¶ 34. concurring and dissenting. I acknowledge that the majority’s decision to require plain error to correct Rule 11 deficiencies in direct appeals follows State v. Thompson, 162 Vt. 532, 650 A.2d 139 (1994), a decision I joined. I conclude, however, that the plain error holding in Thompson is wrong and should be overruled, particularly in light of overwhelming evidence that our decisions have led to regular noncompliance with Rule 11.1, therefore, dissent on this point.
¶ 35. Our law normally requires a contemporaneous objection to court rulings later claimed to constitute such error as to require the reversal of the judgment so that the trial court has the opportunity to correct the error. See State v. Griffin, 152 Vt. 41, 45, 563 A.2d 642, 645 (1989); State v. Curtis, 145 Vt. 552, 553, 494 A.2d 143, 144 (1985); In re Mecier, 143 Vt. 23, 28-29, 460 A.2d 472, 475-76 (1983). In the absence of a contemporaneous objection, we will take action only if an error is “plain”: that is, it will result in a miscarriage of justice or is so glaring, grave and serious that it “strikes at the very heart of the defendant’s constitutional rights.” State v. Tahair, 172 Vt. 101, 110, 772 A.2d 1079, 1086 (2001). Our decision in Thompson simply applied our preexisting preservation requirement to Rule 11 errors.
¶ 36. There was no examination in Thompson of whether it made any sense to require preservation of a Rule 11 error. Although in a slightly different context, we did address these questions, in part, in State v. West, 164 Vt. 192, 200-01, 667 A.2d 540, 545-46 (1995), where we found that the trial court faked to comply with V.R.Cr.P. 23(a) in accepting a waiver of the right to trial by jury. As in this case, there was no preservation in the trial court. See State v. Loveland, 165 Vt. 418, 420, 684 A.2d 272, 274 (1996) (under West, no preservation required to raise violations of V.R.Cr.P. 23(a) on appeal). We noted that the rule contemplates “that only a personal colloquy wkl enable the court to ensure the defendant understands the critical information on which the waiver must be based.” West, 164 Vt. at 200, 667 A.2d at 545. We also noted that “[w]e rejected the use of preprinted information on a printed form because of the great risk such information would neither be read nor absorbed.” Id. We examined whether we should require the kind of presence of prejudice standard that would result from limited plain-error review. We held that a showing of prejudice was unnecessary because of the nature of the right involved and because a prejudice requirement “would be wholly inconsistent with a prophylactic rule created to ensure that a waiver is informed, voluntary and intekigent.” Id. at 201, 667 A.2d at 546. We added that the “point of [Rule 23(a)], ... and other such advice or cokoquy requirements, is to *156create specific requirements to avoid a case-by-case inquiry of the state of mind of the defendant.” Id.
¶ 37. I think it was obvious that the holdings of West and Thompson were inconsistent. Certainly, if preservation is not required to raise defects in the advice given before waiving a jury trial and going to trial before a judge, preservation should not be required to raise defects in the advice given before waiver of any trial in favor of a plea of guilty. Indeed, Justice Morse, the author of the majority opinion here, made the point in his dissent in West, 164 Vt. at 203 n.*, 667 A.2d at 547 n.*, that Rule 11 and Rule 23(a) should be treated in a consistent manner.
¶ 38. The majority’s attempt to distinguish them is both wrong and a misdirection. It is a misdirection because the issue before us is whether preservation is required for direct review, and on this point, the decisions are directly contrary, see Loveland, 165 Vt. at 420, 684 A.2d at 274 (West “allowed defendants to attack the validity of jury trial waivers in this Court without any preservation below”), and none of the distinctions the majority raises are relevant to the standard of review question. Further, the majority is wrong in concluding that West and the Rule 11 decisions cited in it reached different conclusions when substantial compliance was shown; in fact, this Court intentionally didn’t reach the substantial compliance question because the jury trial waiver failed even under any application of substantial compliance. West, 164 Vt. at 202, 667 A.2d at 546.
¶ 39. Because of the conflict between West and Thompson, in the few cases in which Rule 11 violations have been raised on direct appeal following West, the defendants, usually represented by the defender general’s office, have asked us to overrule Thompson. In the seven intervening years, we have never relied upon Thompson to reach our decision, usually noting the request to overrule it and finding it unnecessary to reach the question. See State v. Blish, 172 Vt. 265, 268, 776 A.2d 380, 383 (2001); State v. Thompson, 167 Vt. 383, 387, 708 A.2d 192, 194 (1998).
