Dissenting Opinion by BATTAGLIA, J., which HARRELL, J., joins.
I respectfully dissent.
The crux of the present case requires us to determine whether a State employee is entitled to be paid for the time spent driving from home to a work site other than the assigned workplace. The majority holds that an employee is not entitled to be paid for the entire commute, but only for the amount of time exceeding the employee’s normal commute. Additionally, the majority finds that an employee seeking compensation for that time would only be entitled to compensation for acts occurring twenty days prior to the filing of the grievance.
A.
In the present case, the Administrative Law Judge determined that under COMAR 17.04.11.02 B(l)(j), an employee is *287to be compensated for “work time” when traveling between home and a work site other than the assigned office:
No statute directly addresses how executive branch agencies are to define, and compensate employees for, “work time,” “commute time” or “travel time.” COMAR 17.04.11.02B provides ... “Work time includes time during which an employee ... [tjravels between home and a work site other than the assigned office, in accordance with the Standard Travel Regulations under COMAR 23.02.01.”
The Board of Public Work’s Standard Travel Regulations apply to all executive branch State employees. COMAR 23.02.01.02B(14) provides as follows:
(14) “Travel status” means the condition of a State employee while traveling on State business. An employee is not in travel status while commuting from home to the employee’s assigned office, regardless of the length of time of that commute.
Thus, by promulgated regulation, it is the policy of all executive agencies in the State (unless otherwise exempted) that an employee traveling from home to a field site, and not to the employee’s assigned office, is on “work time” and in “travel status.” An employee is to be paid or compensated for “work time.” See COMAR 17.04.11.02B(l)(a) through (l) (list of instances that qualify as compensable work time). When traveling to a field site, an employee is working for the State, “on the clock” so to speak, from the time the employee leaves the residence or the place from which the normal commute to the assigned office would begin.
In the instant case, under its revised policy (Joint Ex. # 2) the Agency automatically, subtracts out (refuses to compensate for) time equal to an employee’s normal, estimated commute time from home to the employee’s assigned office and back home again when the employee travels to a field site. The Agency argues that the policy is analogous to the Private Mileage Reimbursement policy contained in the Department of Budget and Management’s Vehicle Fleet policy (Joint Ex. # 3, p. 17-18). That policy is one in which mileage equal to an estimated, average round trip commute *288to an assigned office is subtracted out of the total miles traveled to and from a field site, for purposes of reimbursing an employee who uses a personal automobile for travel to a field site. With regard to reimbursing travel time,, the Agency currently subtracts ■ out the estimated round trip travel time to the assigned office on those days when an employee does not commute to the employee’s assigned office.
I conclude that the present policy of the Agency is arbitrary and inconsistent with law and regulations. There is no direct legal authority to allow the Agency to deduct from an . employee compensation for the work time while on travel status. Moreover, if an employee has two or more residences, or two or more places from which an estimated commute to the assigned office begins, the automatic deduction policy becomes unmanageable. The Agency attempted to argue that if the travel time to a field site were shorter than the estimated commute time to the assigned office, then the employee would somehow be unjustly compensated and therefore that interpretation of the law and regulations would lead to an absurd result. I am not persuaded by the Agency’s argument on that point. I conclude that [Ms. Miller] • has met her burdens to show that the Agency misapplied the statewide policy in formulating its own travel time policy.
The Circuit Court for Baltimore City agreed with the Administrative Law Judge that the Comptroller’s revised travel policy was not supported by law; the Circuit Court, however, remanded the case back to the Office of Administrative Hearings'for further hearings to establish the appropriate remedy:
The Court has further reviewed the entire record and finds that there is substantial evidence to support the findings of the Administrative Law Judge that the Comptroller of Maryland (the Agency) misapplied the statewide policy in formulating its own travel policy (A.L.J: Decision at 8). The Court further finds that the Administrative Law Judge applied the correct principles of law to this matter. The Court, though, is not persuaded that the Comptroller of *289Maryland, on these facts, should prevail in having the grievance denied and complaint dismissed by the Administrative Law Judge because of a finding that Petitioner Miller offered no credible evidence regarding the calculation of uncompensated work hours. Accordingly, this Court remands the case to the Administrative Law Judge for further proceedings to determine what, if any, compensation should be awarded Petitioner Miller for travel she undertook to any remote work site. Consistent with all other aspects of the decision of the Administrative Law Judge, Petitioner Miller’s grievance will be granted.
