(concurring in part, dissenting in part).
I agree with the majority opinion that the trial court properly denied an injunction, that defendants had no legal right to discharge the accumulated water upon plaintiffs’ land, and that each of the defendants was jointly and severally liable for damages. I also agree that the trial court’s award for the damages resulting to the land from the flooding was not unreasonable. The award, although perhaps generous, finds support in plaintiffs’ testimony regarding the infestation of perennial weeds resulting from the flooding, together with their testimony regarding the debris that was cast upon their lands and the fact that they were unable to use a portion of their lands from October of 1979 until the spring of 1980.
I am unable to agree, however, that the trial court’s award of $25,000 for the damages to the Grosses’ well finds support in the evidence.
As the majority opinion points out, “In determining the amount of recovery, there need only be ‘a reasonable basis for measuring the loss’ and it is only necessary that the damages ‘can be measured with reasonable certainty.’” Schmidt v. Wildcat Cave, Inc., 261 N.W.2d 114, 118 (S.D.1977) (citing Kressly v. Theberge, 79 S.D. 386, 112 N.W.2d 232 (1961).
When measured against this standard, I find the testimony regarding the damages to the Grosses’ well to be insufficient to support the trial court’s award. There is no question but that the well was damaged inasmuch as the ground waters which provide its source were apparently polluted by the floodwaters cast upon plaintiffs’ land. The question remains regarding the extent and permanency of this damage.
The trial court stated in its memorandum decision (later incorporated into the findings of fact and conclusions of law) that
Ben Gross testified that he has refused to drink water from their well since the flooding and he has purchased or otherwise obtained water for consumption elsewhere since that time. John Gross corroborated his brother’s testimony regarding the quality of the domestic well water following the flooding and further testified he has used the well water since then for culinary purposes after they installed a purifier to the well water system; still, he refuses to drink the well water.
Finding of Fact 35 states: “John and Ben Gross believe the flooding seriously damages the quality of their domestic well and refuse to drink water from the same since the flooding despite the installation of a purifier.” Conclusion of Law 8 states in part that “[t]he Grosses shall further be awarded Twenty-five Thousand Dollars ($25,000.00) damage for pollution and contamination of their domestic water well and permanent injury thereto.”
Although both Ben and John Gross testified that they now refuse to drink the water from the well, John Gross acknowledged that the water is drinkable once it has been run through the purifier that his son installed following the flooding. There is no competent evidence in the record regarding the permanency of the pollution. Also, aside from John Gross’s testimony that his father was apparently unsuccessful in finding another location for a well in the 1920’s, there is no competent evidence that this is the only well that could be successfully drilled on the Grosses’ property. Now this may be a fact, but I would require that more positive evidence be submitted in the way of hydrologic surveys or testimony from well drillers having experience in the area.
No one disputes that the Grosses suffered damages to their well. No one disputes the critical importance of an adequate domestic well to the habitability of a farm and ranch home. Given the importance of an adequate supply of potable water, one can readily understand the an*275ger and concern that the Grosses have felt as a result of the polluting of their well. If emotion is an adequate substitute for evidence on the issue of damages, then beyond peradventure the trial court’s award is supportable. If, however, we are to adhere to our long-standing requirement that there be some reasonable basis in the evidence for the amount of an award of damages, then I conclude that we must reverse this portion of the judgment and remand the case to the circuit court for a new trial on the issue of damages arising from the injury done to the well.
I am authorized to state that Justice MORGAN joins in this concurrence in part and dissent in part.