¶ 40. Under Thompson, the majority would require defendant to object to the absence of Rule 11 disclosures when they are not made. The required obj ection would presumably go something like this: ‘Your honor, I object to your failure to inform me that the maximum sentence for this offense is X years as required by Rule 11(c)(2).” Of course, the only person who can make such an objection is one who knows the information to be provided, thereby showing that the requirements of the rule are wholly unnecessary with respect to the person stating the objection. Put another way, the only person who cannot make this objection is a defendant who is *157ignorant of the Rule 11 information, exactly the person for whom the rule was created to protect. Not surprisingly, I can find no instance that any defendant has ever preserved a Rule 11 error, in this state or in any other jurisdiction.
¶ 41. I recognize that objections are generally preserved by lawyers, not clients, and lawyers theoretically could raise a Rule 11 challenge. We are dealing, however, with a rule that is intended to convey critical information to the client, not the lawyer. It is just as wrong if the client is deprived of the necessary information as a result of the action or inaction of the lawyer rather than the inaction or action of the court. Indeed, if it were deemed sufficient that lawyers would fully protect all the rights and interests of a client, we would have no Rule 11, relying instead on the lawyer to convey all the needed information. The United States Supreme Court essentially rejected that choice in McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969), and we rejected it by requiring the judge, not the defense lawyer, to provide the essential information and determine that defendant understands that information. See V.R.Cr.P. 11(c).
¶ 42. We also have to understand that the vast majority of guilty pleas result from plea negotiations, and the defense lawyer necessarily becomes the advocate for the negotiated settlement. As the recent case of In re Quinn, 174 Vt. 562, 564, 816 A.2d 425, 428 (2002) (mem.), demonstrates, the lawyer’s actions may be more geared to ensuring the plea agreement ■is consummated than to protecting the rights of the client. I find it unlikely that a defense lawyer would be seeking fuller and more detailed Rule 11 disclosures; again, I can find no record that lawyer preservation of an objection to a Rule 11 error has ever occurred. Put another way, I know of no case in which the lawyer made the comparable objection to that described above: ‘Your honor, I object to your failure to inform my client that the maximum sentence for this offense is X years as required by Rule 11(c)(2).” If the lawyer wanted the client to know this information, the lawyer would tell the client directly.
¶ 43. The majority essentially sticks its head in the sand on this point. It says that the lawyer has an obligation to protect the rights of the client, as if saying so will make it happen. Yet, it knows that in case after case that has come to this Court, the lawyer has never made the objection that it says it is the “obligation” of the lawyer to make, and that the only consequence of the failure to make that objection is that the client will lose rights. Given the very few instances in which Rule 11 questions have come here on direct appeal, and the minuscule chance of success for Rule 11 appeals as discussed below, I find incredible the majority’s charge that *158defense lawyers are failing to make the objection to provide a “hidden safety valve” to the client.
¶ 44. I also recognize that under V.R.Cr.P. 32(d) a defendant might attempt to withdraw a plea of guilty before sentencing because of a violation of Rule 11. In the past, we required the discretion provided by Rule 32(d) to be exercised liberally in favor of allowing a plea withdrawal if the motion was made before sentencing. See Reporter’s Notes, V.R.Cr.P. 32(d). Despite the opportunity under Rule 32(d), I doubt many defendants who are unaware of the information the court is supposed to provide under Rule 11 leam of it between plea and sentencing in order to make such a motion. I find no reported decision from this Court using the rule in this way. In any event, the traditional liberality was largely eliminated in State v. Fisk, 165 Vt. 260, 263, 682 A.2d 937, 939 (1996). See id. at 266, 682 A.2d at 940 (Dooley, J., dissenting). Under Fisk, defendant would have to show he had a subjective misunderstanding with respect to the Rule 11 information and present evidence to demonstrate that subjective misunderstanding was reasonable under the circumstances. Id. at 263, 682 A.2d at 939. I find defendant’s burden under Fisk indistinguishable from that in a post-conviction-relief proceeding. See id. at 266, 682 A.2d at 940 (import of decision is that there “is a strong presumption against allowing withdrawal” of a plea). I don’t agree with the majority’s response that the standards are different because in a PCR proceeding defendant would have to show prejudice. More important to this case, and as discussed below, the majority’s comparison in a Rule 11(f) case is clearly erroneous because we specifically held in In re Dunham, 144 Vt. 444, 451, 479 A.2d 144, 148 (1984), that, “[u]nlike collateral review of alleged defects under V.R.Cr.P. 11(c), which places a burden of proving prejudice upon the defendant, collateral attacks for defects under Rule 11(f) require no showing of prejudice.” In short, there is no prejudice requirement for PCR review in this case.
