(dissenting).
i
Following a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of first-degree felony murder. MCL 750.316; MSA 28.548. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 135 Mich App 128; 352 NW2d 367 (1984). This Court granted leave to appeal to review defendant’s con*524tention that the admission of Michael Koski’s similar-act testimony constituted error requiring reversal. We disagree with defendant’s contention and would affirm his conviction.
Defendant was charged with the murder of George Wissmiller, the caretaker of a summer home and hunting lodge in Alcona County. The trial was moved to Traverse City after publication of news stories that the defendant’s father, the principal witness, had passed a polygraph examination.
At trial the father, Grant Goddard, testified that he and his son, Kenneth, had, at noon on August 13, 1980, returned for a second time to the Quart family lodge, to check on the feasibility of breaking and entering the building. Defendant carried a .308 caliber bolt action rifle, Grant Goddard carried a .38 caliber pistol in a holster inside his jacket, and both were carrying household rubber gloves. The father testified that he and the defendant, Kenneth, were on the roof of a root cellar surveying the area of the caretaker’s home and the family residence in preparation for breaking in when they heard a vehicle approach and saw Mr. Wissmiller appear with one of his dogs. The dog ran barking toward the cellar. Wissmiller followed, past the root cellar through a clearing and down to the lake, while father and son lay on the top of the cellar.
Grant testified that Wissmiller turned and began to walk slowly back toward them, facing directly toward the root cellar. Ken said, "I’ll take a fast look through the scope and see what he’s doing.” Grant testified further that the rifle went off and Ken said, "I didn’t mean to shoot. The safety must have been off.” While Grant acknowledged that Ken had never hunted with the safety off, he also said that he did not see Ken’s hands *525near the trigger and that he didn’t think that Ken had raised the gun sufficiently to enable him to see through the scope. Thus, the thrust of the father’s testimony regarding the shooting was that it was accidental. The pathologist testified that the cause of death was a single gunshot from a high velocity weapon that entered the side of the deceased and exploded his heart.
The defendant gave a statement after arrest that he accidentally shot Wissmiller. At trial, however, the defendant claimed that his father had shot the deceased, stating both that Grant said it was unintentional and that Grant said he shot Wissmiller after Wissmiller discovered him.
Ken also testified that he was not on the top of the root cellar, but was hunting in an area away from the buildings when he heard a shot. Grant testified that Ken and he together dragged the body a distance of forty feet,1 that at Ken’s suggestion they went ahead with the breaking and entering, that Ken ripped the phone off the wall in the caretaker’s house, and that they both proceeded to loot both residences. He further testified that because there were too many articles to carry the distance back to their own truck, he and his son returned to George’s body and took the deceased’s wallet and the keys to his pickup truck. Grant testified that Ken drove the truck back to the north line fence and that they then made two trips to their own truck, leaving some items behind. He stated that he found $500 in the deceased’s glove compartment, which he and the defendant divided.
Thus, while the senior Goddard’s testimony provided support for a claim that the shooting was accidental, it fully implicated the son with regard to the breaking and entering.
*526The defendant testified that his sole reason for entering the Quart property was to hunt deer; that when he and his father split up, his father indicated that he was going to check if there was a back door to George Wissmiller’s house; that approximately two hours later he heard a shot and assumed that his father had shot a deer; that when he went looking for his father, two hours after the shot, his father was already in the process of removing articles from the house; that he pleaded with his father to leave; that he took neither the deceased’s keys nor his wallet; that his father moved the body by himself and that he didn’t break in, didn’t assist in putting anything in the truck, and didn’t touch anything in the house. He also testified that he and Grant discussed his taking responsibility for the shooting because he would "probably get manslaughter . . . out of it.”
Thus, the defendant’s version of the incident was fully exculpatory, with regard both to the shooting and to the breaking and entering.
Michael Koski testified that he and defendant had committed a number of breakings and enterings of unoccupied hunting lodges in the same rural area; that Ken was armed at the time; that they both wore gloves; and that at the Silver Wolf Lodge, Ken pulled a pistol, shot into the tv, and said that if they were ever approached, he’d fire once into the air and then at the people. The testimony was preceded by a detailed instruction to the jury regarding the limited use of the evidence. The judge advised the jury that they must not assume that because the defendant did these acts "he must also be guilty of the offense that he is now charged with.” He also repeated the definition of malice given in the opening instructions and stated:
*527Or if you as judges of the facts should find from the other evidence in this case that the Defendant fired the gun that killed George Wissmiller, then you may consider this evidence that you are about to hear only for the limited purpose of determining if he fired — if the Defendant fired — the gun at George Wissmiller with the intent to kill, with the intent to do great bodily harm, or with wanton and wilful disregard of the likelihood of a natural tendency of his behavior was to cause death or great bodily harm. The testimony you are about to hear can go only — only to that issue.
