Driver v. Temple

WIEAND, Judge:

This appeal by Earl Temple and by Walter and Mary Heffner, husband and wife, is from an order confirming finally the report of a board of viewers which established a private road across their lands for the purpose of giving appellees, Richard and Sara Driver, husband and wife, and Samuel and Margaret Harris, husband and wife, access to *392their adjoining properties. Although appellants concede that appellees’ lands are “landlocked,” they contend that the board of viewers abused its discretion by refusing to establish the roadway along the shortest available route. Before considering this issue, we must determine whether the order of the trial court is subject to appellate review prior to a determination of the damages to be paid to appellants for the land taken from them for appellees’ road.

Proceedings for the opening of private roads are authorized by the Act of June 13, 1836, P.L. 551, as amended. Section 11 thereof (36 P.S. § 2731) provides in pertinent part as follows:

The several courts of quarter sessions shall, ... upon petition of one or more persons ... for a road from their respective lands or leaseholds to a highway or place of necessary public resort ... direct a view to be had of the place where such road is requested, and a report thereof to be made____

Section 1 (36 P.S. § 1781) specifically authorizes the court to appoint a board of viewers, whose duties are defined in section 2 (36 P.S. § 1785) as follows:

The persons appointed as aforesaid shall view such ground, and if they shall agree that there is occasion for a road, they shall proceed to lay out the same, having respect to the shortest distance, and the best ground for a road, and in such manner as shall do the least injury to private property, and also be, as far as practicable, agreeable to the desire of the petitioners.

Section 12 (36 P.S. § 2732) provides that if it shall appear by the report of viewers to the court that such a road is necessary, “... the proceedings in such case[] shall be entered on the record, as before directed, and, thenceforth such road shall be deemed and taken to be a lawful private road.” Thereafter, according to section 16 (36 P.S. § 2736),

[t]he damages sustained by the owners of the land through which any private road may pass shall be estimated in the manner provided in the case of a public road, and shall be paid by the persons ... at whose request the *393road was granted or laid out: Provided, That no such road shall be opened before the damages shall be fully paid.

Proceedings to open private roads and subsequent proceedings to assess damages therefor are distinct proceedings. The commencement of proceedings for the assessment of damages, it has been held, is a waiver of defects in the order confirming the opening of the private road. Weaver’s Road, 45 Pa. 405 (1863). Because of the bifurcated course which the two proceedings must take, the trial court is required to determine all legal issues involved in the proceeding to take another’s land for private use before the damages to be paid can be assessed. Only after it has been decreed that a private road is necessary and is to be opened across the land of another, and the location, width, and distance thereof have been determined, does it become possible to estimate damages “in the manner provided in the case of a public road.” 1 Of necessity, therefore, the two proceedings are separate and distinct.

This statutory procedure is still in effect. It has not been altered by constitutional amendment, by statute, or by procedural rule. In recognition of the bifurcated nature of such proceedings, this Court has entertained an appeal from an order confirming finally a viewers’ report determining that a road shall be laid out and fixing the location thereof. See: In re Private Road in Monroeville Borough, Appeal of Marinclin, 204 Pa.Super. 552, 205 A.2d 885 (1964). The Commonwealth Court has similarly entertained such an appeal. Mattei v. Huray, 54 Pa.Commw. 561, 422 A.2d 899 (1980). This practice appears to be sound. For an appellate court to refuse to entertain such an appeal and require proceedings to assess damages to go ahead before the *394location of the roadway has been determined finally would permit absurd consequences in the event the location of the road were subsequently altered following appellate review. We conclude, therefore, that an order finally confirming the opening of a private road is an order which is sufficiently final to permit immediate appellate review.

The contrary holding of a panel majority in Beers v. Raub, 363 Pa.Super. 521, 526 A.2d 801 (1987), is disapproved and expressly overruled. The practice adhered to and followed in cases of this type for many years has not been altered by the elimination of courts of quarter sessions or by the establishment of a unified judicial system. The Act of 1836 and the practice thereunder remain extant.2 Cf. Eminent Domain Code of June 22, 1964, P.L. 84, § 517, 26 P.S. § 1-517 (decree confirming report of viewers after it has been determined finally shall constitute final order).

The Act of 1836, supra, grants to boards of view broad authority to determine whether a private road is necessary and, if so, where it shall be located. Although the board’s findings are subject to review and may be set aside, its authority will not be infringed upon by a court’s substituting its judgment for that of the viewers. In re Private Road in Monroeville Borough, Appeal of Marin*395clin, supra 204 Pa.Super. at 558, 205 A.2d at 887-888. See also: In re Private Road in Greene Township, 343 Pa.Super. 304, 307, 494 A.2d 859, 860-861 (1985). “Appellate review of these matters is solely to ascertain the validity of the court’s jurisdiction, the regularity of the proceedings, questions of law, and whether there has been an abuse of discretion. We cannot look beyond the record ... or consider questions of fact.” Little Appeal, 180 Pa.Super. 555, 558, 119 A.2d 587, 588 (1956). See also: Keller’s Private Road, 154 Pa. 547, 548, 25 A. 814, 814 (1893).

Appellants contend that the board of viewers in the instant case abused its discretion by failing to follow the statutory mandate to lay out a road having the shortest distance and in such a manner as to do the least damage to the remaining land. However, the length of the roadway and the amount of damage caused are only two of several considerations mandated by statute. Of equal importance is the “best ground for a road.”

