Dissenting Opinion by
Hoffman, J.:In this appeal from a judgment of sentence for burglary and larceny, appellant contends that the trial judge committed reversible error in its charge to the jury relating to the testimony of an alleged accomplice.
The pertinent portion of the charge is as follows: “It would not be possible in this case to exculpate Mr. Keppel unless you find that you cannot find Mr. Pettit (the alleged accomplice) believable in what he said Mr. Keppel did. That is what is at issue here, what he has said that he saw Mr. Keppel do and what he has said he heard Mr. Keppel say to him.”
When this statement by the trial judge is read in conjunction with the accomplice’s testimony, it is clear that fundamental error was committed. The accomplice testified that he and appellant were together on *27the night of the crime. They drove from Easton, Pa., to Bethlehem, Pa., where they stopped at several restaurants and aided a stranded motorist. As they drove through Bethlehem, appellant allegedly stated that he knew of a house where there was money. Appellant cruised by the house several times, but then parked his car on another street. The accomplice was not familiar with the area and could not state where the house was.
After parking, the appellant and the accomplice left the car. The accomplice followed appellant for a short time, but soon returned to the car. He did not see appellant thereafter until appellant returned to the car, and could not testify as to appellant’s activities during that period of time. Shortly thereafter, both were arrested and charged with the burglary of a home in the vicinity.
The quoted portion of the trial judge’s charge required the jury to return a guilty verdict if they believed the accomplice’s testimony. The credibility of the witness thus became the sole determinant of guilt. A trial judge may in clear cases instruct a jury that they may convict on the basis of a witness’ testimony if it is believed. However, such an instruction may be given only where the witness’ testimony conclusively establishes every fact necessary to sustain a conviction. Commonwealth v. Williams, 185 Pa. Superior Ct. 312, 185 A. 2d 903 (1958); Commonwealth v. Hull, 65 Pa. Superior Ct. 450, 463 (1917); Commonwealth v. Clay, 56 Pa. Superior Ct. 427 (1914).
The accomplice’s testimony in the instant case falls far short of establishing all of the elements necessary to prove the crimes of burglary and larceny. At best, the accomplice’s testimony shows an intent to burglarize a house in the area,1 but little more. It certainly *28does not show the execution of the burglary and larceny with which the appellant was charged. In conjunction with other evidence presented in the case, a jury might return a verdict of guilty. This was not, however, the option given to the jury in the quoted portion of the charge. In mandatory language, the jury was told that a verdict of guilty was required if they believed testimony which did not establish the commission of the crimes charged. In essence, the jury was permitted to make a finding of guilty on insufficient evidence. Even if the statement is construed to be a mere expression by the trial judge in the belief of appellant’s guilt on the basis of the accomplice’s testimony a new trial is warranted. See Commonwealth v. Ewell, 456 Pa. 589, 597 (1974) (concurring opinion) and cases cited therein.
A further objection to the judge’s charge lies in the manner in which it was worded. By stating that “[i]t would not be possible ... to exculpate [appellant]” if the accomplice was believed, the trial judge conveyed to the jury the impression that it was to deliberate on that evidence for the purpose of determining appellant’s innocence. It would have been possible for the jury to accept the testimony as truthful and still believe appellant’s testimony that he did not burglarize the house after he left the car.
We have held that a charge which gave similar weight to an accomplice’s testimony, without reference to evidence offered by the defendant which was sufficient to create a reasonable doubt, was basic and fundamental error. In Commonwealth v. Didio, 212 Pa. Superior Ct. 51, 57, 239 A. 2d 883 (1968), the trial judge charged the jury as follows: “Whether or not you determine this Defendant to be guilty or not (sic) depends *29upon whether or not you believe the testimony of [the accomplice]. If you believe this testimony, it is sufficient in law for you to find the Defendant guilty. . . .” In an opinion by Judge (now President Judge) Watkins, we held that the charge was error in the absence of an instruction that the defendant’s evidence could raise a reasonable doubt as to guilt.2 Our statement therein is particularly apropos to the instant case: “. . . [T]he charge as a whole gives the clear impression that the testimony of [the accomplice] was crucial, and, if believed, the defendant must be found guilty, so that the remaining evidence would have no weight. . . . There is justification in the complaint of the defendant that there was an implied shift in the burden of proof.” 212 Pa. Superior Ct. at 58. The charge in the instant case is more strongly worded, and thus all the more objectionable.
Although appellant did not specifically object to the charge,3 as in Didio, I believe that the charge had such an adverse effect upon appellant’s right to a fair trial that it constituted basic and fundamental error and may be considered on appeal. Commonwealth v. *30Didio, 212 Pa. Superior Ct. at 54; see Commonwealth v. Ewell, 456 Pa. 589, 319 A. 2d 153 (1974).
Judgment should be reversed and appellant granted a new trial.
Watkins, P. J., and Spaeth, J., join in this dissenting opinion.There is no question but that the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to convict under proper instructions. Several *28cans of beer and two bottles of whiskey were found in the car, identified as stolen form the burglarized premises.
The defendant took the stand and testified that he never said that he was going to burglarize the house. He stated that he stopped the car in order to take a walk and get some air. It is, of course, entirely possible that while appellant was walking the accomplice entered the house. In summarizing the evidence, the trial judge characterized appellant’s testimony as a general denial, never indicating that the testimony could create a reasonable doubt.
The Majority Opinion suggests that the recent ease of Dilliplaine v. Lehigh Valley Trust Co., 457 Pa. 255, 322 A. 2d 114 (1974), should be applied to the instant case. Dllliplaine holds that the doctrine of basic and fundamental error should no longer be applied in civil eases, and that failure to object will hereafter bo deemed a waiver of an issue on appeal. My reading of Dllliplaine reveals no expression by the Majority of the Supreme Court to extend that policy to criminal cases.