II
The opinion for reversal would reverse the defendant’s conviction solely on the basis of the admission of Michael Koski’s testimony. This testimony was offered to establish the element of intent or malice required by a charge of first-degree felony murder. The trial court performed an analysis under MRE 404(b) and decided that the probative value of the offered testimony outweighed its prejudicial effect. We would affirm the decision of the trial court.
Evidence that a person has committed a crime is excluded where it is offered to prove that a person with such character is more likely to have committed the act in question. MRE 404(a). Thus, properly understood,
Rule 404(b) which admits evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts for purposes other than to show that a person acted in conformity with his character is not an exception to Rule 404(a) since 404(a) does not apply when criminal propensity is not used circumstantially as the basis for inferring an act. . . . Rule 404(b) is redundant; it appears as a rule, although the result would have been the same in its absence, to alert the reader to this *528avenue of admitting evidence of other criminal acts, and to detail the most usual instances in which admissibility may be achieved. [2 Weinstein, Evidence, ¶ 404[08], pp 404-52 to 404-53.]
Professor Weinstein characterizes FRE 404(b), which is substantially identical to MRE 404(b), as a specialized rule of relevancy (that requires proffering counsel) to 1) identify the consequential fact to which the proffered evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is directed, 2) prove the other crimes, wrongs, or acts, and 3) articulate precisely the evidential hypothesis by which the consequential fact may be inferred from the proffered evidence. Evidence which passes muster up to the point, must in addition satisfy the balancing test imposed by Rule 403 which requires the probative value of the other-crimes evidence to outweigh the harmful consequence that might flow from its admission. Id., p 404-58. People v Golochowicz, 413 Mich 298, 308; 319 NW2d 518 (1982).
The opinion for reversal distinguishes the testimony concerning the defendant’s statement and testimony implicating the defendant in other breakings and enterings and in shooting at a television set. The opinion then posits that a statement by the defendant is not a prior act and therefore not subject to the general rule excluding evidence of a defendant’s prior crimes. No authority is offered for this proposition, nor is it observed that in Golochowicz, itself, the similar-acts evidence consisted both of acts indicating possession of decedent’s property and related events, including defendant’s "admission” that he had killed the victim of the like act, id., p 307.
In the concurring opinion, it is suggested that a party’s statement is not subject to a "similar acts” analysis because under MRE 801(d)(2) it is admissi*529ble if offered against the party and is his own statement. However, MRE 801(d)(2) is a rule defining hearsay, not relevance. Moreover, as the opinion for reversal properly acknowledges, a party’s statement, in order to be admissible, must also be relevant and not unduly prejudicial. MRE 401 and 403.
The analysis set forth under Golochowicz, supra, for determining admissibility under MRE 404(b) is a variation of the refined test for determining relevancy described by Professor Weinstein. It is designed to assure that the evidence "is probative of some fact other than the defendant’s bad character,” id., p 310. A statement by a defendant which implicates him in a bad act other than the crime charged is subject to use as evidence of bad character as much as conduct evincing a prior bad act. A similar danger exists that a defendant will be convicted upon the basis of a statement that only a "bad man” would make. Therefore, a defendant’s statement is not excepted from a proper 404(b) analysis when the statement implicates the defendant in other bad acts. Indeed, our courts have consistently analyzed the admission of such evidence under the "similar acts” rule in this jurisdiction. See, e.g., People v Duncan, 402 Mich 1; 260 NW2d 58 (1977) (prior incidents of bribery were admissible in a trial to show the defendant’s intent on a charge of solicitation and conspiracy); People v Armentero, 148 Mich App 120; 384 NW2d 98 (1986) (prior threats against a victim were admissible to establish intent in killing the victim); People v Burgess, 153 Mich App 715; 396 NW2d 814 (1986) (the defendant’s constant talk concerning the perfect crime and his request that another help him to accomplish a murder were relevant on the issue of premeditation); People v Artuso, 100 Mich App 396; 298 NW2d 746 (1980) *530(statements by a defendant that he could deliver stolen merchandise were admissible in a trial for receiving and concealing stolen property). See also United States v Johnson, 525 F2d 999, 1006 (CA 2, 1975) (the defendant’s statement was admissible to prove motive for the charged offense even if another crime was incidentally disclosed); 29 Am Jur 2d, § 321, p 369 (the general rule excluding evidence of other crimes and its exceptions extends to statements of intention). Cf. State v Stephenson, 361 NW2d 844 (Minn, 1985) (the defendant’s prior threats were admissible in a trial for making terroristic threats).