The Court of Special Appeals disagreed with the Circuit Court and the Administrative Law Judge, and reversed; the majority affirms the Court of Special Appeals.
What the majority does is fail to apply the appropriate standard of review and it further confuses our jurisprudence, which we recently correctly explicated in Maryland Aviation Administration v. Noland, 386 Md. 556, 873 A.2d 1145 (2005):
“A court’s role in reviewing an administrative agency adjudicatory decision is narrow; it ‘is limited to determining if there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the agency’s findings and conclusions, and to determine if the administrative decision is premised upon an erroneous conclusion of law.’ ”
“In applying the substantial evidence test, a reviewing court decides “whether a reasoning mind reasonably could have reached the factual conclusion the agency reached.’ A reviewing court should defer to the agency’s fact-finding and drawing of inferences if they are supported by the record. A reviewing court ‘ “must review the agency’s decision in the light most favorable to it; ... the agency’s decision is prima facie correct and presumed valid, and ... it is the agency’s province to resolve conflicting evidence” and to draw inferences from that evidence.’ ”
“Despite some unfortunate language that has crept into a few of our opinions, a court’s task on review is not to ‘substitute its judgment for the expertise of those persons *290who constitute the administrative agency.’ Even with regard to some legal issues, a degree of deference should often be accorded the position of the administrative agency. Thus, an administrative agency’s interpretation and application of the statute which the agency administers should ordinarily be given considerable weight by reviewing courts. Furthermore, the expertise of the agency in its own field should be respected.”
Id. at 571-72, 873 A.2d at 1154-55, quoting Board of Physician Quality Assurance v. Banks, 354 Md. 59, 67-69, 729 A.2d 376, 380-81 (1999) (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original). The majority concludes, however, that the Administrative Law Judge’s decision in the present case permitting payment to the employee for the entire time she is at a remote work site and in transit thereto should be given only slight deference “at best.” Op. at 282, 920 A.2d at 472-73. This is clearly wrong.
As pointed out in Banks, “[djespite some unfortunate language that has crept into a few of our opinions, a ‘court’s task on review is not to “substitute its judgment for the expertise of those persons who constitute the administrative agency” ’.” 354 Md. at 68, 729 A.2d at 381 (footnote omitted). Judge Eldridge, writing for this Court in Noland, further agreed that such language is disapproved:
The “substituted judgment” language is misleading and inaccurate for several reasons. It suggests, with respect to legal issues, that no deference whatsoever is owed to the agency’s decision. That is not the law. In an action for judicial review of an administrative agency’s decision, the “court must review the agency’s decision in the light most favorable to it,” and “the agency’s decision is prima facie correct and presumed valid.” In addition, the agency’s interpretations and applications of statutory or regulatory provisions “which the agency administers should ordinarily be given considerable weight by reviewing courts.” “Furthermore, the expertise of the agency in its own field should be respected.” *291In the context of a determination by an agency or official in the Executive Branch o f the State Government, the term “judgment” is often used to mean the exercise of discretion, such as an official exercising “good judgment.” Obviously a court may not substitute its exercise of discretion for that exercised by the Executive Branch agency or official.
If there is a need to articulate a “standard” for judicial review of an agency’s legal rulings, it is sufficient to say that a reviewing court must “determine if the administrative decision is premised upon an erroneous conclusion of law.”
