Christopher and Janice Barczynski (Barc-zynskis), on behalf of Reginald Ray Moore *1223(Reggie), appeal from an order of the Department of Public Welfare (DPW) affirming the decision of the Philadelphia Department of Human Services (DHS) to deny the Barc-zynskis’ application for an adoption assistance subsidy under sections 771-774 of the Public Welfare Code (Code).2 We reverse.
Reggie was born on May 26, 1989 and was committed to the care and custody of DHS. (DPW’s Findings of Fact, No. 1; N.T. at 9.) DHS placed Reggie with an unidentified foster family. (DPW’s Findings of Fact, No. 6; N.T. at 9.)
The original goal of DHS was to reunite Reggie with his biological mother.3 (N.T. at 56.) However, when those efforts failed,' DHS went before the court of common pleas to have its goal for Reggie changed to adoption. (N.T. at 57.) The court accepted the change, and DHS transferred Reggie’s case from its Family Center unit to its adoption division for termination of parental rights. (N.T. at 57, 73.) The termination procedure involved a search for Reggie’s biological father. (N.T. at 58.)
On August 6, 1989, DHS placed Reggie in the care of the Barczynskis under the supervision of Counseling and Care Services. (DPW’s Findings of Fact, No. 5; N.T. at 9.) Two days after his arrival at the Barczyn-ski’s, Reggie stopped breathing and had to be hospitalized for nine days. (N.T. at 13.) When he returned to the Barczynskis’ home from the hospital, Reggie was connected to an apnea monitor, for which the Barczynskis had to receive training. (N.T. at 13.) After being with the Barczynskis for approximately one month, DHS placed Reggie once again with the original foster parents. (DPW’s Findings of Fact, No. 6; N.T. at 9.)
In May 1990, DHS moved Reggie back to the Barczynskis. (DPW’s Findings of Fact, No. 7; N.T. at 9.) According to the Barczyn-skis, Reggie was in worse condition than when he left them. (N.T. at 10.) Reggie did not walk, crawl, hold a bottle or try to feed himself. (N.T. at 10.) In addition, Reggie had no muscle tone. (N.T. at 10.) The Barczynskis believed that Reggie’s original foster mother “did nothing with him.” (N.T. at 13.)
In August or September of 1990, while attempting to terminate parental rights, the DHS adoption division located Reggie’s biological father.4 (N.T. at 33.) He expressed an interest in caring for Reggie. (DPW’s Findings of Fact, No. 10; N.T. at 58.) As a result, the DHS goal for Reggie was changed again, from adoption to reunification, and the case was transferred back to the DHS Family Center unit. (DPW’s Findings of Fact, No. 10; N.T. at 58.) The efforts to reunite Reggie with his biological father did not go well. Apparently, Reggie’s biological father sometimes failed to visit Reggie when visits were scheduled. (N.T. at 58.)
In the first half of 1992, Reggie’s medical condition was not good. He was experiencing febrile seizures and hypergag reflex. He also had asthma, and he suffered from nosebleeds.5 (N.T. at 12.) The Barczynskis, afraid that DHS would move Reggie from one foster home to another and concerned that Reggie needed medical supervision, began to discuss adopting Reggie with DHS during this time. (N.T. at 11,13.)
The Barczynskis, with an attorney, went to see DHS about adopting Reggie. (N.T. at 14, 35.) However, DHS would not talk to the attorney. (N.T. at 35.) Reggie’s caseworker supervisor told the attorney that “he had *1224absolutely no business being there.” (N.T. at 14, 35.) DHS told the Barczynskis that Reggie was not eligible for adoption because his biological father was involved in his life. (N.T. at 13, 34.) The Barczynskis decided to “just see what happened.” (N.T. at 35.)