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the disputed evidence was admissible under MRE 404(b). The standard which must be met in order for the evidence to be properly admissible is set forth in People v Golochowicz, supra, p 309:
(1) there must be substantial evidence that the defendant actually perpetrated the bad act sought to be introduced; (2) there must be some special quality or circumstance of the bad act tending to prove the defendant’s identity or the motive, intent, absence of mistake or accident, scheme, plan or system in doing the act and, in light of the slightly different language of MRE 404(b) we add, opportunity, preparation and knowledge; (3) one or more of these factors must be material to the determination of the defendant’s guilt of the charged offense; and (4) the probative value of the evidence sought to be introduced must not be substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
Whether the first standard has been satisfied is not seriously in dispute.2
*531As to the second standard, the opinion for reversal concludes that there were no similarities between the other-act evidence testified to by Koski and the instant crime. We respectfully disagree. It is simply not true that, "Other than the fact that they were all breakings and enterings, there were no similarities at all.” Ante, p 516. The prior breakings and enterings occurred in the same general sparsely populated area and were of buildings of the same category involved in the crime at bar — a hunting lodge or summer residence. The prior breakings and enterings as well as the instant one were committed while the defendant was armed and wearing gloves, and only after the defendant and his accomplice were convinced that the locations were deserted. Finally, the same sort of items — household goods and sporting equipment —were taken mainly during the course of all of the breakings and enterings.
Concededly, these similarities are not so strong as to justify admission of the evidence on the issue of identity. The threshold issue under 404(b) is whether the evidence is probative of some material fact. Thus, it is essential to identify the purpose for which the evidence is offered. Evidence of similar acts offered on the issue of identity are probative on that issue only if a distinct and unique relationship between the like act and the crime in question permits the inference that defendant was the perpetrator of the crime.
It is because of the combined value of those two factors, the unique and uncommonly distinctive *532style employed by the defendant in committing the "substantially proved” uncharged similar offense, and the same distinctive modus operandi employed in the charged offense, that the jury is permitted to infer, if it believes the evidence, that both crimes were the handiwork of the same person, the defendant. [People v Golochowicz, supra, p 311.]
In this case, however, the evidence was not admitted to establish the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator of the crime but to establish his intent and motive in killing Wissmiller. As this Court explained in Golochowiez, supra, trial courts should be
stricter in applying [the] standards of relevancy when the ultimate purpose of the [evidence] is to prove identity or the doing by the accused of the criminal act charged than they are when the evidence is offered on the ultimate issue of knowledge, intent or other state of mind. [McCormick, Evidence (2d ed), § 190, p 452.]
To be sure, in each instance the trial judge must determine whether the proffered evidence tends to make a consequential fact more or less probable, and where there is a high degree of similarity, the evidence may have higher probative force. Where as here, however, the issue is whether defendant’s intent on a prior occasion has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact . . . more probable,” MEE 401, the commonalty of circumstances need not be so unusual and distinctive as to be like a signature indicating the handiwork of the accused. See also United States v Beechum, 582 F2d 898, 911, n 15 (CA 5, 1978).
In the case at bar, the defendant’s statement that he would shoot if discovered, made during the *533course of breaking and entering a hunting lodge, coupled with the shooting of a television set, was sufficiently similar to the shooting of Wissmiller immediately prior to the burglary of the Quart ranch to justify its admission on the element of defendant’s intent.
Golochowicz further requires for the similar act evidence to be admissible to show intent, motive, identity, lack of accident, or a criminal plan that one of these factors is genuinely controverted. "A genuine controversy exists concerning such matters when the defendant, either by counsel’s opening statement, a motion in limine, the nature of cross-examination by the defense, or evidence offered by the defense, has made one or more of them an issue actually disputed in the case.” Id., p 316.
During the opening statement in this case, the defense indicated it would show that the defendant went to the Quart residence in order to hunt deer and that it was his father who stated he might burglarize the ranch. Further, the defense contended that defendant’s father intentionally killed Wissmiller because Wissmiller would be able to identify him and he was already a fugitive from federal justice. The defense further stated it would show that defendant did not take part in the breaking and entering.
Accordingly, the thrust of defendant’s defense was that Grant Goddard, Jr., had the intent and motive to kill Wissmiller, and by negative implication that the defendant did not. By assigning intent to some other party, the defendant cannot foreclose evidence by the prosecution tending to show that defendant was the one who intended to accomplish the act. A contrary reading of the rule would render it nonsensical. People v Chism, 390 Mich 104, 118; 211 NW2d 193 (1973).
