(concurring in part and dissenting in part):
I am constrained to concur in the result reached in Dodson v. Scheve, et ah, because there is a record showing that Mr. Dodson was given notice by registered mail before his property was sold for nonpayment of taxes. I cannot concur in the result reached in Hawkins v. D. C., et al., and therefore dissent.
Appellant Hawkins was at the time of the acts complained of the owner-occupier of a dwelling-house. It appears that prior to 1969, the bill for real estate taxes assessed against the property was mailed to and paid by the holder of the first trust. In the early part of 1969 the dwelling was so damaged by fire that appellant was required to leave it while repairs costing some $6500.00 were made.
Real estate taxes in the amount of $245.-27 were assessed against the property for Fiscal Year 1970, and the tax bill was mailed to appellant Hawkins as owner of record of the property. Appellant failed to pay the taxes and her property, described only by lot and square number, was included in a delinquent tax list prepared by the assessor. After publication of the delinquent tax list together with notice of sale as required by D.C.Code 1973, § 47-1001, appellant’s property was sold to the Scheves for the amount of the unpaid taxes plus penalties and costs. Because the property was not redeemed within the time permitted by law, the District of Columbia on March 14, 1973, conveyed the property to the Scheves as tenants by the entireties for $259.27 representing the amount of the unpaid taxes, penalties, and costs.
Even if appellant was afforded the proper statutory protection before the tax sale of her property, it seems to me that the District of Columbia owed her a duty to give proper notice of the expiring period for redemption before conveying the property by tax deed to the Scheves. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S.Ct. 652, 657, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950), where the Court said:
An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceed*42ing which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections. . . . [Citations omitted.]
See also and compare Miles v. District of Columbia, et al., 510 F.2d 188 (D.C.Cir.1975).
There is, of course, a record showing that the District did address a letter to appellant advising her that the period within which she was permitted to redeem her property was about to expire. However, appellant insists that the letter was not received until more than 15 days after the period had expired, and it is undisputed that the envelope in which the letter was enclosed had no postmark. Under the circumstances I refuse to indulge a presumption that the letter was ever mailed. In any event, it appears to have been the practice of the District to send such a notice by registered mail because in the companion case of Dodson v. Scheve, et al., notice by registered mail was given.
But aside from all of this, Congress has made owner-occupiers of dwellings in the District of Columbia the subject of special concern. Thus, in D.C.Code 1973, § 47-903, it is provided:
No family dwelling-house occupied by the owner therepf shall be sold for delinquent . . . real-estate taxes . unless notice has been personally served upon such owner or sent by registered mail, addressed to him at such dwelling-house, not less than thirty days prior to the date of such sale.
By D.C.Code 1973, § 47-905, Congress provided further that:
This chapter shall be deemed as applying only to such occupant and owner as shall have filed with the assessor of the District of Columbia an affidavit as to domicile and ownership. The form of the affidavit shall be prepared by the assessor of the District of Columbia, and shall show the beginning of domicile, the time when ownership began, the street number, the number of the square and lot, and all trusts, if any, against the property. [Emphasis added.]
It is a matter of general knowledge that the District of Columbia has formulated elaborate procedures for the collection of delinquent taxes and in the process has set forth on the face and back of tax bills varied tax information, although there was no statutory obligation to do so. Significantly enough, no notice has been given by the District, in fine print or otherwise, that the owner-occupier of a dwelling, upon filing an affidavit on a form prepared by the assessor, would be entitled to thirty days’ notice by registered mail before his property was sold for delinquent taxes. See D.C.Code 1973, § 1-1504(d) (5). The District of Columbia insists that it did all that the law required, and it is true that every person is presumed to know the law. However, I perceive basic unfairness in the system which on the one hand frustrates, in effect, the will of the Congress as expressed in D.C.Code 1973, § 47-903, and on the other gives aid and comfort to those who are permitted to profit a thousandfold at the expense of the poor, the ignorant and the less alert.
I would reverse the judgment in Hawkins v. D. C., et al., and remand with directions to set aside the tax deed and afford the appellant an opportunity to redeem, within a reasonable time, her property by paying the amount of the delinquent taxes plus costs, penalties, and interest.