Id. at 573-74 n. 3, 873 A.2d at 1155-56 n. 3 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). He emphasized that “[i]f there is a need to articulate a ‘standard’ for judicial review of an agency’s legal rulings, it is sufficient to say that a reviewing court must ‘determine if the administrative decision is premised upon an erroneous conclusion of law.’ ” Id. The majority’s assertion, then, that the deference, if any, is “slight ... at best,” does not accord with our jurisprudence.
B.
The Administrative Law Judge determined that an employee is entitled to be compensated for the entire time she was traveling from home to a work site other than the assigned office. This is not an erroneous conclusion of law.
Section 17.04.11.02 of the Code of Maryland Regulations defines “Work Time” in the context of employee compensation:
A. Workweek.
(1) The regular workweek consists of 40 hours in a 7-day period.
* * *
(7) Work in excess of an employee’s regular workweek shall be compensated by overtime payments or compensatory time....
B. Work Time.
*292(1) Work time includes time during which an employee: ■
(a) Is on duty, whether at the employee’s principal job site or at a remote location as part of the State’s telecommuting program;
* * *
(j) Travels between home and a work site other than the assigned office, in accordance with the Standard Travel Regulations under COMAR 23.02.01____
Clearly, then, work time includes time spent at a remote site and transit time, in accordance with the Standard Travel Regulations. The majority, nevertheless, refuses to apply those Standard Travel Regulations to the remote workplace commute, interpreting them to not apply because of the following language:
C. These regulations do not apply:
* *
(2) To State-owned, State-leased, or privately owned motor vehicles. Reimbursement to employees or officials who use State-owned, State-leased, or privately owned motor vehicles to conduct official business for the State is within the jurisdiction of the State Fleet Administrator, Department of Budget and Management, and subject to policies issued by the Secretary of Budget and Management.
COMAR 23.02.01.01 C. The majority interprets the “reimbursement” language in juxtaposition to the State Fleet Administrator language to deny State employees their just due.
This is the erroneous interpretation. Because we interpret language in regulations according to its “natural and ordinary meaning,” Ins. Comm’r v. Engelman, 345 Md. 402, 692 A.2d 474, 485 (1997) (“The Commissioner’s decision to promulgate and adopt COMAR §§ 09.30.94.09B and 09.30.94.11B without any reference to §§ 226(a), 230(b), and 242(e) belies [application of those sections to the regulation].”), citing Messitte v. Colonial Mortgage Service Co., 287 Md. 289, 295-96, 411 A.2d 1051, 1054 (1980) (when words of an administrative regulation are unambiguous, they will be accorded their natural and ordinary meaning), “reimbursement” in C(2) clearly refers to *293mileage reimbursement, not work commute time, as is revealed in the ordinary meaning of “reimbursement,” connoting repayment of prior incurred expenses. See Black’s Law Dictionary 1312 (8th ed. 2004) (defining “reimbursement,” as “repayment”); Merriam-Webster’s College Dictionary 1049 (11th ed. 2003) (defining “reimburse” as “to pay back to someone, to make restoration or payment of an equivalent to” and cites as an example the repayment of travel expenses); Random House Dictionary of the English Language 1625 (2nd ed. 1987) (defining “reimburse” as “to make payment to for expense or loss incurred,” or “to pay back, refund, repay”). Thus, the exception in the Standard Travel Regulations by its terms only applies to reimbursement for travel expenses such as mileage, tolls, etc.
The applicable language of the Standard Travel Regulations is really:
A. In this chapter, the following terms have the meanings indicated.
B. Terms Defined.
* * *
(7) “Official business” means the authorized duties performed by an employee or official of the State in the employee’s or officer’s defined capacity under the duties and responsibilities prescribed by the employment or office.
(10) “Routine business travel” means authorized travel on a daily basis or periodic basis to a jobsite other than the employee’s assigned office for official business.