At some point, the Barczynskis and DHS discussed “legal custody” or “temporary legal custody” as an alternative to adoption. (N.T. at 58, 75.) DHS considers “temporary legal custody” to be an uncommon and temporary situation usually initiated by the Family Center unit when, as in this case, a biological parent is not ready to reunite with his or her child.6 (N.T. at 70-71.) However, DHS also considers placement of a child in “legal custody"’ to be one of the final goals for a dependent child in its care and custody, like reunification and adoption. (N.T. at 71.) Thus, once that goal is achieved, DHS no longer has any contact with the dependent child.7 (N.T. at 71.)
When foster parents take “temporary legal custody” of a dependent child, DHS assumes that the foster parents will not be adopting the child. (N.T. at 75.) Thus, DHS does not advise the foster parents that, by taking “temporary legal custody,” they may forfeit an opportunity in the future to receive adoption assistance payments. (N.T. at 74.)
DHS believed that Reggie would benefit from a “temporary legal custody” arrangement because the Barczynskis would be able to make medical care decisions for Reggie without first obtaining the approvals of DHS and Reggie’s biological father. (N.T. at 68.) Thus, Reggie could avoid “some of the complications that come from involvement with the whole system.” (N.T. at 68.)
On September 2, 1992, the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas issued a Dependency Review Order8 indicating that there was an agreement between DHS, the Barczynskis and Reggie’s biological father to discharge the commitment of Reggie’s care to DHS.9 The court ordered that “temporary legal custody” be transferred to the Barczynskis and that the matter be relisted “upon application.” 10 (DHS Exhibit No. 1.)
The Barczynskis had no further contact with DHS or any other agency with respect to Reggie. (DPW’s Findings of Fact, No. 13.) However, the Barczynskis are foster parents to another child and have adopted a set of twins. (N.T. at 38.) The Barczynskis receive foster care payments for the other child and adoption subsidy payments for the twins. (N.T. at 30, 38-39.) The Barczynskis were under the supervision of Counseling *1225and Youth Care with respect to their foster child, but not with respect to Reggie. (N.T. at 27-29.)
In 1994 or 1995, the Barczynskis sent a letter to Reggie’s biological father asking him to consent to their adoption of Reggie. (N.T. at 16.) Reggie’s biological father gave his consent after a year, and the Barczynskis then proceeded to file papers to adopt Reggie. (N.T. at 16-17.)
By letter dated November 10, 1997, the Barczynskis applied for an Adoption Subsidy. By letter dated November 13, 1997, DHS denied the request because Reggie was not in the legal custody of a county agency or another state-approved agency and because the Barczynskis’ adoption of Reggie was considered to be a private adoption. (DPW’s Findings of Fact, No. 14; DHS Exhibit No. 2.)
On November 24, 1997, the Barczynskis filed an appeal from the DHS decision with DPW. (DPW’s Findings of Fact, No. 15.) On or about December 29,1997, the Barczynskis filed an adoption petition with the court of common pleas. (DPW’s Findings of Fact, No. 16.) On January 23, 1998, the court terminated the parental rights of Reggie’s biological parents and ordered that custody of Reggie remain with the Barczynskis in expectation of adoption. (DPW’s Findings of Fact, No. 18; DHS Exhibit No. A-2.) On April 29,1998, DPW issued an order denying the Barczynskis’ appeal.
On appeal to this court from the DPW April 29,1998 order,11 the Barczynskis argue that our state law, which limits adoption assistance payments to special needs children in the legal custody of a county agency or other state-approved agency,12 conflicts with the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 (Federal Law).13 We agree.
State law that conflicts with federal law is “without effect.” Cellucci v. General Motors Corp., 550 Pa. 407, 413, 706 A.2d 806, 809 (1998). This is because, under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, federal law preempts state law that conflicts with federal law. Id. Courts will find a conflict “where the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Id.
Congress stated that its purpose in enacting the Federal Law was to enable each state “to provide ... adoption assistance for children with special needs.” 42 U.S.C. § 670. This statement of purpose does not limit adoption assistance to special needs children in the legal custody of a county agency or other state-approved agency. Moreover, the provision of the Federal Law dealing specifically with the adoption assistance program states: “Each State having a plan approved under this part shall enter into adoption assistance agreements ... with the adoptive parents of children with special needs.” 42 U.S.C. § 673(a)(1)(A). The state is not directed to enter into adoption assistance agreements only with adoptive parents of special needs children in the legal custody of a county agency or other state-approved agency. Therefore, we conclude that our state adoption assistance law conflicts with the Federal Law to the extent that it withholds adoption assistance payments from special needs children who are not in the legal custody of a county agency or other state-approved agency.
