(dissenting). Today my colleagues have struck down the City of East Detroit’s obscenity ordinance,1 and in consequent effect every other comparable obscenity ordinance in the state, on the grounds that the state criminal obscenity statute2 has pre-empted that field of legislation.
If indeed the state had pre-empted the field of obscenity legislation, municipal ordinances of the East Detroit type would offend Const 1963, art 7, § 22.3 Because I am persuaded there has been no pre-emption, I respectfully dissent.
East Detroit is a "home rule city” with authority4 to adopt a city charter which may provide:
"For the enforcement of all such local, police, sanitary and other regulations as are not in conflict with the general laws.” MCLA 117.4i(9); MSA 5.2082(9).
and,
"For the exercise of all municipal powers in the management and control of municipal property and in the administration of the municipal government, whether such powers be expressly enumerated or not; for any act to advance the interests of the city, the good government and prosperity of the municipality and its inhabitants and through its regularly constituted authority to pass all laws and ordinances relating to its *333municipal concerns subject to the constitution and general laws of this state.” MCLA 117.4j(3); MSA 5.2083(3).
In pursuance thereof, the city adopted a charter, ch 2, § 1 of which provides that the city may regulate or prevent all things "detrimental to the health, morals, comfort, safety, convenience and welfare of the inhabitants of the city”. Pursuant to this charter authority, the city council adopted the aforementioned obscenity ordinance.
That the regulation of activities affecting public morals and welfare is a proper "municipal concern” is a proposition well settled in our cases. See Watnick v Detroit, 365 Mich 600; 113 NW2d 876 (1962); People v Sell, 310 Mich 305; 17 NW2d 193 (1945); People v Pennock, 294 Mich 578; 293 NW 759 (1940). See, also, Young v American Mini Theaters, Inc, 427 US 50; 96 S Ct 2440; 49 L Ed 2d 310 (1976). Incontrovertibly, obscenity is a matter germane to public morals and welfare.
The majority has concluded that the state statutory scheme has pre-empted the East Detroit obscenity ordinance, and all those like it, for two reasons:
1) "[B]ecause the comprehensiveness of the statutory scheme established by the state shows a pre-emptive [legislative] intent”,
and
2) "[B]ecause the nature of the regulated subject matter demands uniform, statewide treatment”.
In my view that conclusion is neither legally nor factually sound.
Essentially, the principle of pre-emption is that when general law on a specific subject occupies a *334particular field so completely that any local ordinances seeking to regulate conduct in that field will necessarily conflict because of inconsistency between the two, the ordinance must give way to the general law.
Consequently, to justify the conclusion in this case that the state legislation has pre-empted the field of obscenity regulation, it must be clearly evident that the East Detroit ordinance is in direct conflict with the Constitution or a state statute. Merely because the state has entered into the field of obscenity regulation is no justification for the implication that local regulation will necessarily conflict. When the Legislature prohibits certain conduct, local communities may nevertheless prohibit other and different conduct in the same field, providing the state and local enactments are not in conflict.
We addressed this aspect of the pre-emption doctrine in a different context in Miller v Fabius Twp Board, 366 Mich 250, 256-257; 114 NW2d 205 (1962), in which we quoted approvingly from 37 Am Jur, Municipal Corporations, § 165, p 790 as follows:
"It has been held that in determining whether the provisions of a municipal ordinance conflict with a statute covering the same subject, the test is whether the ordinance prohibits an act which the statute permits, or permits an act which the statute prohibits.
"The mere fact that the State, in the exercise of the police power, has made certain regulations does not prohibit a municipality from exacting additional requirements. So long as there is no conflict between the two, and the requirements of the municipal bylaw are not in themselves pernicious, as being unreasonable or discriminatory, both will stand. The fact that an ordi*335nance enlarges upon the provisions of a statute by requiring more than the statute requires creates no conflict therewith, unless the statute limits the requirement for all cases to its own prescription. Thus, where both an ordinance and a statute are prohibitory and the only difference between them is that the ordinance goes further in its prohibition, but not counter to the prohibition under the statute, and the municipality does not attempt to authorize by the ordinance what the legislature has forbidden or forbid what the legislature has expressly licensed, authorized, or required, there is nothing contradictory between the provisions of the statute and the ordinance because of which they cannot coexist and be effective. Unless legislative provisions are contradictory in the sense that they cannot coexist, they are not deemed inconsistent because of mere lack of uniformity in detail.”
