Dissenting Opinion by
Judge FRIEDMAN.I respectfully dissent. In this appeal, the State Civil Service Commission (Commission) determined that Sean P. Clapper’s (Clapper) failure to follow proper procedures “reflected'] on his ability to properly execute his duties as a correction officer” but, nevertheless, concluded that the Department of Corrections (Department) did not have just cause to terminate *534Clapper. (R.R. at 227.) The majority agrees, concluding that because Clapper’s conduct showed only “bad judgment,” the Commission had statutory authority to modify the discipline and impose a suspension. (Majority’s op. at 532). I cannot agree. Rather, I believe that the Department established just cause for Clapper’s termination as a matter of law and that the Commission exceeded its statutory authority in modifying Clapper’s discipline.
The Commission found the following relevant facts. On February 2, 2002, between 8:25 a.m. and 8:35 a.m., four officers under Clapper’s supervision attempted to retrieve cleaning supplies from an inmate’s cell. After negotiations with the inmate failed, the officers entered the inmate’s cell, restrained him, retrieved the cleaning supplies and left the cell. Clapper did not enter the inmate’s cell. (Commission’s Findings of Fact, Nos. 18-19.)
The inmate subsequently required medical treatment.1 Later that morning, Lt. Hayes informed Clapper that a surveillance video tape indicated that an inmate’s cell had been entered, and Hayes asked Clapper what had happened between 8:45 a.m. and 9:45 a.m. Clapper stated that nothing had happened between those times. (Commission’s Findings of Fact, Nos. 21-22.) Lt. Hayes then questioned the four officers that had entered the cell and informed them of the surveillance video, again requesting information about what had happened between 8:45 a.m. and 9:45 a.m. The officers wrote incident reports; Clapper also wrote a report, stating that nothing had happened between those times. (Commission’s Findings of Fact, Nos. 22-24.)
Lt. Hayes asked the officers and Clapper to amend their statements. At that time, Clapper amended his statement to read, “Let it be known that at no time did I enter the cell at or before 09^5,” and added a statement that he had no knowledge of anyone entering the inmate’s cell.2 (Commission’s Findings of Fact, Nos. 27, 28) (emphasis added). On February 3, 2002, Clapper was told to report to Capt. Weaverling.
Capt. Weaverling asked Clapper if anyone had entered the inmate’s cell between 8:45 a.m. and 9:45 a.m.; Clapper again denied that anything had happened during the time period in question. (Commission’s Findings of Fact, Nos. 29-30.) On February 4, 2002, Clapper wrote another statement, admitting that the incident occurred at 8:30 a.m. and that “the decision to not mention this situation was a mutual agreement among those involved.” Clapper accepted full responsibility for his actions, acknowledging that his decisions were “incorrect.” (Commission’s Findings of Fact, Nos. 31-33.)
Clapper was charged with nine violations of the Department’s Code of Ethics and was terminated from his position. On appeal, the Commission concluded that the Department proved only three of the nine charges and, therefore, failed to establish just cause for termination. The Commission set aside Clapper’s termination and suspended him for thirty days based on the three proven charges. Before this court, the Department argues that the Commission erred as a matter of law in altering the discipline imposed by the Department because Clapper’s refusal to fully cooperate with an internal investigation and his untruthful and misleading state*535ments during the investigation established Clapper’s inability to satisfactorily perform his job duties and, thus, provided just cause for his dismissal. The majority rejects this argument, holding that the Commission acted within its authority in reinstating Clapper and modifying the Department’s discipline to a suspension. In doing so, the majority dismisses our prior decisions in Pennsylvania Game Commission v. State Civil Service Commission (Toth), 720 A.2d 1065 (Pa.Cmwlth.1998) aff'd, 561 Pa. 19, 747 A.2d 887 (2000) and Department of Corrections v. Roche, 654 A.2d 64 (Pa.Cmwlth.) appeal denied, 541 Pa. 644, 663 A.2d 695 (1995), distinguishing those cases because the underlying conduct was criminal in nature and not comparable to Clapper’s conduct here. I cannot accept this reasoning.