¶ 45. It is the sentencing that is likely to bring out any misunderstanding of the consequences of the plea of guilty. Yet, if the sentence involves incarceration, defendant no longer has any ability to correct a Rule 11 error in the district court once the sentence is imposed. See V.R.Cr.P. 32(d). Even where the district court retains jurisdiction because defendant is not in custody under sentence, the burden that must be overcome is no easier than that necessary to successfully obtain plain-error review. See id. (plea may be withdrawn after sentence “only to correct manifest injustice”); State v. Yates, 169 Vt. 20, 27-28, 726 A.2d 483, 488 (1999). Thus, as explained by the majority in this case, the real remaining remedy is a post-conviction-relief proceeding in superior court.
*159¶ 46. My point is that whatever the theoretical possibilities, there is actually no such thing as direct review of a Rule 11 error under the. majority’s holding. There can only be plain error review or a collateral attack in a post-conviction-relief proceeding. Although on the surface Thompson simply treated Rule 11 errors the same as all other errors in requiring preservation for review, in reality it carved out a special and unique class of errors — that is, failures to comply with Rule 11 — that are virtually unreviewable. It would help this debate if the majority would acknowledge that it is not about preservation, but is really about the standard of review for Rule 11 errors. The suggestion that defendant is somehow to blame for failure to object to the Rule 11 error only makes the majority’s policy much harder to swallow.
¶ 47. Is there some reason to make Rule 11 errors virtually unreviewable? To the extent this Court has articulated a rationale in the past, I suppose it is that the trial judge should always have the opportunity to correct errors and we do not want to reverse convictions solely for technical errors. I think the latter concern can be addressed by a common sense application of the rule, and the former argument is inadequate where, as here, preservation will never occur.
¶ 48. The majority has. stated part of the rationale for the United States Supreme Court decision in United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 72 (2002), and I have responded to that rationale above. The Court went further:
But the incentive to think and act early when Rule 11 is at stake would prove less substantial if Vonn’s position were law; a defendant could choose to say nothing about a judge’s plain lapse under Rule 11 until the moment of taking a direct appeal, at which time the burden would always fall on the Government to prove harmlessness. A defendant could simply relax and wait to see if the sentence later struck him as satisfactory; if not, his Rule 11 silence would have left him with clear but uneorrected Rule 11 error to place on the Government’s shoulders. This result might, perhaps, be sufferable if there were merit in Vonn’s objection that applying the plain-error standard to a defendant who stays mum on Rule 11 error invites the judge to relax. The plain-error rule, he says, would discount the judge’s duty to advise the defendant by obliging the defendant to advise the judge. But, rhetoric aside, that is always the point of the plain-error rule: the value of finality requires defense counsel to be on his toes, not just the judge, and the defendant who just *160sits there when a mistake can be fixed cannot just sit there when he speaks up later on.
Id. at 73.1 find this rationale unpersuasive. It presupposes a defendant with a preexisting knowledge of the details of Rule 11 and counsel who will obtain exacting compliance with Rule 11 even if it undermines a negotiated plea. It fails to recognize that a sentence after an appeal is unlikely to be more favorable to a defendant. It also fails to recognize that it is the sentence that shows the consequences of the plea that the Rule 11 colloquy may have omitted. The plain-error standard does, indeed, “discount the judge’s duty to advise the defendant by obliging the defendant to advise the judge.” Id. It may in theory require “defense counsel to be on his toes,” but in practice offers no incentive to defense counsel to do so and simply curtails direct review in all cases. Finally, the balancing of protection of the defendant’s rights against judgment finality may require very limited review in case of collateral attack; it should not reach the same conclusion on direct review.
