(dissenting).
I dissent. Minn.Stat. § 541.15 (1988) is silent as to whether the claims of minors’ parents are also tolled. There is no readily apparent “plain meaning,” and the language of the statute offers little guidance for resolution of this issue of statutory construction. Because this issue is unsettled under Minnesota law, it is helpful to examine cases from other jurisdictions. Though presenting the minority position, the decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Korth v. American Family Ins. Co., 115 Wis.2d 326, 340 N.W.2d 494 (1983), is illustrative because, unlike the approach followed by the majority of courts in other jurisdictions, it examines the competing arguments and analyzes the relevant policy considerations. I agree with the Korth court that the best approach to resolving this issue is to examine the legal context in which the parents’ claim arises and make a determination that furthers the policies of the law in question.1 See id., 115 Wis.2d at 331-32, 340 N.W.2d at 496.
*243The basic purpose of statutes of limitations is to protect defendants from stale claims brought after evidence is unavailable. See Swenson v. Emerson Elec. Co., 374 N.W.2d 690, 696 (Minn.1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1130, 106 S.Ct. 1998, 90 L.Ed.2d 678 (1986); Korth, 115 Wis.2d at 332, 340 N.W.2d at 497. Although the public has a strong interest in the prompt filing of claims, the unique circumstances of personal injury claims of minors and their parents, together with the policies supporting joinder of claims, justify construing Minn.Stat. § 541.15 (1988) to toll both the child’s and the parents’ limitation period.
In many cases involving personal injuries to minors, the full extent of the injuries, both physical and psychological, are unas-certainable until long after the injury. This is especially true in situations like the present case where the child was less than 2 years old when injured. Since defendants are already required to preserve evidence and maintain their readiness to defend against the child’s claim, they will not be prejudiced by the tolling of the parents’ claims as these claims are based upon the same occurrence. Thus, the primary purpose of statutes of limitations is not an overriding concern in these types of cases. Extending the tolling statute to parents would probably ensure that the parents’ and child’s claim be brought together, but not until the full extent of the child’s injuries are known.
The joinder of claims arising from the same occurrence upholds the public’s interest in the prompt, complete, and efficient settlement of controversies in one proceeding. See Korth, 115 Wis.2d at 331, 340 N.W.2d at 496. Joinder of related claims also minimizes the possibility of multiple litigation and inconsistent judgments. See id. The fact that Minnesota law may not require the joinder of the parents’ suit with their child’s does not render the policies supporting the joinder of claims any less important.
Under the majority’s interpretation of the statute, parents will be forced to bring their suit within 6 years even though their child’s claim for damages may not be ripe. Forcing the parents to bring suit within 6 years might also compel them to bring the minor’s suit at the same time, thereby eliminating the extended time period provided by the tolling statute. Granted, parents may elect not to prosecute their action and wait until the full extent of their child’s injuries are known, but this would result in two essentially duplicative lawsuits and trials. Such a result is inconsistent with judicial economy. In addition, having two trials would raise a serious question as to whether res judicata would apply to the second suit based on the results in the first. See Thill v. Modern Erecting Co., 284 Minn. 508, 170 N.W.2d 865 (1969). Clearly, tolling the limitations period of both the child’s and parents’ claim is a reasonable construction of the statute that promotes efficiency and fairness in the courts.
. The Wisconsin statute tolling the statute of limitations during minority cited in Korth, was Wis. Stat. § 893.18(2) (1982), which provided:
If a person entitled to bring an action mentioned in this chapter, except actions for the recovery of a penalty or forfeiture or against a sheriff or other officer for an escape, or for the recovery of real property or the possession thereof is, at the time the cause of action accrued, either (a) Within the age of 18 years, except for actions against health care providers * * * the time of such disability is not a *243part of the time limited for the commencement of the action * * *.
See Korth, 115 Wis.2d at 328-29, 340 N.W.2d at 495. This statute is similar to Minn.Stat. § 541.15 (1988).