At the outset, I submit that this court cannot ignore Toth and Roche solely on the basis that Clapper’s conduct was not criminal and did not involve the physical mistreatment of inmates. Although the facts are different, the rationale in those cases remains applicable to the present situation. Neither Toth nor Roche was decided on the basis of whether the charged conduct was criminal or non-criminal in nature; rather, those cases focused on whether the employee’s conduct touched upon the ability to perform his or her job.3 As we recently explained in Davis v. Civil Service Commission, 820 A.2d 874, 878 (Pa. Cmwlth.2003), “[e]ven a single instance of misconduct or an error of judgment can constitute just cause for dismissal if it adversely reflects on the fitness of a person for his duties.” Id. at 878 (emphasis added). This is the standard that must apply in every civil service termination case.
Section 807 of the Civil Service Act (Act), Act of August 5, 1941, P.L. 752, as amended, 71 P.S. § 741.807, states that civil servants may only be terminated for just cause.- Although the Act does not define just cause, our supreme court has stated that just cause “must be merit-related and the criteria must touch upon [the employee’s] competency and ability in some rational and logical manner.” Galant v. Department of Environmental Resources, 534 Pa. 17, 20, 626 A.2d 496, 498 (1993). As noted, the Commission here admitted that Clapper’s violations proved by the Department reflected on his ability to properly execute his duties as a corrections officer.4 Nevertheless, because the Department failed to prove a majority of the charges, the majority here approves the Commission’s determination that the Department failed to prove just cause for Clapper’s termination. I submit that the majority’s conclusion is legally flawed. *536Unlike the majority, I believe that Clapper’s conduct was more than an example of “bad judgment.” (Majority’s op. at 532.) Clapper’s actions constituted a serious dereliction of duty that raised significant questions as to his ability to perform as a corrections officer. Because Clapper’s proven conduct “struck at the heart” of his ability to perform his duties, that conduct justified termination as a matter of law. Toth, 561 Pa. at 30, 747 A.2d at 893.
The majority also agreed that the Commission acted within its statutory authority in modifying the Department’s discipline of Clapper. Although I recognize that the Commission has wide discretion under section 952(c) of the Act, added by the Act of June 26, 1989, P.L. 47, 71 P.S. 741.952(c), to modify the Department’s action, I disagree with the majority’s determination that the Commission acted within the boundaries of its statutory authority here. Section 952(c) allows the Commission to order reinstatement of an employee only “where appropriate.” 71 P.S. § 741.952(c). Such modification is not appropriate here. Clapper’s conduct is indefensible and touches upon his job performance at the most basic level.
Accordingly, I believe that the majority erred as a matter of law in affirming the discipline imposed by the Commission, and I would vacate the Commission’s order and reinstate the discipline imposed by the Department.
. The record is not clear on the cause of the inmate's injuries or whether the four officers were responsible.
. The Commission noted that the record contained no information about the other officers’ amended reports.
. Indeed, I note our prior decisions in Eller-bee-Pryer v. State Civil Service Commission, 803 A.2d 249 (Pa.Cmwlth.2002), and Department of Labor & Industry v. Civil Service Commission (Davis), 693 A.2d 634 (Pa.Cmwlth.) appeal denied, 550 Pa. 712, 705 A.2d 1312 (1997). In Ellerbee-Pryer, this court affirmed the Commission’s decision to terminate a corrections officer for failure to comply with a substance abuse program because it affected the terms of her employment. In L & I, we vacated the Commission's order reinstating an employee because it determined that the Department of Labor and Industry (L & I) did not have just cause for terminating an employee that purposely destroyed paperwork critical to the operations of the L & I. Again, our focus did not rest on what was charged, but how it affected the employee’s ability to perform his or her duties.
. As a corrections officer, Clapper had a "duty to prevent injustice," and at the very least, was required to "report abuses, and to do so promptly and truthfully.” Roche, 654 A.2d. at 69. In Roche, we determined that a corrections officer's attempt to cover-up the criminal actions of fellow corrections officers by lying about what he observed constituted a dereliction of duty in a matter of public concern and reflected upon his duties as an officer. Roche.