Until today, this Court has consistently followed the quoted rule in holding that portions of a field not covered by state law are open to local regulation. Miller v Fabius Twp Board, supra; City of Howell v Kaal, 341 Mich 585; 67 NW2d 704 (1954); Loose v Battle Creek, 309 Mich 1; 14 NW2d 554 (1944); Eanes v Detroit, 279 Mich 531; 272 NW 896 (1937); People v McGraw, 184 Mich 233; 150 NW 836 (1915).
"The rule has long been recognized that municipalities are not divested of all control even where the legislature has enacted laws.” Miller, supra, p 257.
This Court has never inferred pre-emption merely because the state and local communities have legislated in the same field. On the contrary, in order to insure the reasonableness of such a finding and to properly safeguard the authority of local communities, this Court has always demonstrated an express showing of the Legislature’s *336intent to exclusively occupy the field before invalidating an ordinance on pre-emptive grounds.5
*337The majority concedes that there is "no express statutory language nor legislative history which indicates one way or the other whether the state statutory scheme pre-empts an ordinance such as the one before us”. The Court thus appears to overlook our precedential requirement that an express showing of a legislative expression of intent to pre-empt the field be made before we will invalidate a local ordinance.
The language of the statute itself in no sense expresses or even infers an intent to occupy the field of obscenity regulation to the exclusion of local communities.
The first of the two reasons assigned by the majority for finding pre-emption is that "the comprehensiveness of the statutory scheme established by the state shows a pre-emptive intent”. That the statute in question is not sufficiently comprehensive to suggest such a legislative intent is evident from a line by line comparison of it with the ordinance. The ordinance forbids nothing the statute permits and permits nothing the statute forbids, criteria we approved in Miller, supra. Further evidence that the statute lacks the pre-emptive comprehensiveness claimed for it by the ma*338jority is this Court’s on the record declaration in People v Bloss, 394 Mich 79, 81; 228 NW2d 384 (1975), while speaking of the statute here in question, that:
"We are divided as to whether such statutes can properly be construed by us without further legislative expression as proscribing the dissemination of 'obscene’ material to consenting adults.” (Emphasis added.)
Absent such construction or subsequent legislation,6 local ordinances proscribing such conduct can hardly be said to be inconsistent with the general law or the general law be held so comprehensive as to pre-empt local ordinances.
Because the state law has neither expressly nor by reasonable inference permitted the dissemination of obscene material to consenting adults, on that point alone it is unquestionably within the province of local authorities to further protect their legitimate interests in the field of obscenity legislation through the enactment of local ordinances prohibiting such conduct.
The second reason relied upon by the Court in concluding that the ordinance before us is preempted is "because the nature of the regulated subject matter demands uniform, statewide treatment”.
The fact that a subject is one which logically lends itself to statewide uniform regulation or even demands it is hardly justification for the conclusion that such legislation has been enacted, or if enacted is in conflict with local ordinances on the subject. More significantly, whether the regulation of obscenity "demands uniform, statewide treatment” is a judgment for the Legislature to *339make, not the judiciary. It has given no indication to date, despite this Court’s invitation in Bloss, supra, of an intent to pre-emptively provide the comprehensive, uniform statewide regulation my colleagues say the subject demands.
The considerations advanced by the majority in favor of pre-emption are factors to be weighed by our state Legislature in deliberations concerning future obscenity legislation.
Should the Legislature deem it appropriate, it may choose to completely occupy the field at that time. Under the present statutory scheme, however, local governments are not prohibited from legislating in the interest of furthering a valid "municipal concern” by regulating obscenity within their respective communities in a manner that does not conflict with the state’s non-exclusive regulation in this field.
