officer’s information is an anonymous call, the tip should be treated with particular suspicion. However, a tip from an informer known to the police may carry enough indicia of reliability for the police to conduct an investigatory stop, even though the same tip from an anonymous informant would likely not have done so. Indeed, a known informant places himself at risk of prosecution for filing a false claim if the tip is untrue, whereas an unknown informant faces no such risk.
Swartz, 787 A.2d at 1024 -1025 (citations omitted). The information supplied by the informant must be specific enough to support reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is occurring. Commonwealth v. Allen, 555 Pa. 522, 725 A2d 737 (1999). To determine whether the information provided is sufficient, we assess the information under the totality of the circumstances. Id.
¶ 6 Herein, the information supplied to Officer Rivera came from an identified informant. This indicates a high degree of reliability. See Swartz, supra. The information provided was sufficiently specific. The information indicated the make and color of the vehicle: a burgundy Chevrolet; and it provided the vehicle registration number (EJT 8020). The informant pro*828vided information about the occupants of the vehicle: it indicated that multiple individuals were occupying the vehicle. The information also described the conduct of the occupants, that is, that they were engaged in drug activity. The information indicated the approximate location of the vehicle and its occupants (at the 1100 block of Hanover Street, Harrisburg, Dauphin County).
¶ 7 It is important to note that prior to the investigatory stop, Officer Rivera was able to corroborate some of the information provided by the informant. The officer found the vehicle described by the informant (a burgundy Chevrolet with the registration number EJT 8020); the officer found the vehicle in the area described by the informant (at the 1100 block of Hanover Street, Harrisburg). Also, Officer Rivera noticed that the vehicle had two occupants: the informant indicated that the vehicle had multiple occupants. Under these circumstances, Officer Rivera was justified in investigating further to determine whether the occupants of the vehicle were engaged in drug activity as the informant alleged.
¶ 8 The above conclusion is quite consistent with Commonwealth v. Korenkiewicz, 743 A.2d 958 (Pa.Super.1999) (en banc), appeal denied, 563 Pa. 659, 759 A.2d 383 (2000). In Korenkiewicz, the information available to the police officer was provided by an identified source, Kenneth Pinger-ton. In his call to the police, Pingerton reported that a suspicious person in a dark colored convertible was parked at his Amoco service station. According to Pinger-ton, the driver of the vehicle appeared ill or intoxicated and was about to pull out onto the road. When the police officer arrived, he saw a vehicle matching the description in the report at the exact location provided by Pingerton. Without observing any criminal or unusual activity, the police officer initiated an investigatory stop based on Pingerton’s report. On appeal we upheld the validity of this stop and held that the police officer was constitutionally authorized to execute a brief investigatory stop.
¶ 9 In Commonwealth v. Lohr, 715 A.2d 459 (Pa.Super.1998), an identified citizen caller reported that she observed a red and white Ford Bronco being driven erratically into the parking lot of a supermarket. The police officer proceeded to the scene where he observed the appellant operating a red and white Bronco, as it began to back out of the parking space. Based on the dispatch message derived from the citizen’s telephone call, the police officer initiated a traffic stop. Id. at 460. On appeal, we held that based on the circumstances and on the fact that the police officer saw the described vehicle in the described location, the totality of information justified the brief investigative stop. Id. at 462.
¶ 10 In Janiak, supra, two police officers received radio communications that an individual had been reported in an intoxicated condition near gas pumps at a convenience store which was located one long block to the south and a long block to the west of the officers’ location. The communication indicated that the individual was about to drive away. Janiak, 534 A.2d at 833. The officers then received a second telecommunication that the individual was now driving in an easterly direction on West Third Street in Williams-port. The police officers later saw the appellant’s vehicle proceeding in an easterly direction toward the officers and initiated a traffic stop based on the radio communications. Id. at 834. Prior to the stop, the police officers did not observe any unusual or criminal behavior on the part of the appellant. The only observation that they made with respect to the *829manner of operation of the vehicle was that it was proceeding at 15 to 20 miles per hour. The police officers indicated that their decision to initiate the stop was based on the report that an intoxicated individual was operating the vehicle, and their belief under all of the circumstances that the vehicle could only be the one in question. Id. On appeal, we found that the police officers acted with reasonable suspicion and possessed specific and artic-ulable facts which warranted the stop of the appellant’s automobile. Id. at 835.
¶ 11 In Commonwealth v. Ogborne, 410 Pa.Super. 164, 599 A.2d 656 (1991), we held that a confidential informant’s tip to a police officer that the appellant would arrive at his home in his car within a few hours and carrying bundles of POP exhibited sufficient indicia of reliability to justify an investigatory stop of the appellant in the driveway of his home when defendant arrived at his home in his car several hours after the officer received the tip. In reaching the above conclusion, we noted that the police officer received specific information from a reliable informant with personal knowledge of the appellant’s return time to his home in Delaware County from Philadelphia; that the informant described the specific make and model of the automobile; that the informant stated that the appellant would be carrying bundles of PCP; and that the police officer’s subsequent investigation corroborated much of this information. Id. at 659. Significantly, we observed that:
[B]ecause an informant is shown to be right about some things, he is probably right about other facts that he has alleged, including the claim that the object of the tip is engaged in criminal activity. Thus, it is not unreasonable to conclude ... that the independent corroboration by the police of significant aspects of the informer’s predictions imparted some degree of reliability to the other allegations made by the caller.
Id. at 659 (citation omitted; alteration in original).
¶ 12 Based on the foregoing discussion and the cases cited above, I would conclude that in the instant case, Officer Rivera was justified in conducting the investigative detention of Jones based on the information provided by the identified citizen informant. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.