*534Moreover, during the cross-examination of Grant Goddard, Jr., the defense affirmatively put the intent of defendant in issue by eliciting from the witness that he did not see the defendant intentionally aim at Wissmiller.
In People v Aaron, 409 Mich 672; 299 NW2d 304 (1980), this Court held that felony murder could not be made out simply by proof that a homicide occurred in the course of an enumerated felony. Thus, as the trial judge in this case clearly recognized, the prosecution was required to present not only evidence of defendant’s participation in the breaking and entering, but also evidence of a murder, that is, evidence of malice in that defendant either intended to kill or to do great bodily harm, or wantonly and wilfully disregarded the likelihood that the natural tendency of his behavior was to cause death or great bodily harm.
During the prosecution’s case in chief, testimony of the examining pathologist that Wissmiller died of one gunshot to the heart was offered to satisfy the element of intent. Grant Goddard’s testimony was offered to identify the defendant as the perpetrator. During the prosecutor’s examination of Goddard, the intent of the defendant in aiming at Wissmiller was not affirmatively put in issue. Grant Goddard, Jr., was allowed to present his exculpatory version of the facts, but the prosecutor did not impeach that version at the time. Instead, it was defense counsel during cross-examination who emphasized, "At that time that the gun discharged . . . Ken had not pointed the gun at anything, had he? . . . And it wasn’t being intentionally pointed at anything; is that correct?”
The opinion for reversal contends that the prosecutor was not required to call Grant Goddard as a res gestae witness because he was an accomplice. The opinion further contends that the prosecutor *535may not admit the testimony of Grant Goddard in order to transform an uncontested matter into a contested question of fact and create an opening for introducing prejudicial evidence of prior bad acts.3 Where the prosecutor feels that a particular witness must be called, and that witness’ testimony will call into question issues that the defendant has not himself called into question, the opinion for reversal would require redaction of those portions of the testimony which create the conflict.
Such a suggestion would artificially parse the witness’ testimony and conflict with the trial court’s authority to govern the order of proofs. See MRE 611(a). It is, in any event, clearly not called for by the facts of this case.
The reason why an accessory need not be named and produced as a witness is because of the inclination or inducement of those close to the accused, by community of interest in the crime or relationship, to perjure themselves, if necessary in his behalf, and the incongruity of requiring the prosecution to make such witnesses his own. People v Raider, 256 Mich 131, 135-136; 239 NW 387 (1931). Where, as here, the accomplice implicates the defendant as the perpetrator, the reason for the rule excusing the production of accomplices does not apply. The accomplice is competént to testify for the prosecution subject to cautionary instructions if requested by the defendant. People v McCoy, 392 Mich 231; 220 NW2d 456 (1974).
It is well established that the prosecutor is *536charged both with the duty to see that the law is vindicated by seeing that the guilty are brought to justice as well as the duty to see that the accused receives a fair trial. People v Duncan, supra, p 17. As the trial court recognized in determining whether the element of intent was properly in issue, "[t]he people are required to present exculpatory as well as accusatory proofs.”
To fashion a rule requiring redaction from an accomplice’s testimony of those portions tending to exculpate a defendant from a crime would be contrary both to the prosecutor’s obligation to insure that a defendant receives a fair trial and to the fact-finding purpose of a trial. Such a harsh rule is in any event not required by the facts of this case because the issue of defendant’s intent was not controverted until the defense counsel expressly cross-examined Grant Goddard, Jr., on that precise issue. The intelligence in doing so is clearly revealed in counsel’s argument on the motion for directed verdict, in which he contended that the prosecution’s proofs did not show that the weapon was "intentionally aimed” and that the failure of proof on the malice element required dismissal of the murder charge under People v Aaron.4
*537Nor is it dispositive as the opinion for reversal suggests that the defendant did not argue or object to the involuntary manslaughter instruction. These observations are not relevant to whether malice was an issue in the case. Malice was an element of the offense charged, and the testimony regarding defendant’s intent to shoot if he was discovered during the course of an unlawful entry had a direct bearing on that question.5 The prosecution’s proofs identified defendant as the shooter; however, defense counsel’s cross-examination of defendant’s father’s testimony made the intent of the defendant a doubtful element in the case. Moreover, the proofs offered by the defense suggesting that Grant Goddard, Jr., had the motive for killing Wissmiller and not the defendant, made both the identity of the killer and the intent of the shooter, "material in the sense that it was a matter genuinely controverted . . . .” People v Golochowicz, supra, p 319.