¶ 49. Although I am struck by the weakness of the rationales for curtailing Rule 11 direct review, the real reason for my disagreement is the overwhelming evidence that limitations on review have eviscerated Rule 11 compliance. Virtually all of our Rule 11 decisions involve one form or another of collateral attack. Most of these decisions involve the colloquy requirement of Rule 11(e), the requirement that the court address the defendant “personally in open court” and inform the defendant and determine that the defendant understands the nature of the charge, the maximum and minimum penalty, the right to plead not guilty, the consequences of the guilty plea, the consequences of the court’s refusal to accept a plea agreement, and the consequences if the court questions the defendant under oath. V.R.Cr.P. 11(c)(1)-(6). In the course of those decisions, we have allowed virtually every possible violation of Rule 11(c), short of total noncompliance. See State v. Riefenstahl, 172 Vt. 597, 599, 779 A.2d 675, 678 (2001) (mem.); State v. Morrissette, 170 Vt. 569, 571, 743 A.2d 1091, 1093 (1999) (mem.); In re Thompson, 166 Vt. 471, 475, 697 A.2d 1111, 1113 (1997); State v. Pilette, 160 Vt. 509, 511-12, 630 A.2d 1296, 1297-98 (1993); In re Moulton, 158 Vt. 580, 583-84, 613 A.2d 705, 707-08 (1992); State v. Whitney, 156 Vt. 301, 302-03, 591 A.2d 388, 389-90 (1991); In re Fadden, 148 Vt. 116, 121-22, 530 A.2d 560, 563-64 (1987); In re Kivela, 145 Vt. 454, 457-58, 494 A.2d 126, 128-29 (1985); In re Bentley, 144 Vt. 404, 409-11, 477 A.2d 980, 982-83 (1984); In re Hall, 143 Vt. 590, 594-96, 469 A.2d 756, 758-59 (1983); In re Lovejoy, 131 Vt. 525, 527-28, 309 A.2d 926, 927 (1973); see also State v. Ploof, 162 Vt. 560, 562-63, 649 A.2d 774, 776-77 (1994) (direct appeal, plain error required); State v. Thompson, 162 Vt. at *161533-34, 650 A.2d at 141 (direct appeal, plain error required); State v. Gabert, 152 Vt. 83, 88-89, 564 A.2d 1356, 1359-60 (1989) (direct appeal). The only decision of this Court reversing a criminal conviction for failure to comply with Rule 11(c) noted that the defendant had serious mental limitations and the colloquy “hardly touched on the requirements of Rule 11(c).” State v. Thompson, 167 Vt. 383, 387, 708 A.2d 192, 194 (1998) (direct appeal; plain error found). We also reversed a delinquency adjudication in In re J.M., 172 Vt. 61, 63, 769 A.2d 656, 658 (2001), but only on a finding that the court “failed to conduct any V.R.Cr.P. 11 colloquy whatsoever.”
¶ 50. We have had a particularly large number of Rule 11 appeals in recent months in cases where predicate DUI convictions based on guilty pleas are being used to enhance the DUI charge in the case before us, usually into felony status. Prior to our holding in State v. Boskind, 174 Vt. 184, 192, 807 A.2d 358, 366 (2002), that a repeat-offense DUI defendant cannot challenge predicate convictions that lead to an enhanced penalty because of noncompliance with Rule 11 requirements, many district courts were allowing such challenges. We have had such a glut of these cases that most are being resolved on the express.track without a published opinion. These records demonstrate that it is almost always possible for a defendant to argue that a predicate conviction should not be used to enhance because of a substantial noncompliance with Rule 11(c). These records strongly suggest that the requirements of Rule 11(c) are too often honored in the breach.
¶ 51. Over 95% of our criminal cases are resolved on pleas of guilty or nolo contendere. This means that in busy trial courts guilty plea proceedings occur thousands and thousands of times each year. The quality of our criminal justice is actually determined by how we conduct those plea proceedings and not by how we conduct the relatively few criminal trials. At least as judged by the ideal created by Rule 11, we often do not measure up.
¶ 52. I recognize that the problem may be that the requirements of Rule 11 may be too rigid, causing an unnecessary time consumption incompatible with the mass processing of the volumes of cases in our courts. We should face up to that reality by examining the rule critically and making the needed adjustments to adapt it to current realities without sacrificing the essential protections against unconstitutional convictions. We now have the worst of the available options — legal requirements that are ignored by the same institutions that created them, demonstrating official disrespect for the law. As long as we have it in our *162power to reshape Rule 11 if it is incompatible with its function and fail to do so, we should enforce it.
¶ 53. Iam not arguing that we should change the standards of review on collateral attack of a conviction based on a guilty or nolo plea, and, therefore, my position would not affect the outcome in the vast majority of Rule 11 cases we have decided. Indeed, our collateral attack decisions frequently note that the standard to obtain relief is higher in the case of collateral attack. See In re Thompson, 166 Vt. at 475, 697 A.2d at 1113. I believe, however, that the current deficiency in Rule 11 compliance exists because there is no way to get review, even directly, to avoid the very limited standard of review that affirms the conviction despite virtually any Rule 11 error. Deviations from Rule 11 requirements for which there never can be conviction reversals simply let the deviations become the normal level of compliance.