The prevailing opinion does violence to the legitimate interests of our municipalities in locally regulating a subject of vital concern to them by striking down virtually every ordinance in Michigan proscribing obscenity, despite the fact that the state has not adequately legislated in the field.
Coleman and Fitzgerald, JJ., concurred with Ryan, J.Chapter 129 of title IX, §§ 9.301, 9.302, 9.303 and 9.305.
MCLA 750.343a et seq.; MSA 28.575(1) et seq.
Const 1963, art 7, § 22 provides:
"Under general laws the electors of each city and village shall have the power and authority to frame, adopt and amend its charter, and to amend an existing charter of the city or village heretofore granted or enacted by the legislature for the government of the city or village. Each such city and village shall have power to adopt resolutions and ordinances relating to its municipal concerns, property and government, subject to the constitution and law. No enumeration of powers granted to cities and villages in this constitution shall limit or restrict the general grant of authority conferred by this section.”
MCLA 117.4Í; MSA 5.2082.
From Walsh v River Rouge, 385 Mich 623, 635; 189 NW2d 318 (1971):
"The act specifically declares in § 2, 'the legislative intent [is] to invest the governor with sufficiently broad power of action in the exercise of the police power of the state to provide adequate control over persons and conditions during such periods of impending or actual public crisis or disaster. The provisions of this act shall be broadly construed to effectuate this purpose.’ ”
From Grand Haven v Grocer’s Cooperative Dairy Co, 330 Mich 694, 701; 48 NW2d 362 (1951):
"That by enactment of the pertinent statutory provisions, the legislature intended to and did take over plenary control of pasteurization of dairy products is quite conclusively indicated by the following quoted sections of the statute:
" 'Sec. 1. The purpose of this act is to secure the wholesomeness and safety of milk, cream, skimmed milk and other milk products by requiring pasteurization as herein set forth.’
" 'Sec. 5. It shall be the duty of the department of agriculture to enforce the provisions of this act.’ 1948 CL 288.131, 288.135; MSA 12.693[11], 12.693[15]).”
From Builders Ass’n v Detroit, 295 Mich 272, 275-276; 294 NW 677 (1940):
"The State statute provides, in part, as follows:
" 'No person shall keep open his shop, warehouse, or workhouse, or shall do any manner of labor, business, or work, or be present at any dancing, or at any public diversion, show, or entertainment, or take part, in any sport, game, or play on the first day of the week. The foregoing provisions shall not apply to works of necessity and charity, nor to the making of mutual promises of marriage, nor to the solemnization of marriages. And every person so offending shall be punished by fine not exceeding ten dollars for each offense.’ 1929 CL 9078; MSA 18.851.
" 'No person who conscientiously believes that the seventh day of the week ought to be observed as the Sabbath, and actually refrains from secular business and labor on that day, shall be liable to the penalties provided in this chapter, for performing secular business or labor on the said first day of the week, provided he disturb no other person.’ 1929 CL 9083; MSA 18.855.
"In the instant case the legislature, in prohibiting the transaction of business on Sunday, exempts from the application of the statute those who conscientiously believe that the seventh day of the week should be observed as the Sabbath, providing they disturb no other person. No such exception is to be found in the ordinance before us. It applies to all alike, regardless of religious convictions. It denies to the conscientious observer of the seventh day of the week as the Sabbath *337the right to transact business on Sunday, which is granted such individual by the exception to be found in the statute. It attempts to prohibit that which the statute permits and is, therefore, void.”
From Noey v Saginaw, 271 Mich 595, 598; 261 NW 88 (1935):
"The power conferred upon the city under the constitutional provision is 'subject to the Constitution and general laws of this State.’ The constitutional amendment, providing for a liquor control commission, vested in it when established by act of the legislature 'complete control of the alcoholic beverage traffic within this State, including the retail sales thereof.’ The legislature, after providing for its creation, conferred upon it, subject to certain exceptions, 'the sole right, power and duty to control the alcoholic beverage traffic * * * within the State,’ and to 'adopt rules and regulations governing the carrying out of this act and supplemental thereto.’
“The word 'control,’ as used in the Constitution, means to regulate and govern.”
None has been forthcoming to date.