dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The trial court erred in permitting the introduction of Mr. Chiechi’s potential use of drugs without establishing the necessary predicate required by law, i.e., that Mr. Chicchi was intoxicated and impaired. Because the Majority determines otherwise, I must dissent.
*611The rules governing admissibility of evidence of drug consumption and intoxication are the same as those governing the admissibility of evidence governing the consumption of alcoholic beverages. Hawthorne v. Dravo Corp., Keystone Division, 352 Pa.Super. 359, 508 A.2d 298 (1986), allocatur denied, 514 Pa. 617, 521 A.2d 932 (1987). As the Majority notes, the general rule is that evidence of mere consumption of alcohol is inadmissible to prove recklessness of the party. Whyte v. Robinson, 421 Pa.Super. 33, 617 A.2d 380 (1992). Only if, in addition to the evidence establishing consumption of alcohol, there is evidence that the consumption of alcohol caused the party to become intoxicated and physically impaired, can an adverse party introduce the evidence of the consumption by and the intoxication of the party. Id. Moreover, the Majority is correct that intoxication and physical impairment may be established by circumstantial evidence. Kriner v. McDonald, 223 Pa.Super. 531, 302 A.2d 392, 394 (1973). However, I disagree with the Majority’s conclusion that the “record in this matter contains sufficient circumstantial evidence, from which it may be inferred that at the time of the accident, Chicchi could not hear the whistle due to his physical impairment resulting from intoxication of cocaine.” Maj. op. at 607. There is not sufficient circumstantial evidence to support such a conclusion.
Even viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to SEPTA as required in an appeal from the denial of a post trial motion for a new trial, Smith v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 707 A.2d 604 (Pa.Cmwlth.1998), the most that can be said is that Mr. Chicchi had ingested cocaine at some time prior to the occurrence of the accident and that he was “high.” There is no evidence of record to indicate when he ingested such cocaine or how long after one uses cocaine traces of cocaine can be found via blood or urine testing. Thus, without more, the tests performed at the hospital on Mr. Chicchi on the date of the accident do not establish upon which date he ingested cocaine. Nor is there any evidence of record adduced to show how long the effects of cocaine last. Neither do the tests establish that Mr. Chicchi was impaired or intoxicated at the time of the accident. Perhaps most troubling is that there is absolutely no evidence whatsoever that cocaine impairs one’s ability to hear. This is critical because the Majority appears to rest its entire conclusion of impairment upon the fact that Mr. Chicchi could not hear the train whistle. See Maj. op. at p. 607. This lack of any evidence that cocaine impairs hearing is especially significant in light of the fact that there was a playing Walkman found near Mr. Chicchi’s body at the accident site. Trial court slip op. at p. 2. Nor is there any other evidence of impairment as, for example, Mr. Chicchi was staggering as he walked or slurring his speech prior to the accident, indicating some functional impairment in motor control. See, e.g., Ackerman v. Delcomico, 336 Pa.Super. 569, 486 A.2d 410 (1984)(finding slurred speech, inter alia, to constitute sufficient evidence of intoxication); Couts v. Ghion, 281 Pa.Super. 135, 421 A.2d 1184 (1980)(finding staggering gait, inter alia, observed by police officer to constitute sufficient evidence of intoxication).
Without such predicate evidence, I fail to see the relevance of the fact that at some point in time prior to the accident Mr. Chic-chi ingested cocaine. Without such evidence, it was eiror to permit the introduction of the evidence concerning the presence of cocaine in Mr. Chicchi’s system. For, while circumstantial evidence such as staggering or slurred speech may allow a jury to infer intoxication and impairment, this record is devoid of such evidence. Moreover, without some evidence that cocaine impairs one’s ability to hear, and there is none in this record, the jury cannot be permitted to conclude that Mr. Chicchi was impaired merely because he failed to hear the train whistle. This is especially true given the playing Walkman found near him at the accident scene. For without evidence that cocaine affects hearing, the jury is merely guessing that Mr. Chicchi was intoxicated to the point of impairment at the time of the accident, something they are not permitted to do. Freund v. Hyman, 377 Pa. 35, 103 A.2d 658 (1954)(a jury is not permitted, however, to speculate or guess). Thus, while the trial court has broad discretion to determine *612whether relevant evidence ought to be admitted or excluded depending upon whether its probative weight outweighs its potential for prejudice, the trial court has no discretion to admit evidence which is not relevant. Commonwealth v. Jackson, 336 Pa.Super. 609, 486 A.2d 431, 437 (1984)(“only relevant competent evidence is admissible at trial.”)(emphasis added); Commonwealth v. Petroll, 696 A.2d 817, 839 (Pa.Super,1997)(Johnson, J. dissenting), allocatur granted in fart, 660 Pa. 167, 703 A.2d 1034 (1997) (“Irrelevant evidence is inadmissa-ble.”). Here the evidence of Mr. Chicchi’s ingestion of cocaine is not relevant absent a showing that such ingestion rendered Mr. Chicehi intoxicated or impaired at the time of the accident.
Moreover, not only is the evidence of merely ingesting cocaine at some point prior to the accident irrelevant and therefore inadmissible absent a showing of intoxication, the introduction of such evidence is highly prejudicial. What Justice Musmanno, writing for the Court, observed over thirty-five years ago in upholding the exclusion of evidence of alcohol consumption at the “Crazy Bar” without proof of intoxication still holds true regarding the use of drugs today:
[wjhile proof of intoxication is relevant where reckless or careless driving of an automobile is the matter at issue, the mere fact of drinking intoxicating liquor is not admissible, being unfairly prejudicial ....
Cook v. Philadelphia Transportation Company, 414 Pa. 154, 159, 199 A.2d 446, 448 (1964), quoting, Fisher v. Dye, 386 Pa. 141, 148, 125 A.2d 472, 476 (1956). And as the Superior Court more recently observed, “[t]he same reasons for excluding evidence of alcohol consumption where intoxication is not proved apply with equal, if not added, force to situations involving the use of marijuana” and we might add, to situations involving the ingestion of cocaine. Hawthorne v. Dravo Corp., 508 A.2d at 303.
Because the trial court permitted the introduction of evidence concerning Mr. Chic-chi’s potential ingestion of cocaine at some undetermined time prior to the accident without the requisite proof of intoxication and impairment, contrary to law and to the manifest prejudice of Mr. Chicchi, the post trial motions for a new trial should have been granted. Because the Majority affirms the denial of the post trial motions, I respectfully dissent.