(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. The primary purpose to be served in the analysis of a trust, as the majority acknowledges, is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the settlors. The search for that intent should begin with the language of the instrument; and when the trust language is plain and clear, the search should end there. In re Trust Known as Great Northern Iron Ore Properties, 308 Minn. 221, 227, 243 N.W.2d 302, 306 (1976) cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1001, 97 S.Ct. 530, 50 L.Ed.2d 612 (1976), subsequently appealed, 263 N.W.2d 610 (Minn.1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 835, 99 S.Ct. 116, 58 L.Ed.2d 130 (1978). In my opinion the settlors of the John W. Daniels’ trust clearly and unambiguously expressed in the 1923 amendment to the trust instrument an intention to limit the class of future beneficiaries to the natural or biological children of Thomas L. Daniels and Frances H. Daniels. Hence, there is no room for construction. Neither is there need to resort to extrinsic evidence of the settlor’s intent. Indeed, the consideration of extrinsic evidence is impermissible. Id. In Re Campbell’s Trusts, 258 N.W.2d 856, 841 (Minn.1977).
Adoption, unknown at common law, is solely a creature of statute. Minnesota’s original adoption statute created a new status, establishing between persons not so related by nature the legal relationship of child and parent, “the same as if he had been born to them in lawful wedlock.” Act of February 26, 1876, ch. XCI, § 6, 1876 Minn.Gen.Laws 107, 108. See In re Adoption of Zavasky (Petition of Sherman), 241 Minn. 447, 451, 63 N.W.2d 573, 576 (1954). Although early adoption statutes limited the child’s right of inheritance from his adoptive parents and their relatives, since 1905 the child inherits from the adoptive parents and their relatives “the same as though he were” the legitimate or natural child of the adoptive parents, and the adoptive parents and their relatives inherit the child’s estate “as if they had been” his parents and relatives in fact. Minn.Revised L., ch. 73, § 3616 (1905); Minn.Stat. § 259.29 (1982). Thus, since 1905 an adopted child has been a “child” of the decedent within the purview of the laws of intestate succession. The law of intestate succession, however, is not determinative of the intention of the settlor of a trust.
Because adoption statutes are in derogation of the common law, a majority of courts initially took a somewhat restrictive view of the status of an adopted child. In Minnesota, however, we long ago came to the realization that the family relationship is far more the product of love, understanding, and the mutual recognition of reciprocal duties and bonds, than of the biological act of begetting offspring. In re Trust Created by Will of Patrick, 259 Minn. 193, 196, 106 N.W.2d 888, 890 (1960). As a corollary of that recognition, adopted children have been accorded the same position as biological children, including not only their right to inherit by laws of intestate succession but also the right to inherit by appropriate testamentary provisions. In re Estate of Youmans, 218 Minn. 172, 180, 15 N.W.2d 537, 541 (1944).
Where the purpose to grant or withhold benefits with respect to adopted children is not clear, it is presumed that the settlor or testator intended to include adopted children within the grant. In re Trust Creat*812ed by the Will of Patrick, 259 Minn. 193, 195-96, 106 N.W.2d 888, 890 (1960). The unqualified word “children” is simply presumed to include both biological and adopted children. The adopted child has long been recognized as a lineal descendant, In re Sutton’s Estate, 161 Minn. 426, 201 N.W. 925 (1925); an heir at law, Bakke v. Bakke, 175 Minn. 193, 220 N.W. 601 (1928); and next of kin of his adoptive parents, McKeown v. Argetsinger, 202 Minn. 595, 279 N.W. 402 (1938). Even absent formal adoption proceedings, a young man was deemed to have been intended to take under a will as a descendant of his de facto adoptive father. In re Trust Created by Will of Patrick, 259 Minn. 193, 106 N.W.2d 888 (1960). The terms “issue” and “lawful issue” or “legal issue” have been held to have a technical meaning which comprehends an adopted child, In re Trust under Will of Holden, 207 Minn. 211, 291 N.W. 104 (1940), and an illegitimate child, Northwestern National Bank of Minneapolis v. Simons, 308 Minn. 243, 242 N.W.2d 78 (1976). Adopted children are included in the category of “children of” and “issue of” a life tenant “who may hereafter be born”. In re Trusteeship under Agreement with Nash, 265 Minn. 412, 122 N.W.2d 104 (1963). More recently, we held that the use of the term “issue of her body” without further elaboration did not evince an intent to include only natural born children of the settlor’s daughter and to exclude an adopted child from the benefits of the trust. “To hold otherwise would cast a cloud over this state’s policy toward adopted children and add to the reports another mindless case based on sham ‘intent’ manifested in virtually meaningless common-law phrases.” In re Trusts Created by Agreement with Harrington, 311 Minn. 403, 250 N.W.2d 163 (1977).