Finally, the probative value of the evidence substantially outweighed the danger of unfair prejudice. Defendant’s anticipatory admission of what he would do if discovered is as logically probative on the issue of intent as a statement by a defendant after the fact of what his intent was at the time of the action in question.
Thus, it is generally accepted that threats by the defendant against a class of persons to which the deceased belonged is admissible against the accused even though the name of the deceased was not mentioned. 40 Am Jur 2d, § 317, p 587; Brandley v State, 691 SW2d 699 (Tex Crim App, 1985). The evidence offered by the prosecution in its case in chief clearly allowed the inference that the Goddards’ presence had been or was about to be *538discovered when Wissmiller was shot. Accordingly, the jury could reasonably infer from the evidence presented that Wissmiller came within the class of persons who were the subject of defendant’s earlier statement.
The probative value of the prior breakings and enterings and the shooting of the television set become quite clear when examined as an explanation of the context in which the statement was made. The opinion for reversal provides no support for its statement that "[providing context for understanding a prior statement is not one of [the limited purposes]” of similar act evidence under MRE 404(b).
Clearly, the fact that the statement was made during the course of a breaking and entering and accompanied by an act of shooting tends to prove that the statement was not a mere "exercise in machismo” but indicative of an identifiable plan developed by the defendant in case he was caught. Contrary to the conclusion of the opinion for reversal, the highest and best use of the circumstances surrounding the statement is as foundation for the statement indicating that the statement was made and the intent of the defendant when the statement was made. Such a use is not forbidden by the safeguards set forth in MRE 404(b).6
m
In sum, the testimony concerning defendant’s *539prior statement was relevant to the defendant’s intent or state of mind on the instant occasion. See United States v Johnson, supra, p 1006 (the defendant’s statement was admissible to prove motives for the charged offense even if another crime was incidentally disclosed).
[T]he statements were an admission as to intent and motive .... The statements were not admitted for the purpose of showing that the defendant acted in conformity with a particular character trait, but rather for the purpose of showing that he acted in conformity with a particular emotional state, jealousy, and that this provided a motive and intent for the crime. [State v Wyss, 124 Wis 2d 681, 712; 370 NW2d 745 (1985).]
See also State v Stephenson, supra. The evidence here was admissible not to show that the defendant acted in conformity with a character trait for violence, but rather to show his intent to shoot anyone interfering with a future breaking and entering to prevent his apprehension. The prior burglaries and shooting at the television set were properly admitted to provide context for the statement. Rule 404 does not preclude admission of such evidence for this purpose.
The other issues presented by the defendant are without merit for the reasons stated by the Court of Appeals.
The decision of the Court of Appeals should be affirmed.
Brickley, J., concurred with Boyle, J. Griffin, J., took no part in the decision of this case.The victim was six feet tall and weighed 270 pounds.
It need not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defen*531dant committed the other act. People v Golochowicz, supra, p 309, n 6. In the instant case, the defendant admitted the other breakings and enterings and aiming at the tv, although he denied hitting the tv and making the statement. In addition, Grant Goddard, Jr., testified that he and Ken had gone to the property armed, on a prior occasion, for the purpose of breaking and entering and that several weeks before the incident, the defendant had said, "If I ever get caught, I’ll fight my way out of it.”
This position seems to suggest that an issue cannot become genuinely controverted until after the defendant has presented his proofs. Such an assumption is clearly erroneous as recognized by this Court in Golochowicz. A genuine controversy may arise during the defendant’s opening statement, a motion in limine, or during the cross-examination of prosecution witnesses as well as by evidence offered by the defense. Golochowicz, supra, p 316.
Mr. Larkin argued as follows:
It’s our belief that if all the testimony as offered by the prosecution if viewed most favorably for the prosecution, that perhaps the Defendant could be found guilty of involuntary manslaughter resulting from an intentionally armed firearm. However, the one point or one item in that I don’t believe they have even proved is that weapon or even offered testimony to the effect that that weapon was intentionally fired — I mean intentionally aimed. We have under People v Aaron that this malice requirement has to be addressed completely separate from the b and e. . . . I believe on that point, and getting away from the b and e, that we just have that malice issue and there is no showing at all, no question of fact that may be interpreted as malice, sufficient to be murder.
The propriety of the jury instruction on involuntary manslaughter is not before us.
Only by separating the statement from its circumstances can the opinion for reversal make an arguable case for finding that admitting the evidence was more prejudicial than probative. Such a tactic would not be so objectionable if the opinion for reversal analyzed the offered evidence in terms of all its permissible uses and did not selectively choose characteristics of the prior act evidence which have no bearing on the case at bar.