¶ 54. Nor am I arguing that all violations of Rule 11, however technical, should cause reversals of criminal proceedings. Under V.R.Cr.P. 52(a), an error that “does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.” We have used this standard on countless occasions to separate errors that matter from those that do not. The wording is based on the federal rule, and has been used many times by the federal courts. See 3A C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure §§ 852-854 (1982). Although I recognize that I would not adopt the standard of review the majority favors, I cannot agree that it is unclear what standard I favor for direct review of a Rule 11 violation.
¶ 55. Again, I find the majority’s approach is to ignore the problem. I am not purporting to base my conclusions about Rule 11 compliance on a scientific study. Nor is it surprising that the numbers of appeals from guilty plea convictions are low because in most cases, irrespective of Rule 11 compliance, the result is fair and defendant is unlikely to improve upon it with resentencing. I am, however, seeing the same records on appeal as the rest of the Justices, and those records show that we have a substantial noncompliance problem. If we do not require or expect compliance with Rule 11, why is it surprising that compliance does not occur?
¶ 56. While I believe it inappropriate to require a finding of plain error to respond to a Rule 11 error on direct appeal in any case, there is a special reason why it is inappropriate in this case. Defendant alleges a violation of Rule 11(f), not Rule 11(c), because the court failed to make a sufficient inquiry to determine that there was a factual basis for defendant’s plea. In In re Dunham, 144 Vt. at 451, 479 A.2d at 148, a post-conviction-relief proceeding in which petitioner attacked a guilty plea because of noncompliance with Rule 11(f), this Court held: “Unlike *163collateral review of alleged defects under V.R.Cr.P. 11(c), which places a burden of proving prejudice upon the defendant, collateral attacks for defects under Rule 11(f) require no showing of prejudice.” By this decision, the majority has made defendant’s burden on direct appeal more onerous than that applicable to a collateral attack, exactly the opposite of how review should be structured. Moreover, we justified our decision in Thompson on the need for “a factual record” that could be obtained in a post-eonviction-relief proceeding, 162 Vt. at 534, 650 A.2d at 140, but under Dunham no factual record is necessary to evaluate a Rule 11(f) error in such a proceeding.
¶ 57. Although my primary dissent is to the limited standard of review in the majority’s holding, I also believe that it’s conclusion, even under its limited standard of review, is wrong. There was no compliance with Rule 11(f) in this case. Indeed, the majority’s rationale for finding no error is a vivid demonstration why our law in this area is in need of modification.
¶ 58. After a colloquy directed at whether defendant understood the information set out in Rule 11 (c), the prosecution requested that the court determine the factual basis for the plea. The court first asked defense counsel whether defendant conceded that there was a factual basis for the plea and defense counsel answered “yes.” The court then addressed defendant and asked whether the affidavit had been read to him and defendant answered “yes.” The court then asked whether defendant agreed that the facts in the affidavit were “what happened.” Before defendant could answer, the prosecutor intervened to explain an error in the affidavit and explained that defendant might not agree with the affidavit because of the error. The court then said “Is there any dispute about that?” and defense counsel answered “no.” Defendant never spoke again and never answered the question whether he agreed with the affidavit and was never asked whether he agreed with the prosecutor’s version of the facts. Even defense counsel’s statement is open to multiple interpretations; specifically, he agreed only that the affidavit was in error. The court found that defendant “knows what he is doing, that he is well advised, and he understands the consequences of his plea and the terms of his plea agreement,” but never found a factual basis for the plea.
¶ 59. We explored in detail the requirements of Rule 11(f) in State v. Yates, 169 Vt. at 24-25, 726 A.2d at 486, a direct appeal case. We reasoned:
While the court may obtain facts from other sources, including the prosecutor and the presentence report,..., ultimately, the court’s inquiry into the accuracy of the plea must be addressed personally to the defendant. This is because the factual basis for the plea may consist only of facts that defendant has admitted *164during the proceedings at which the plea is entered. While few Vermont cases have turned on an interpretation of Rule 11(f), those that have consistently require that the defendant admit to and possess an understanding of the facts as they relate to the law for all elements of the charge or charges to which the defendant has pleaded.
