dissenting.
I dissent from that part of the Court’s opinion which upholds the constitutionality of Section 3102 of the Crimes Code.1
*56Appellant was precluded by Section 3102 from asserting as a defense to the charge of statutory rape undisputed evidence that the complainant deliberately misrepresented her age as sixteen and that appellant reasonably believed her misrepresentation.2 Appellant was thus unfairly convicted of a serious felony on the basis of strict criminal liability without any showing of criminal intent, negligence or recklessness.
More than twenty years ago, this Court held that imprisonment on the basis of vicarious criminal liability without a showing of mens rea would deny due process of law under Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Commonwealth v. Koczwara, 397 Pa. 575, 583-585, 155 A.2d 825, 829-830 (1959). See Commonwealth v. Field, 490 Pa. 519, 417 A.2d 160 (1980) (inferring culpability requirement for homicide by vehicle conviction). Today, however, the majority upholds a felony conviction where there not only has been no showing of mens rea, but the accused has been precluded from proving his assertion that he was misled to form the reasonable belief that he was committing no crime.3
Under the circumstances of this case, a felony conviction, carrying the possible penalty of a lengthy prison term, *57without a finding of criminal intent is unduly harsh and offensive to the due process protections of both the Pennsylvania and United States Constitutions. I agree with the enlightened view expressed by the appellate courts of several states that a felony conviction in circumstances similar to that presented here should not be obtained without some showing of criminal intent.4 As the California Supreme Court has cogently stated:
[I]f the [accused] participates in a mutual act of sexual intercourse, believing his partner to be beyond the age of consent, with reasonable grounds for such belief, where is his criminal intent? In such circumstances he has not consciously taken a risk. Instead he had subjectively eliminated the risk by satisfying himself on reasonable evidence that the crime cannot be committed. If it occurs that he has been misled, we cannot realistically conclude that for such reason alone the intent with which he understood the act suddenly becomes more heinous.
People v. Hernandez, 61 Cal.2d 529, 39 Cal.Rptr. 361, 393 P.2d 673, 676 (1964). See also State v. Guest, 583 P.2d 836 (Alaska 1978) (recognizing universal rule that conduct cannot be criminal unless the accused was conscious of some wrongdoing); Walker v. State, 356 So.2d 672 (Ala.1977) (due process restrains legislature’s power to create strict liability crimes).5
Rather than summarily dismissing appellant’s constitutional claim, as does the majority, I would hold unconstitutional that part of Section 3102 which denies an accused the opportunity to offer proof of reasonable belief as to age and remand this case to the trial court to permit appellant to *58raise as a defense his reasonable belief that the complainant’s misrepresentation as to her age was true.6
LARSEN and FLAHERTY, JJ., join in this dissenting opinion.. Act of December 6, 1972, P.L. 1462, No. 334, § 1, as amended, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3102. Section 3102 provides:
§ 3102. Mistake as to age
*56Whenever in this chapter the criminality of conduct depends on a child being below the age of 14 years, it is no defense that the actor did not know the age of the child, or reasonably believed the child to be the age of 14 years or older. When criminality depends on the child’s being below a critical age other than 14 years, it is a defense for the actor to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he reasonably believed the child to be above the critical age.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3102 (Emphasis supplied).
. The felony of statutory rape, which carries a penalty of up to ten years’ imprisonment, is an offense based solely on the ages of the accused and the complainant. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3122. Section 3122 of the Crimes Code makes criminal sexual intercourse between a person eighteen years old or older and a person below the age of fourteen. Id. At the time of the incident leading to prosecution in this case, appellant was apparently eighteen, while complainant was thirteen and a half years old.
. It is undisputed that the complainant gave a false name to appellant, misrepresented her age and freely consented to the act of sexual intercourse giving rise to this prosecution.
. While not deciding that every crime must be based on a finding of criminal intent, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that the Due Process Clause limits the power of state legislatures to establish strict liability offenses. See Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 78 S.Ct. 240, 2 L.Ed.2d 228 (1957); Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 72 S.Ct. 240, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1951).
. Some states have expressed the same view through legislation. See, e.g., Arizona, Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 13-1407(B); Arkansas, Ark. Stat.Ann. § 41-1802(3); Montana, Mont.Rev.Codes Ann. § 94-5-601.
. This result would not require a finding that the statutory rape statute, Section 3122, is unconstitutional, but only that appellant must be permitted to show that he had been misled into believing that he was committing no crime.