The three possible routes in the instant case are depicted as follows:

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According to Plan No. 1, the roadway would extend from Legislative Route 41080 to the southeast corner of the Harris tract. It would cross the Heffner tract via an *396existing roadway through woodland, traverse a field used for farming on the Temple tract, continue along an existing roadway on the Temple tract, and terminate at the Harris tract, where it would connect with another existing roadway. The roadway across lands of Heffner and Temple would rise an average of 1.11 feet in 100 feet, a grade of 1.11%. The steepest grade would be 4.81%. The length of this road would be 2596.31 feet. It would take .4340 acres from the Heffner tract and .9965 acres from the Temple tract. Of the total length of this roadway, however, a distance of 1311.22 feet would be over existing roadways, consuming .7224 acres. The balance of the road, 1284.99 feet in length and .707 acres in area, would traverse farmland owned by Temple. Of all possible routes, this roadway would be the easiest to maintain.

The route envisioned by Plan No. 2 is the shortest route. It would commence at Township Road 738, cross the Temple property at a descending grade of 13.62% to a stream, and then continue across the Temple property at an ascending grade of 12.61% to the Harris tract. The steepest grade would be 14.57%. This route would be 1062.70 feet in length and would take .5855 acres from the Temple tract. There was engineering testimony that the grades for such a road would be excessive and that extensive drainage ditches would be necessary to capture surface run-off and prevent a washout of the road. To construct such a road it would be necessary to erect a drainage structure across the stream and to alter the road’s surface with fill in order to accommodate its entrance at the township road. Whether an all-weather road could be maintained adequately was uncertain.

The roadway to be accommodated by Plan No. 3 would also begin at Township Road 738, but it would terminate at the northwest corner of the Driver tract. This roadway would be 1932.8 feet in length and would take 1.056 acres of pasture land owned by Temple. The average grade of such a road would be 8.94%, but the steepest grade would be 21.17%. The roadway would be winding and would include *397several sharp turns. It would be bordered on the south by a stream and, therefore, would require extensive drainage ditches and cross-drains to capture and divert surface waters away from the road in order to prevent flooding of the road. These necessary improvements, according to engineering testimony, would significantly increase the cost of constructing the road.

The board of viewers concluded from the evidence presented that the excessive grades and poor, overall terrain over which routes 2 and 3 would run “made them less practical than Plan No. 1 in spite of the fact [that] Plan No. 1 [was] longer and [would cause] more injury than the others.” The board also observed that Plan No. 1, as surveyed, would minimize the injury to Temple’s farmland by following the contour lines and crop rows as it crossed his field. Finally, the board found that the road envisioned by Plan No. 1 would be an all-weather road; whereas, the other routes had the potential for becoming impassable in winter months and during periods of heavy rains. Thus, even though it entailed the longest route, the roadway included in Plan No. 1 would be constructed over the most suitable ground.

The board’s findings are fully supported by competent evidence. The trial court found no abuse of discretion and confirmed the report of the viewers. Our review of the record discloses no basis for reversing the order of the trial court.

Appellants argue, however, that the relief sought by the petitioner-appellees was barred by principles of res judicata. In support of this argument they point to a prior action in equity wherein appellees were unable to prove a right-of-way by prescription. There is no merit in this argument. The doctrine of res judicata precludes relitigation of an issue of fact or law which was fully litigated in a prior action. “[B]efore the doctrine of res judicata will apply, there must be: (1) identity of the thing sued ... for; (2) identity of the cause of action; (3) identity of the ... parties to the action; and (4) identity of the quality or *398capacity of the parties suing or being sued.” Shindel v. Leedom, 350 Pa.Super. 274, 278, 504 A.2d 353, 355 (1986).

In the prior equity action, the court determined that appellees had failed to prove that their use of a roadway across land owned by Temple had been open, notorious, continuous, and hostile for a period of 21 years. The present proceedings are authorized by statute and are determined by necessity. Because the parties are agreed that appellees’ properties are landlocked, the need for a private road has been fully established. The remaining issues concern location and such things as grade and practicality. These are not the same issues which were litigated in the prior action in equity. Clearly, therefore, the present proceedings are not barred by principles of res judicata.

It is correct, as appellants contend, that the route adopted by the viewers and confirmed by the trial court will cross through prime farmland. This fact, however, will be reflected in the amount of damages which they will be entitled to recover as a result of the taking of their land. It does not alone prevent the laying out of the road across land otherwise found most suitable for roadway purposes.

The order confirming the report of viewers is affirmed.

OLSZEWSKI, J., files a concurring and dissenting opinion. KELLY, J., files a dissenting opinion in which BECK and JOHNSON, JJ., join.

. This is vividly illustrated by the facts of the instant case. Three separate routes have been proposed. Locations and lengths, as well as terrain, the area subsumed, and the type of land crossed, are different. Thus, damages will vary according to the final route selected. Realistically, therefore, proceedings to determine the amount of appellants’ damages cannot begin until the precise location of the roadway across their lands has been finally determined.

. The author of the dissenting opinion would adopt the reasoning in Beers v. Raub that “since, under the new procedures, the same court which confirms the viewers’ report also conducts the trial on damages, the need for piecemeal review of private road cases ha[s] been removed.” Dissenting Opinion at p. 402-403. This overlooks the fact that prior to 1969, the proceedings to determine damages were held in the same court as the court which had determined that a private road should be opened. Prior to 1969, proceedings to open a private road and proceedings to assess damages were both held in the court of quarter sessions before a board of viewers. See: In re Private Road in Monroeville Borough, Appeal of Marinclin, supra. If a party were dissatisfied with the damages awarded by viewers, he was permitted to file exceptions. These exceptions were filed in the court of quarter sessions. Id. Only if he wanted to appeal from the viewers’ award of damages and have his damages determined by a jury would he file an appeal in the court of common pleas. Id. This procedure was not changed in 1969. The only change made by constitutional amendment in 1969 was to consolidate the courts of quarter sessions and common pleas into one trial court to be known as the court of common pleas.