It is apparent from the foregoing that the Minnesota policy in favor of adopted children is one of unique power. Nevertheless, although the adoption statute may establish the legal relationship of parent and child, it cannot abrogate the laws of nature by providing that those who are not children of the blood shall be so in fact. McKeown v. Argetsinger, 202 Minn. 595, 598, 279 N.W. 402, 404 (1938). Nor does the adoption statute attempt the impossible; the statute creates rights of inheritance between the adopted child and his adoptive parents and their relatives “the same as though” or “as if” they were related in fact, even though they are not. Minn.Stat. § 259.29, subd. 1 (1982).
Furthermore, although the law may designate the persons entitled to inherit in cases of intestacy, a testator or the settlor of a trust, in the free exercise of his will, may limit the benefits of his estate to persons of his choice. In re Trusteeship Created by Fiske, 242 Minn. 452, 65 N.W.2d 906 (1954). He may designate the “children of” the settlor as beneficiaries, thus including both natural and adopted children in the class of beneficiaries; or he may exclude them. He may designate “the children adopted by” the settlor, to the exclusion of his natural children. Or he may designate “the children born to” the settlor as beneficiaries, thus, on any literal reading of the phrase, excluding adopted children. The language is perfectly ordinary and straightforward. The man on the street speaks of his children and grandchildren; a reference to his issue would be extraordinary. The terms “issue,” “legal issue,” and “issue of her body” are technical, common-law phrases which may well be characterized as virtually meaningless to all but lawyers. “Children”, however, is a word of common usage, as is the term “born to”. To lawyers and non-lawyers alike the phrase “children hereafter born to” X and Y has a plain and unmistakable meaning: the biological children of X and Y.
In arriving at the intent of the settlors of a trust a court is not at liberty to disregard the plain language employed in the trust instrument, to insert or add words, to substitute other words for those used, or to engraft inconsistent limitations on the terms of the trust. No matter how ill-advised or how much at odds with public policy we regard the terms of the trust, it is fundamental that the words used must *813be given their ordinary meaning unless it clearly appears that they were otherwise used. In re Trusteeship Created by Fiske, 242 Minn. 452, 65 N.W.2d 906 (1954). The words “children hereafter born to the said Thomas L. Daniels and Frances H. Daniels” conveyed a plain and ordinary meaning — the natural or biological children of Thomas and Frances Daniels — when the settlors employed them in 1923, and they convey the same unambiguous message today. Since the meaning is clear, there is no need to seek intent in public policy; indeed, we are precluded from doing so. Id. at 460, 65 N.W.2d at 910-11.
That the words were used in their ordinary sense is confirmed by the context in which they appear. The words “children hereafter born to” referred to the children of Thomas and Frances Daniels. Beneficial provisions for subsequent generations referred to “issue”, and concluded with the provision, “The term ‘issue’ shall not include adopted children.” While the majority regards this specific exclusion of adopted children from the class of grandchildren and subsequent descendants of Thomas and Frances as indicative of an intent to include adopted children in the class of children born to them, that seems to me an unreasonable inference productive of an absurd result. Apart from ignoring the plain reference to biological children, the majority position attributes to the sett-lors an intention to include as beneficiaries any children whom Thomas and Frances Daniels might later adopt while at the same time excluding from beneficial enjoyment of the trust estate any adopted grandchildren or great grandchildren. It is far more likely that the settlors intended to treat adopted children the same regardless of the generation to which they happened to belong.
Moreover, although there is no basis for seeking intent in extrinsic evidence, it is-not amiss to point out that the conduct of the settlors was consistent with an intention to limit the class of beneficiaries to biological offspring. When a third son, David, was born to Thomas and Frances in 1927, he immediately joined his older brothers, both of whom were named in the instrument, as trust beneficiaries. When Carol was adopted in 1936, neither of the then living settlors-trustees caused Carol to be numbered among the trust beneficiaries. While expressing the wish that Carol were a beneficiary, Thomas frequently told Carol and others that she was not a beneficiary.
Because I am forced to conclude, albeit with considerable reluctance, that the sett-lors clearly expressed their intention to include only biological children and issue as beneficiaries of the trust, I would reverse the judgment of the district court.