Concurring Opinion by
Van der Voort, J.:This case is an appeal from an Order of the Trial Court granting Defendants’ Motion for judgment on the pleadings in a trespass action.
On January 8, 1970, David Katz, then 13 years of age, had his right leg fractured and injured when the Defendant Richard A. Greig drove his pick up truck into the back of an automobile owned by his father, pinning David’s leg between two bumpers. David was hospitalized on seven occasions through the years 1970 to 1973 with the lower leg eventually being amputated. A summons in trespass was issued on November 6, 1970, but was not served. On January 5, 1973, the summons was re-issued *134and the following day a complaint was filed which summons and complaint were served on January 16, 1973. Certain medical expenses of David Katz were paid by the United States of America since his father was a retired member of the Navy. The United States asserted its claim for these expenses in the name of the injured person David Katz. Its claim was asserted in the following language:
“14. As a result of said injuries, the Plaintiff has received and in the future will continue to receive medical and hospital care and treatment furnished by the United States of America under the provisions of 42 U.S.C. 2651-53 and with its expressed consent, asserts a claim for the reasonable value of said care and treatment.”
And in Count 2 of the Complaint:
“18. As a result of said injuries, the Plaintiff has received and in the future will continue to receive medical and hospital care and treatment furnished by the United States of America. The Plaintiff, for the sole use and benefit of the United States of America under the provisions of 42 U.S.C. 2651-53 and with its expressed consent, asserts a claim for the reasonable value of said care and treatment.”
The Appellee filed an answer raising the two year state statute of limitations and moving for judgment on the pleadings which motion the Court granted. The granting of judgment for the Defendants insofar as the claim of David Katz is concerned was correct but the granting of judgment for the Defendants relating to the claim of the United States was improper.
The writ of summons not having been re-issued within the period of the state statute of limitations expired and died as to the claim of David Katz. The period of limitations for the Federal claim, however, is and was three years and the writ of summons was effectively re-issued and revived within that time.
*135The United States is required by law to- furnish hospital services to members of the Armed Forces and certain of their dependents. In 1962, Congress provided by the Federal Medical Care Recovery Act that the United States might recover the costs of such services where there was third party liability for tortious injuries. See 42 U.S.C. 2651-53, Section 2651 of the Code which provides as follows:
“(a) In any case in which the United States is authorized or required by law, to furnish hospital, medical, surgical, or dental care, under treatment (including prosthesis and medical appliances) to a person who is injured or suffers a disease, after the effective date of this Act, under circumstances creating a tort liability on some third person ... to pay damages therefor, the United States shall have a right to recover from said third person, the reasonable value of the care and treatment so furnished or to be1 furnished and shall, as to this right, be subrogated to any right or claim that the injured or diseased person . . . has against such third person to the extent of the reasonable value of the care and treatment so furnished or to be furnished.” (Emphasis supplied)
The right of the United States to recover its costs of medical treatment is a separate and independent right of action. U.S. v. Greene, 266 F. Supp. 976 (N.D. Ill. 1967). This separate and independent right is not limited nor barred by state statutes of limitation. United States v. Summerlin, 310 U.S. 414, 60 S.Ct. 1019, 84 L.Ed. 1283 (1940) ; United States v. Gera, 409 F.2d 117 (3d Cir. 1969). In Summerlin, the Court stated:
“When the United States becomes entitled to a claim, acting in its governmental capacity and asserts its claim in that right, it cannot be deemed to have abdicated its governmental authority so as to become subject to a state statute putting a time limit upon enforcement.” 310 U.S. at 417, 60 S.Ct. at 1020.
*136The statute of limitations for the claim of the United States under the Federal Medical Care Recovery Act is governed by 28 U.S.C. §2415(b), which provides as follows:
“Subject to the provisions of section 2416 of this title, and except as otherwise provided by Congress, every action for money damages brought by the United States or an officer or agency thereof which is founded upon a tort shall be barred unless the complaint is filed within three years after the right of action first accrues ...”
The Appellee would have us hold that since the language of Federal Medical Care Recovery Act provides that the United States shall “be subrogated to any right or claim that the injured person . . . has against such third person . . .” and since the right of the injured Plaintiff is barred by the state statute of limitations the right of the United States is also barred. What the Recovery Act does is to create an independent right of action in the United States and subjects it to the substantive right of the injured Plaintiff to recovery for his injuries. The Act does not subject the United States to state procedural limitations. As it is stated in United States v. Fort Benning Rifle and Pistol Club, 387 F.2d 884, 887 (5th Cir. 1967) : “Limitations has nothing to do with whether the circumstances surrounding the injury created tort liability in that third person.”
The claim of the United States having been duly commenced and asserted within the three year Federal Statute of Limitations and not being barred by the State Limitations should not have been extinguished by the granting of judgments for the Defendants upon the pleadings.
I concur in affirming the Order of the Trial Court with respect to judgment for the Defendants as to the claim of the individual Plaintiffs, and reversing the Order granting such judgment with respect to the claim of the United States.
. Act of June 24, 1895, P.L. 236, Sec. 2 (12 P.S. §34) providing for a two year statute of limitations in personal injury actions.