dissenting.
The Municipal Police Officers’ Education and Training Commission (Commission) revoked Paul F. DiSalvatore’s certification as a municipal police officer pursuant to 37 Pa.Code § 203.14(a)(6), which states that the Commission may revoke a certification where the officer has been convicted of a “disqualifying criminal offense.” The regulation at 37 Pa.Code § 203.1 defines a “disqualifying criminal offense” as a criminal offense for which more than one year in prison “can be imposed as punishment.” I do not agree with the majority that, as a matter of law, “the conviction [of DiSalva-tore] was for a criminal offense for which more than one year in prison could be imposed as punishment under 37 Pa.Code § 203.1.” (Majority op. at 316.) Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
Because this case arises out of the system of military justice, which involves different kinds of courts-martial with varying degrees of authority, I believe the question presented under 37 Pa.Code § 203.1 in this case is whether more than one year in prison could have been imposed as punishment by the court with jurisdiction over the matter.1 There are three kinds of courts-martial in the armed forces: (1) general courts-martial; (2) special courts-martial; and (3) summary courts-martial. 10 U.S.C. § 816. The two that concern us here are the general and the special courts-martial. For the most part, general courts-martial have authority to impose any punishment, including the death penalty. 10 U.S.C. § 818. Special courts-martial, on the other hand, may impose punishment, but may not impose as punishment confinement for more than six months. 10 U.S.C. § 819 (1998). Thus, DiSalvatore could have received more than one year in prison for his conviction only if he was convicted by a general court-martial. Consequently, I believe that the Commission had to present substantial evidence to support the finding that DiSalva-tore was convicted by a general, as opposed to a special court-martial, a burden that the Commission failed to satisfy. (R.R. at 118a.)
In this regard, the only evidence that matters is Exhibit No. I,2 which contains various documents from the record of Di-Salvatore’s trial. Within Exhibit No. 1, the only document that pertains directly to whether DiSalvatore was convicted by a general or special court-martial is Action and Order No. DN026-92. (R.R. at 99a-100a.) This piece of evidence, which consists of two pages, is critical because it alone shows that DiSalvatore was convict*318ed of a criminal offense. Therefore, it must be examined carefully.
The caption on the first page of Action and Order No. DN026-92 indicates that a general court-martial was convened, and the first paragraph below the caption states that DiSalvatore “was arraigned” at a general court-martial. (R.R. at 99a.) The fact that a general court-martial was convened and that DiSalvatore was arraigned before it does not necessarily mean that he was convicted and sentenced by the general court-martial.3 Indeed, on the same page, under the heading “ACTION,” it states: “In the Special Court-Martial of ... [DiSalvatore], tried on 8 April 1992, the sentence is approved and ordered executed.” (R.R. at 99a.) (Emphasis added.) Thus, the evidence shows that, although DiSalvatore may have been arraigned before a general court-martial, his trial was before a special court-martial.
The second page of Action and Order No. DN026-92, signed by the convening authority, Paul K. Van Riper, Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps, indicates that DiSalvatore was tried, convicted and sentenced by a special court-martial. This is evident from the caption, which reads: “SPECIAL COURT-MARTIAL CONVENING AUTHORITY’S ACTION & ORDER NO. DN026-92 CONT’D.” (R.R. at 100a.)
Finally, the Director of the Administrative Support Division for the U.S. Marine Corps certified Action and Order No. DN026-92 as Special Court-Martial Order (SPCMO) No. DN026-92. (R.R. at 18a-19a, 94a.) I note that, in cases where the Department of Transportation (DOT) suspends a license as the result of a conviction involving a motor vehicle, the report of the clerk of courts to DOT is sufficient to establish the conviction. Department of Transportation v. Johns, 153 Pa.Cmwlth. 312, 621 A.2d 1064 (1993). Likewise, here, the Director’s certification stating that the convening authority’s order is a special court-martial order establishes that DiSalvatore was convicted by a special court-martial.
Having considered the evidence presented by the Commission, I conclude that the Commission failed to meet its burden of proving with substantial evidence that Di-Salvatore could have received a sentence of more than one year in prison for his aggravated assault conviction.
Accordingly, I would reverse the Commission’s order revoking DiSalvatore’s certification as a municipal police officer.
. The majority treats this case as if it arose out of the court system of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Under our state court system, the court of common pleas would have jurisdiction over a first-degree felony charge of aggravated assault and would be able to impose the maximum sentence permitted for that charge.
I fail to see how this court can determine whether a particular sentence could be imposed on a person without considering the sentencing power of the court with jurisdiction over the matter. Indeed, the majority does not cite any legal authority for the proposition that the military must assign a particular case to a court-martial with the authority to impose the maximum penalty for the alleged offenses.
. Examining the evidence presented, I agree with the majority that the Commission’s Exhibit Nos. 3 and 4 are not competent to support a finding that the court martial was general. (See majority op. at 315.) Exhibit No. 2, which is simply a portion of the Manual for Court-Martial, is not relevant to the issue. (R.R. at 103a-08a.)
. The record indicates that, in addition to the general court-martial, a summary court-martial was convened and that DiSalvatore appeared before it. (R.R. at 97a.)