Id. at 24, 726 A.2d at 486. We held in terms directly applicable to this case:
We therefore [hold]... that an affidavit may be a source of facts to support the plea, but that the defendant must subsequently admit to these facts in the plea colloquy to demonstrate that there is a sufficient factual basis.
Id. at 27, 726 A.2d at 488.
¶ 60. Here the court failed to obtain an admission of facts from defendant showing that each element of the offense was met. The court obtained a conclusory statement from defense counsel and an explanation from the prosecutor, but never obtained any admission from defendant. The majority’s attempt to slide over the error with its statement that “the factual basis was in effect stipulated to and admitted by defendant” is clearly inconsistent with the record.
¶ 61. The majority grounds its decision on Stale v. Morrissette, 170 Vt. at 571, 743 A.2d at 1092-93, a memorandum decision involving a collateral attack. Essentially, the majority holds that irrespective of the reasoning of Yates, it is sufficient if defendant’s lawyer, not defendant, agrees that there is a factual basis for the plea. If Morrissette held as the majority credits it, this memorandum decision sub silentio overruled the one-year-old decision in Yates, 169 Vt. at 24, 726 A.2d at 486, that only a personal colloquy with defendant to establish the factual basis complies with Rule 11(f). We should be very cautious in giving this kind of effect to a memorandum decision, particularly where the decision claims it is consistent-with Yates.
¶ 62. A fair reading of Morrissette must distinguish it rather than putting it in conflict with its most recent precedent. Morrissette was a collateral attack, not a direct appeal, and there is no indication in the decision that defendant claimed a violation of Rule 11(f), as opposed to Rule 11(c) and (d). Indeed, it is not clear that this Court believed in Morrissette that the facts are similar to those here since it states in that decision that defendant made a stipulation to the “factual basis for the charge.” Id. at 570, 743 A.2d at 1092.
¶ 63. The majority response is to restate the holding of Yates and ignore its rationale. Yates specifically requires that compliance with Rule *16511(f) come from personal address of the defendant, 169 Vt. at 25, 726 A.2d at 487, and added that “[t]his necessarily requires a conversation with defendant regarding whether or not the defendant admits to the alleged conduct.” Id. at 26, 726 A.2d at 487. It went on to say that defendant’s understanding “cannot be probed except through personal interrogation.” Id. at 27, 726 A.2d at 487. Despite this language, the majority now holds that where there is a colloquy with defendant’s lawyer and the lawyer states that there is a factual basis for the plea, “defendant stipulated to the facts.”
¶ 64. There are two ways to read the majority’s rationale in this case, either of which is inconsistent with Yates. The first is that the lawyer is the agent of the client for purpose of the Rule 11(f) colloquy, and the court may conduct it solely with the lawyer. This reading is plainly inconsistent with the requirement of personal address or interrogation in Yates.
¶ 65. The second is that the client who hears the colloquy between the judge and the lawyer is presumed to have endorsed it. For this theory to be correct, however, the content of the colloquy must comply with Rule 11(f). Here, the lawyer stipulated that there was a factual basis for the plea, a statement of pure legal jargon that does not convey to defendant what facts the lawyer has stipulated to. Stipulation to a legal conclusion, and not to facts, does not comply with Yates. See id. at 26, 726 A.2d at 487.
¶ 66. I return to my point that the majority’s rationale itself demonstrates the deficiency in our approach. We have over many decisions allowed such violations of Rule 11 that the few decisions that insist on Rule 11 compliance appear almost to be random, unpredictable acts. Our approach to Rule 11 requires rethinking, not the invention of more ways to excuse noncompliance.
¶ 67. In describing the effect of the 1983 addition to F.R.Cr.P. 11 of section (h), explicitly applying harmless error standards to Rule 11 violations, Professor Charles Alan Wright in his leading treatise opines that the addition did not turn “Rule 11 into a paper tiger.” 1A C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure § 178, at 312 (1999). I wish I could say the same about the effect of our decisions, including this one, on Rule 11 in Vermont. If we are willing to enforce Rule 11 only as a paper tiger, it is preferable for our jurisprudence to repeal the rule.
¶ 68. I would hold that the standard of review for a direct appeal of a Rule 11 violation is governed by State v. West and explicitly overrule the prior holding to the contrary in State v. Thompson. Thus, I would hold that defendant need not show plain error here and that he showed error such that the criminal conviction must be reversed. Moreover, even if defendant is required to show plain error, he did so under the standards of *166State v. Yates. Accordingly, I dissent from the majority’s decision to affirm defendant’s conviction.