concurring.
I concur in the judgment not because Dr. Zedie lacks standing to challenge the adoption of Baby T., but because the posthumous adoption properly recognized the substantive rights of the parties.
As Judge Shebell noted in his dissent below, it is inescapable that we cannot foreclose Dr. Zedie from defending herself in the wrongful death action, both by contesting the allegations of negligence and by challenging the nature of the relationship between Baby T. and his adoptive parents. Judge Shebell reasoned that any issues remaining after the adoption judgment would “be considered by a jury in the wrongful death action by taking into account1 ... whether there was such a well founded expectation of pecuniary benefit to the decedent’s next-of-kin to be derived from a continuance of the life of the decedent as could be estimated in money ...’” In re Adoption of Baby T., 311 N.J.Super. 408, 418, 709 A.2d 1381 (1998) (Shebell, J., dissenting) (quoting Capone v. Norton, 21 N.J.Super. 6, 9-10, 90 A.2d 508 (App.Div.1952)). I believe that we should consider the merits now and determine whether Dr. Zedie may attack the validity of the adoption judgment in the context of the wrongful death action.
*350The situation in which P.H. and J.H. found themselves is akin to the “black hole” described in Carr v. Carr, 120 N.J. 336, 340, 576 A.2d 872 (1990). Because Baby T. died before the then-six-month statutory waiting period had passed, his adoptive parents faced the possibility that the State was the only party able to obtain compensation through a wrongful death action against Dr. Zedie.
Under the circumstances, these adoptive parents did not need a certified copy of the adoption judgment to have suffered emotional harm. A bystander may recover for emotional distress even if the bystander’s relationship to the injured person is not by marriage or by blood. See Dunphy v. Gregor, 136 N.J. 99, 115, 642 A.2d 372 (1994) (holding that familial relationship between unmarried cohabitants will support emotional distress claim, so long as relationship was “stable, enduring, substantial, and mutually supportive”). Similarly, although P.H. and J.H. cannot claim emotional distress here, an adoption need not be final for adoptive parents to develop a stable, enduring and substantial relationship with their adoptive child such that fair and just compensation may be awarded under the Wrongful Death Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:31-1 to - 6.
In granting the adoption, the Family Part simply did what the Legislature would undoubtedly intend that it do in the circumstances — achieve “essential and fundamental justice.” In re Adoption of a Child by H.C., 284 N.J.Super. 202, 207, 664 A.2d 515 (Ch.Div.1994) (quoting Crane v. Bielski, 15 N.J. 342, 349, 104 A.2d 651 (1954)).
Based on these equitable principles, and the facts and circumstances uniquely presented by this case, the chancery judge’s equitable adoption holding was properly made in the adoption proceeding and should stand. Baby T “should not be allowed to be placed in some sort of legal limbo. Equity should not and cannot permit such a bizarre result in this case.”
[Baby T., supra, 311 N.J.Super. at 420, 709 A.2d 1381 (Shebell, J., dissenting) (quoting In re Adoption of Baby T., 308 N.J.Super. 344, 364, 705 A.2d 1279 (Ch.Div.1997)).]
Justices HANDLER and O’HERN, concur in result.
*351For reversal & reinstatement — Chief Justice PORITZ and Justices HANDLER, POLLOCK, O’HERN, GARIBALDI, STEIN and COLEMAN — 7.
Opposed — None.