* * *
(14) “Travel status” means the condition of a State employee while traveling on State business. An employee is not in travel status while commuting from home to the employee’s assigned office, regardless of the length of time of that commute.
COMAR 23.02.01.02. This language, because of the explicit reference to the Standard Travel Regulations in COMAR 17.04.11.02 B(l)(j), authorizes payment for the commute to and *294from a remote workplace. Unlike the indirect “regulation skipping” incorporation utilized by the majority, incorporation by reference has only been permitted when the reference is direct and explicit. See Adventist Healthcare Midatlantic, Inc. v. Suburban Hospital, Inc., 350 Md. 104, 107, 711 A.2d 158, 160 (1998) (stating that state health plan incorporated Specialized Health Cafe Services-Cardiac Surgery and Percutaneous Coronary Intervention Services with the language in COMAR 10.24.17.01: “Specialized Health Care Services-Cardiac Surgery and Percutaneous Coronary Intervention Services is incorporated by reference”); JBG/Twinbrook Metro Ltd. P’ship v. Wheeler, 346 Md. 601, 617, 697 A.2d 898, 907 (1997) (noting that language in COMAR 26,10.11.01—“[t]he Department incorporates by reference the provisions contained in 40 CFR §§ 280.90-280.116”—was sufficient to incorporate by reference); Getson v. WM Bancorp, 346 Md. 48, 57, 694 A.2d 961, 965 (1997) (“COMAR 14.09.04 reads: ... ‘Those provisions of “Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment” (American Medical Association, 3rd ed. 1988) specified in Regulation .02 are incorporated by reference.’ ”).
The majority’s conclusion directly contradicts the ordinary and plain language of COMAR 17.04.11.02 B(l)(j), supplanting the language “in accordance with the Standard Travel Regulations” with “in accordance with the State Vehicle Fleet Policies and Procedures.” If the Department of Budget and Management intended to incorporate the State Vehicle Fleet Policies and Procedures, it would have do so with a direct and explicit reference to such policies. Furthermore, the majority’s conclusion is dubious because the purpose of the State Vehicle Fleet Policies and Procedures is to “ensure the economical and efficient use of motor vehicles by units of the Executive Branch of State Government,” State Vehicle Fleet Policies and Procedures, Section 1.01, not to regulate compensation to employees.1 .
*295The majority contends that its holding is consistent with the principle that we seek to avoid regulatory interpretations that are illogical, unreasonable, or inconsistent with common sense; the majority “decline[s] to endorse a [clearly illogical and absurd] result that would require an employee to be paid for non-work time just because he or she was at a remote work site when they would not be entitled to be paid for non-work time if they were assigned and traveling to their regular work site,” asserting that such a result would create a “windfall” for employees. Op. at 285, 920 A.2d at 474. The “windfall,” however, would only occur when the length of the commute is less than the normal commute, which is not in issue in the instant case—it is a chimerical béte noire. On the other hand, no one should be forced to work beyond the normal work day without remuneration, such as what happened in the present case.
COMAR 17.04.11.02 B(l)(j), which permits compensation for commuting to and from a remote work site, clearly refers to the Standard Travel Regulations, and therefore we should give effect to it as written.
C.
The grievance procedures pertaining to employees in the State Personnel Management System within the Executive Branch are codified in the State Personnel and Pensions *296Article of the Maryland Code. Section 12-203 of the State Personnel and Pensions Article provides the relevant procedure for initiating an employment grievance:
(a) Initiation.—A grievant may initiate a grievance proceeding by filing a written grievance with the grievant’s appointing authority. The grievant shall provide a copy of the grievance to the grievant’s supervisor when the grievance is filed.
(b) Time Limitations. A grievance procedure must be initiated by an employee within 20 days after:
(1) the occurrence of the alleged act that is the basis of the grievance; or
(2) the employee first knew of or reasonably should have known of the alleged act that is the basis of the grievance.
