concurring and dissenting:
I join the concurring and dissenting opinion by Judge Johnson in all respects and would add the following.
In my opinion, it is clear that the court below did not abuse its discretion in valuing Mr. McCabe’s interest in the partnership of Rawle and Henderson at $286,276.00. The majority opinion considers only the partnership agreement in placing a valuation for equitable distribution of marital property and concludes that the appellant’s interest in his law firm is approximately $19,000.00. In my opinion, this valuation is totally unrealistic and does not represent a correct valuation of his interest. A partnership agreement is only one factor to consider and even then, as in this case, the partnership agreement is unlikely to deal with valuation of a partner’s interest vis a vis equitable distribution upon dissolution of the marital relationship. Generally, a partnership agreement will deal with valuation upon the voluntary withdrawal, death of a partner or dissolution of the firm. Stern v. Stern, 66 N.J. 340, 331 A.2d 257, 261 (1975) lists other factors which must be considered:
Generally speaking the monetary worth of this type of professional partnership will consist of the total value of the partners’ capital accounts, accounts receivable, the *466value of work in progress, any appreciation in the true worth of tangible personalty over and above book value, together with good will, should there in fact be any; the total so arrived at to be diminished by the amount of accounts payable as well as any other liabilities not reflected on the partnership books.
See Pennsylvania’s Equitable Distribution, Progress or Confusion?, 60 Temple Law Quarterly 293 (1987)1 While the Divorce Code provides for the equitable distribution of marital property, it gives no guidance on determining the manner of valuing such property. The method of valuation depends on the nature of the property interest involved, and the court must look at the realities of the situation and avoid an unrealistic valuation. The Divorce Code, 23 Pa.S. § 102 states that it is the policy of the Commonwealth to “[e]ffectuate economic justice between parties who are divorced ... and insure a fair and just determination and settlement of their property rights.”
The court below correctly points out at slip opinion page 2 that the partnership agreement is not determinative in placing a value on Mr. McCabe’s partnership interest:
The [partnership] agreement provides for only three situations; a) withdrawal with 90 days notice, b) withdrawal without 90 days notice and c) death. None of these situations are relevant to the instant action. Our concern is with the equitable distribution of marital property and for the purposes of such distribution the marital assets must be viewed in their present form. The defendant is remaining with the firm as an ongoing concern. As *467such, he will enjoy the benefits of a part owner far in excess of what he would enjoy if he retired, died or withdrew from the partnership.
I find no abuse of discretion by the court below and accordingly would affirm the orders in their entirety.
MONTEMURO, TAMILIA and JOHNSON, JJ., join.. In re Marriage of Morris, Missouri Ct. of Appeals, 588 S.W.2d 39, 44 (1979) the court stated:
However, it would seem the factors mentioned in Annotation Divorce—Value of Interest in Partnership, 74 A.L.R.3d 621, 623 (1976) would be appropriate to consider in corporation stock valuation along with any other relevant factors. The annotation states assets such as capital investments, capital accounts, other fixed shares of partnership worth, accrued equity, accounts receivable, as adjusted, the value of work in progress, appreciation of tangible personalty, goodwill, cash on hand and partnership life insurance should be considered in determining the value of a partner’s interest.