Accordingly, we reverse.14
*1226 ORDER
AND NOW, this 15th day of April, 1999, the order of the Department of Public Welfare, dated April 29,1998, is reversed.
. This case was reassigned to the authoring judge on February 9, 1999.
. Act of June 13, 1967, P.L. 31, added by section 1 of the Act of December 30, 1974, P.L. 1039, 62 P.S. §§ 771-774. Sections 771-774 of the Code provide for payment of an adoption assistance subsidy to eligible children. These sections comprise subdivision (e) of the Code and are commonly known as the Adoption Opportunities Act.
. DPW found as a fact that, at the time of Reggie’s birth, the goal of DHS for Reggie was adoption. (DPW’s Findings of Fact, No. 9.) However, the record does not contain substantial evidence to support that finding.
. DPW found as a fact that Reggie’s biological father was located in August or September 1992. (DPW’s Findings of Fact, No. 10.) However, that finding is not supported by substantial evidence in the record.
. DPW found as a fact that Reggie suffered from these problems in May 1990. (DPW’s Findings of Fact, No. 8.) However, there is not substantial evidence in the record to support that finding.
. It is difficult to understand why DHS would approve a "temporary legal custody” arrangement with foster parents when its goal for the child is reunification, not adoption. DHS admits that giving “temporary legal custody” to foster parents makes reunification with biological parents less likely. (N.T. at 72.)
. However, we note that DHS has a statutory duty to protect the welfare of all children and to prevent neglect, abuse and exploitation. Section 405 of the County Institution District Law, Act of June 24, 1937, P.L. 2017, as amended, 62 P.S. § 2305.
. Under section 6351(a)(2) of the Juvenile Act, as amended, 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(a)(2), if a child is found to be a dependent child, a court of common pleas may transfer "temporary legal custody” of that child to an individual who, after study by the person or agency designated by the court, is found by the court to be qualified to receive and care for the child. The court may make such an order if it is best suited to the protection and physical, mental and moral welfare of the child.
. The court had the authority to order DHS to continue its supervision of Reggie but did not do so. See In re Lowry, 506 Pa. 121, 484 A.2d 383 (1984).
.Section 6351(e) of the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(e), provides:
Within six months of ... a transfer of temporary legal custody ... under subsection (a)(2), the court shall conduct a disposition review hearing for the purpose of determining whether placement continues to be best suited to the protection and physical, mental and moral welfare of the child. The court shall conduct a second review hearing not later than six months after the initial hearing, a third hearing not later than six months after the second hearing and subsequent disposition review hearings at least every 12 months until the child is returned home or removed from the jurisdiction of the court.
The court does not have to hold "disposition review hearings” if the court has determined that the child should remain permanently in foster care with a specified foster family. 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(h). Here, the court only ordered temporary custody but, contrary to law, held no further hearings.
. Our scope of review is limited to determining whether constitutional rights were violated, whether errors of law were committed or whether necessary findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence. Section 704 of the Administrative Agency Law, 2 Pa.C.S. § 704.
. Section 772 of the Code, 62 P.S. § 772, states, in relevant part, that an "eligible child” is a "child in the legal custody of local authorities” or a "child in the legal custody of an agency approved by [DPW].” DPW’s regulation at 55 Pa.Code § 3140.202(b)(3) states that an eligible child must be “in the legal custody of the county agency or another agency approved by [DPW].”
. 42 U.S.C. §§ 670-677.
. Because of our disposition here, we need not address whether DHS had a duty to inform the Barczynskis that, by assuming "temporary legal custody” of Reggie, Reggie would not be eligible for adoption assistance payments.