Maryland Code (1993, 2004 RepLVol.), Section 12-203 of the State Personnel and Pensions Article. The remedies available to a successful grievant are enumerated under Section 12-402, which in part provides that
the remedies available to a grievant under this title are limited to the restoration of the rights, pay, status, or benefits that the grievant otherwise would have had if the contested policy, procedure, or regulation had been applied appropriately as determined by the final decision maker.
Maryland Code (1993, 2004 Repl.Vol.), Section 12-4102 of the State Personnel and Pensions Article.
The majority’s conclusion that a grievant’s remedy is limited to recovery for acts occurring within the twenty days prior to the filing of the grievance, however, creates an unfounded connection between Sections 12-203 and 12-402. Section 12-303 delineates the requirement of when an individual must file a grievance, and Section 12-402 independently supplies the remedies available if the grievance is successful, without any twenty-day limitation. We have noted the independence of the state employee grievance system steps, remarking in Walker v. Department of Human Resources, 379 Md. 407, 842 A.2d 53 (2004):
*297With certain exceptions, §§ 12-201 through 12-205 create a three-step procedure for resolving grievances. Step 1, provided for in § 12-203, is the filing of a written grievance with the employee’s “appointing authority” within 20 days after (1) the occurrence of the alleged act that is the basis of the grievance, or (2) the employee first knew or should have known of that act. Within 10 days after receiving the grievance, the appointing authority, through its designee, is required to confer with the employee and attempt to resolve the grievance, and within 10 days after that conference, to issue a written decision in which any relief permissible under § 12-402(a) may be awarded. That relief is limited to restoration of rights, pay, status, or benefits that the employee otherwise would have had if the contested policy, procedure, or regulation had been properly applied.
Id. at 410, 842 A.2d at 55. See also Wilson v. Simms, 380 Md. 206, 225, 844 A.2d 412, 424 (2004) (“In a grievance proceeding, an administrative law judge or final decision maker is authorized by Section 12-303 of the State Personnel and Pensions Article (1993, 1997 Repl.Vol.) to grant ‘any appropriate remedy’ available under Section 12-402(a).... Section 12-402(a) defines the remedies that may be provided to aggrieved state employees”); Comptroller v. Nelson, 345 Md. 706, 710 n. 6, 694 A.2d 468, 470 n. 6 (1997) (remarking that Section 12-102 provides the remedies available successful grievants under the state employee grievance system). The General Assembly could not have intended the remedies available under Section 12-402 to be restricted by Section 12-203’s filing requirements when the grievant, such as Ms. Miller in this case, timely files her grievance.
By holding as it does, the majority adopts a view of “work time” unsupported by the express definition of the term and impermissibly restricts the statutorily prescribed remedies available to successful grievants. I disagree, and would reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.
Judge HARRELL has authorized me to state that he joins in this dissenting opinion.
. The majority’s holding also may have ramifications, unfortunately, for the doctrines*of vicarious liability and respondeat superior. By sanctioning the interpretation that some amount of time during which an *295employee is traveling to a remote work site at the direction of her employer is not compensable, the majority appears to be saying that she would not be acting within her scope of employment. Our jurisprudence has supported the notion that a person traveling to a remote work site, other than her normal commute, is acting within the scope of employment, without eliminating the normal commute distance. See Regal Laundry Co. v. A.S. Abell Co., 163 Md. 525, 163 A. 845 (1933). In Regal Laundry Co., the contention was that a reporter for the Baltimore Sun was not acting in the scope of employment when he was traveling to Crisfield and back on Sunpaper business. We held that he was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident when he was returning from his assignment to the Sunpaper’s office in Baltimore. Id. at 533, 163 A. at 848. See also Dhanraj v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 305 Md. 623, 631, 506 A.2d 224, 228 (1986) (recognizing that remote work place travel, if authorized by the employer, and in employee’s vehicle as authorized by the employer, can be the basis for respondeat superior liability).