This is an appeal by the City of Omaha from the order of the District Court for Douglas County, Nebraska, granting plaintiff, Foreman & Clark of Nebraska, Inc., a new trial.
The action was originally commenced in the county court of Douglas County, Nebraska, as a condemnation action filed by the City of Omaha as condemner. The condemnee, Foreman & Clark, had a leasehold interest in a store located in a building known as the Karbach Building, located at 15th and Douglas Streets in Omaha, Nebraska. Foreman & Clark operated a retail men’s clothing store on the second floor of the building which the City had earlier purchased by negotiation. It was only the leasehold interest of Foreman & Clark that was being condemned.
Following condemnation proceedings in the county court and an award by the board of appraisers, the *748City of Omaha appealed to the District Court for Douglas County, Nebraska.
In its petition the City of Omaha alleged that on September 19, 1974, the fair market value of the leasehold interest in the real estate was $17,000. Nevertheless, the record reflects that the City permitted Foreman «fe Clark to remain in possession after the taking and until January 1, 1975.
The trial court in its instructions to the jury specifically stated that the condemnation proceedings were instituted by the City in September 1974, but possession did not occur until January 1, 1975, and the lease did not expire until February 28, 1978. The court further instructed the jury that the lease would therefore have been valid and existing for an additional 38 months from and after January 1, 1975. The measure of damages in the taking or injury of a leasehold is the difference between the rental value of the remainder of the term and the rent reserved in the lease. Ballantyne Co. v. City of Omaha, 173 Neb. 229, 113 N. W. 2d 486. See, also, Balog v. State, 177 Neb. 826, 131 N. W. 2d 402; State v. Dillon, 175 Neb. 350, 121 N. W. 2d 798.
During the course of the trial, the City introduced evidence as to the value of the leasehold, including testimony that the leasehold had no value because the difference between the rental still due under the remaining portion of the lease and the reasonable value of the leasehold was zero.
Foreman <fe Clark objected to the introduction of certain of the City’s expert testimony on the basis that there was no foundation for such testimony. Foreman <fe Clark did not, however, at any time object to the introduction of such evidence on the basis that the City had admitted in its pleading the leasehold interest had a value of at least $17,000 on September 19, 1974. Moreover, the condemnee, Foreman & Clark, never sought to take advantage of the fact the City admitted that on September 19, 1974, *749the property had a value of $17,000, nor did the condemnee request the court to either instruct the jury of that fact or take the matter into account.
At the conclusion of the jury’s deliberation, it returned a verdict for no dollars. Foreman & Clark then filed a motion for new trial claiming it was entitled to an award of at least $17,000 on the basis of a judicial admission made by the City. This amount was chosen by Foreman & Clark alleging that the City judicially admitted in its petition that the leasehold interest had a value of at least $17,000.
The trial court concluded that Foreman & dark was correct and granted a new trial. We believe the trial court was in error and should not have granted a new trial. We therefore reverse and remand.
While it is true the dty admitted in its petition that the leasehold interest on September 19, 1974, had a value of $17,000, it did not make an admission as to the value of the leasehold interest on January 1, 1975, the date which the jury was instructed to use for determining Foreman & dark’s damage. It was certainly true that the admission by the dty that on September 19, 1974, the leasehold interest was worth $17,000 was relevant evidence which Foreman & Clark would have been entitled to introduce in evidence. The jury could have taken that fact into account in attempting to determine the difference in value of the leasehold between September 19, 1974, and January 1, 1975. However, Foreman & dark chose to waive that right by refusing to bring that value to the jury’s attention.
A party may not claim error on the failure to introduce evidence which was incumbent upon the party seeking the benefit of the evidence to introduce. A party cannot be heard to complain of error which he was instrumental in bringing about. Regier v. Nebraska P. P. Dist., 189 Neb. 56, 199 N. W. 2d 742. Having failed to introduce the evidence as to value and having failed to request an instruc*750tion on that matter, Foreman & Clark is not now in a position to claim error.
Moreover, the allegation by the condemner, City of Omaha, as to the value of the leasehold interest on September 19, 1974, was not a judicial admission in that it was not the admission of a fact in issue in the lawsuit which the jury was to determine. In this case the date of September 19, 1974, was no longer relevant to the condemnation proceeding. The parties agreed to try the case on the theory that the relevant date for a determination of the value of the leasehold was January 1, 1975, and no assignment of error is made of that matter. The value of the leasehold on September 19, 1974, therefore, was merely evidence of the value of the leasehold some sy2 months earlier, but not a judicial admission as to the value of the leasehold on the important date. There was evidence, introduced without objection, that the leasehold interest had no value on January 1, 1975. The value on that date was a question of fact to be determined by the jury. Where the evidence is conflicting, this court will not ordinarily interfere with the verdict of the jury unless it is clearly wrong. Ward v. Nebraska Electric G. and T. Coop., Inc., 195 Neb. 641, 240 N. W. 2d 18. The evidence presented as to value of the leasehold on January 1, 1975, was clearly in conflict.
“ ‘The district court has the power and is required to consider and determine motions for a new trial by the exercise of its judicial discretion ....
‘Where a party has sustained the burden and expense of a trial and has succeeded in securing the judgment of a jury on the facts in issue, he has a right to keep the benefit of that verdict unless there is prejudicial error in the proceedings by which it was secured.
* * *
‘Whether the decision was to grant a new trial or deny one, the questions here are, do the alleged *751error or errors appear in the record, were they called to the attention of the trial court by the motion, and do they constitute prejudicial error to the party complaining.’ ” Roush v. Nebraska P. P. Dist., 189 Neb. 785, 205 N. W. 2d 519.
We have examined the record and found there was an abuse of judicial discretion. The judgment of the trial court in granting the motion for a new trial on the basis of an admission as to value on a date irrelevant to the proceedings was in error and must be reversed. The verdict of the jury must therefore be reinstated.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the District Court for Douglas County, Nebraska, in granting a new trial, and remand the cause back to the District Court for Douglas County, Nebraska, with instructions to reinstate the verdict of the jury.
Reversed and remanded with DIRECTIONS.