Dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent. I simply cannot agree that where a court has unequivocally ordered reconsideration within the thirty day time period required by 42 Pa.C.S. § 5505, that order becomes null and void if it is not entered on the docket until after the time has run. Other than dicta in Schoff v. Richter, 386 Pa.Super. 289, 562 A.2d 912, 913 (1989), I have found no cases requiring any more than that the court “expressly grant” reconsideration within the statutory period. See Valentine v. Wroten, 397 Pa.Super. 526, 580 A.2d 757, 758 (1990). Moreover, § 5505 specifically provides that the thirty day period begins to run from entry of the original order, but only requires the court to “modify or rescind” not to “enter an order modifying or rescinding” within that period. As the majority and other courts have noted, strict application of the thirty day rule often produces harsh results, and I would not extend that harshness by reading an additional technical requirement into § 5505.
Such a construction of the rule yields a particularly inequitable result under the circumstances presented here. The City, in reliance upon the trial court’s vacatur of its original sanctions, withdrew its timely appeal from that first order. All parties and the court thereafter proceeded in good faith to litigate the matter on reconsideration, a modified order was entered, and the City again filed a timely appeal. Even if I agreed with *108the majority’s reading of § 5505, I would hear the appeal under the authority of Great Am. Credit Corp. v. Thomas Mini-Markets, Inc., 230 Pa.Super. 210, 326 A.2d 517, 519 (1974), or at a minimum, reinstate the original appeal. See Commonwealth v. Gordon, 329 Pa.Super. 42, 477 A.2d 1342, 1346 (1984).
KELLEY, J., joins in this dissent.