(dissenting).
I would affirm this conviction for intentional damage to property under SDCL 22-34-1. The majority opinion views the evidence too narrowly and unnecessarily restricts proper evidence.
The essential facts are that defendant received an adverse jury verdict at 3:30 p.m. on October 22,1987. Within thirty-six hours of the adverse jury verdict, the glass in the doors of the opposition law office was broken on five (5) separate occasions. On all five occasions, the glass appeared to be broken with a cement block or a wooden object. Defendant was identified as the man with sandy blond hair who was seen on the premises on the third occasion with a cement block in his hand. He wore a black trench coat. Defendant was seen leaving the premises getting into a car which was parked near the law office. The vehicle license number was copied, traced to defendant, and he was arrested shortly thereafter. Wooden splinters or residue which were found in the shattered glass on one occasion could have come from a wooden cane found in the front seat of defendant’s car along with a black trench coat.
Itzen was charged with an indictment which provided in part “That on or about the 23rd of October ... [he] intentionally damage[d] ... private property, namely several windows [of] ... Davenport Law Firm[.]” (emphasis added).
The trial court ruled that the State could not show the extent of the damage or the cost of repairs of the other four incidents, but permitted evidence of all five incidents. However, at the outset, the trial court urged the defendant to move to strike the other incidents from the record if not connected to him. Although he made general objections to a few related questions, defendant did not move to strike these incidents from the record during the trial, nor did he request the court to instruct the jury to disregard this evidence. Consequently, the State contends “he has waived any objection on appeal.” I agree. In effect, defendant has failed to have the trial court give a final ruling on the matter. SDCL 19-9-3; State v. Jones, 416 N.W.2d 875 (S.D.1987); State v. Holter, 340 N.W.2d 691 (S.D.1983). Defendant, who was acting “pro se,”1 may have forgotten or he may have concluded that the State’s evidence of all five incidents “within 36 hours of the adverse jury verdict was more than a mere *670coincidence” and sufficiently connected him to all of them. In this context, the majority opinion fails to explain how evidence of these four other incidents were actually prejudicial to defendant if in fact the State failed to “connect” them to him.
Even more important is the fact that the trial court’s initial ruling was partially in error because it “misses the mark” and was “too restrictive.” The trial court and now the majority opinion incorrectly conclude that the State had to prove that defendant committed each separate incident to make them admissible. Just the opposite is true. The evidence of the other incidents were admissible because they tend to prove that defendant committed the third incident.2
This is not a “prior bad acts” problem under SDCL 19-12-5. This is simply a problem of relevancy. This is a series of similar events in a short period of time which were essentially contemporaneous. This evidence, though circumstantial, was relevant, material, and competent. Under such circumstances SDCL 19-12-5 is not implicated because “[ejvidence of ‘an uncharged offense arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions as the charged offense is not an “extrinsic” offense within the meaning of rule 404(b) [SDCL 19-12-5]’ and is thus admissible.” United States v. Simpson, 709 F.2d 903, 907 (5th Cir.1983) {quoting United States v. Gonzalez, 661 F.2d 488, 493 (5th Cir.1981)), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 942, 104 S.Ct. 360, 78 L.Ed.2d 322 (1983); see also United States v. Leichtman, 742 F.2d 598, 604 (11th Cir.1984). Accordingly, when evidence that is not part of the crime charged “forms an integral and natural part of an account of the crime, or is necessary to complete the story of the crime for the jury” admission is proper. United States v. Williford, 764 F.2d 1493, 1499 (11th Cir.1985); see also United States v. Currier, 821 F.2d 52 (1st Cir.1987); United States v. Brennan, 798 F.2d 581 (2d Cir.1986); United States v. Howard, 504 F.2d 1281 (8th Cir.1974); State v. Scott, 211 Neb. 237, 318 N.W.2d 94 (1982). Moreover, admission of such evidence that completes the story is proper even though the evidence tends to show the commission of another offense. Chase v. Crisp, 523 F.2d 595, 600 n. 4 (10th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 947, 96 S.Ct. 1418, 47 L.Ed.2d 354 (1976). In the present case, evidence of the uncharged incidents of glass damage is inextricably intertwined with the charged offense. A full account of the crime is not possible without reference to all incidents of damage. Thus, the uncharged offense cannot be considered “prior bad acts” within the scope of SDCL 19-12-5, and the challenged evidence is admissible.
Even if one were to conclude that this case presents a “prior bad acts” problem under SDCL 19-12-5, the evidence was admissible and not reversible error. The evidence was relevant under SDCL 19-12-1, more probative than prejudicial under SDCL 19-12-3, and materially at issue on the question of identity (and possibly motive) under SDCL 19-12-5. As indicated above, this was a series of similar events in a short period of time which were essentially contemporaneous.
This evidence was not being offered “to prove the character of [defendant] in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith” in violation of SDCL 19-12-5. It was offered as proper, relevant evidence to support the State’s position that the defendant, and defendant only, was motivated to commit these acts of revenge. Therefore, the inference the jury was permitted to draw was proper, not improper. This evi*671dence was admissible and this conviction was proper.
. Neither the defendant nor the State should be penalized for defendant's choosing to act "pro se.” Defendant should not receive preferential treatment on rulings such as this. The defendant received a "reasonably” fair trial, despite his repeated rejection of advice from his court-appointed counsel.
. The majority contends the evidence is irrelevant because Itzen was not connected to the uncharged incidents. However, to be relevant, evidence simply must have a "tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” SDCL 19-12-1. The evidence in question meets this requirement. For example, whether Itzen caused the third incident of glass damage is a fact of consequence to the determination of this action. Evidence of the first incident shows that the incidents began within hours of the unfavorable jury verdict in Itzen’s personal injury action. That evidence is relevant because it tends to make it more probable that Itzen, rather than someone else, caused the damage in the third incident.