(dissenting). I would dismiss this case as moot. The court is giving an advisory opinion on the basis of general factual allegations in the pleading. Yet it is apparent from the briefs and the oral argument that the parties disagree about the *64course of their dealings after the notice of termination and the effect of these dealings on the accrual of the causes of action.
Without the facts and without careful analysis of various potential factual situations, the majority concludes that, although the complaint alleged violations of sec. 135.03 (termination without good cause) and sec. 135.04 (failure to furnish sufficient notice), a distinction between these two types of claims for purposes of the statute of limitations “is not warranted where the grantor has terminated the dealer as of a future date and given the dealer written notice of that decision.” (P. 61.) The majority concludes that “[wjhen the dealer receives a written termination notice, he may bring an action under sec. 135.03, Stats., if the grantor lacked good cause to terminate, or under sec. 135.04, if the written notice did not comply with that provision.” (P. 61.) This conclusion is broader than the holding set forth at page 53, and is broader than warranted by the facts of the case.
According to sec. 135.06, Stats. 1981-82, if a grantor violates more than one provision of ch. 135, a dealer has a cause of action for each violation. Each of these causes of action may accrue at different times. See Hansen, Defenses, pp. 14-22, in State Bar of Wisconsin, Magna Carta for Wisconsin (ATS-CLE Program Materials, November 1979).
I conclude that in each case the facts must be examined to determine when the cause of action for each particular violation accrued. Although the opinion is ambiguous, it can be read as establishing a blanket rule: where the grantor gives written notice of termination, whether or not the notice is defective, the dealer’s cause of action for “termination without good cause,” as well as the dealer’s cause of action for failure to furnish sufficient notice, accrues as of the date of receipt of the written notice. P. 61. I do not believe that such a blanket rule, if that is what the majority is creating, will stand the test of time.