OPINION OF THE COURT
HUTCHINSON, Justice.Appellant, Linda Ziccardi, was employed as a clerk-typist I by the Commonwealth’s Department of General Services. She received notice on November 16, 1972 that her employment would be terminated on November 23,1972. Pursuant to the provisions pertaining to discharge in the collective bargaining agreement, appellant’s exclusive bargaining representative, AFSCME, presented her grievance and represented her through the various steps of the procedure up to the point of arbitration.
In the summer of 1975, appellant was asked by a union representative if she would be willing to settle her case for reinstatement and four months back pay. Ms. Ziccardi declined to settle on those terms. On October 7, 1975, without notice to or discussion with her, AFSCME withdrew the request for arbitration and closed appellant’s file.
The appellant then filed this action in the Commonwealth Court by a complaint against the Commonwealth and Ronald E. Lench, Secretary, Department of General Services *329alleging in counts of assumpsit, trespass and equity, that she was wrongfully discharged, without just cause, in violation of the collective bargaining agreement, the United States Constitution, the Pennsylvania Constitution, and the Civil Rights Act of 1871; and against AFSCME in counts of trespass alleging a breach of duty of fair representation in the grievance process.
I
In this case the bargaining agent refused to represent an employee in an arbitration proceeding arising from an alleged wrongful discharge. The Commonwealth Court held an employee’s allegation of unfair representation is an unfair labor practice under Section 1201(b)(3) of the Public Employe Relations Act (PERA) 43 P.S. 1101.1201(b)(3), (Supp.1982-83), and is, therefore, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board (Board). On that view, the Commonwealth Court sustained preliminary objections to the employee’s complaint in trespass, assumpsit and equity against her former employer and the Union, her exclusive representative and bargaining agent. See also Maggs v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, 50 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 549, 554 n. 2, 413 A.2d 453, 455 n. 2 (1980); McCluskey v. PennDot, 37 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 598, 607, 391 A.2d 45, 50 (1978).
The Commonwealth Court’s conclusion that an employee may file an unfair labor practice against its bargaining agent is erroneous. The union’s refusal to submit a grievance to arbitration does not fall under any of the categories of unfair labor practices enumerated in Section 1201(b) of PERA.1 See also Falsetti v. Local Union No. 2026, 400 Pa. 145, 161 A.2d 882 (1960). In Falsetti this Court *330held that a public employee’s remedy for his bargaining agent’s refusal to submit a grievance to arbitration is an action against the union for damages for breach of its duty of fair representation.
Under Falsetti, a member of a bargaining unit has a right to sue his union for failure to proceed to arbitration when the complaint alleges bad faith. Of course, the union, like any fiduciary, must be given broad discretion in determining whether to pursue the remedy. Falsetti v. Local Union No. 2026, United Mine Workers, 400 Pa. at 168 n. 19, 161 A.2d at 894 n. 19 (1960). Furthermore, the issue of just cause does not determine liability for this breach. Whether there was just cause becomes relevant on the issue of damages, only after bad faith has been shown. For these reasons, the Commonwealth Court’s order sustaining preliminary objections as to the action against the union must be vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
II
Appellant is not entitled to bring an equity and assumpsit action against her employer for breach of the collective *331bargaining agreement. That procedure was specifically disapproved in Falsetti.
In Falsetti an employee brought an action in equity against his employer and collective bargaining agent. The employee claimed, as a third party beneficiary of the collective bargaining agreement, he had the standing to enforce it. The Falsetti court determined that the parties to the agreement, the Union and the employer, had sought to avoid litigation by providing for arbitration of grievances, a procedure to be initiated by the Union. The Falsetti Court concluded that the employee’s remedy was by way of an action against the Union for breach of its fiduciary duty.
In effect, the appellant is a beneficiary of the appellee Company’s promises as to seniority rights, but the Company has limited those promises by refusing to entertain claims based on such rights (beyond the initial complaint stage) unless brought by the other party to the Agreement, the trustee Union. The limited character of the Company’s promises serves to defeat any attempt to get redress individually.
To view this type of agreement otherwise would lead to chaos and a breakdown in the entire scheme of collective bargaining for which the parties have provided and contracted. Instead of being able to rely on the disposition of employee grievances through the established machinery, the Company would face the constant threat of attempted individual enforcement through litigation. Union responsibility would be diminished and all parties would suffer. For these reasons, most, if not all, Union-management agreements of any magnitude in force throughout the Commonwealth are similarly drafted, with an eye toward reposing enforcement responsibility in the labor organization concerned.
As Judge Fuld of the New York Court of Appeals, concurring in a recent decision very similar to ours, concluded: “. . . absent specific language giving the employee the right to act on his own behalf, it is my conclusion that, under a collective bargaining agreement such as the one *332before us — which contains provision for the submission of unsettled disputes to arbitration — the union alone has a right to control the prosecution of discharge cases. (See Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 Harv.L.Rev. 601, 648-652.” Parker v. Borock, 5 N.Y.2d 156, 159 [182 N.Y.S.2d 577, 582], 156 N.E.2d 297, 300 (1959). With this approach we wholeheartedly concur.
Id., 400 Pa. at 169-70, 161 A.2d at 894-895 (footnote omitted).
We hold, as a general rule, that an employee has no right to sue his employer in equity and assumpsit for wrongful discharge where his union has refused to proceed to arbitration. Of course, we do not here reach the situation where he alleges and shows by specific facts that the employer actively participated in the union’s bad faith, or conspired with it to deny the employee the job protection accorded him by the collective bargaining agreement. By giving the employee an unfettered right to sue the employer for the union’s bad faith, we would relieve the wrongdoer of any effective sanction, make the plaintiff whole at the expense of an innocent party and bind that innocent party by the action of the plaintiff’s agent, over whom it has no control. This would be in total violation of the principles of the law of agency. Furthermore, any attempt by the employer to exercise control over the union in such matters violates fundamental principles of labor law concerning the right of the bargaining agent and its members to be free of employer coercion. Thus, the Commonwealth Court correctly sustained the preliminary objections to the action against the employer on the theory of breach of the bargaining agreement’s just cause provision.
However, the causes of action against the employer, asserted in counts 2, 3 and 4 of appellant’s amended complaint, seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, require further consideration. The case is remanded to the Common*333wealth Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
LARSEN, J., files a concurring and dissenting opinion in which O’BRIEN, C.J., and ROBERTS, J., join.. Section 1201(b) provides:
“Employe organizations, their agents, or representatives or public employes are prohibited from:
(1) Restraining or coercing employes in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Article IV of this act.
(2) Restraining or coercing a public employer in the selection of his representative for the purposes of collective bargaining or adjustment of grievances.
*330(3) Refusing to bargain collectively in good faith with a public employer, if they have been designated in accordance with the provisions of this act as the exclusive representative of employes in an appropriate unit.
(4) Violating any of the rules and regulations established by the board regulating the conduct of representation elections.
(5) Refusing to reduce a collective bargaining agreement to writing and sign such agreement.
(6) Calling, instituting, maintaining or conducting a strike or boycott against any public employer or picketing any place of business of a public employer on account of any jurisdictional controversy.
(7) Engaging in, or inducing or encouraging any individual employed by any person to engage in a strike or refusal to handle goods or perform services; or threatening, coercing or restraining any person where an object thereof is to (i) force or require any public employer to cease dealing or doing business with any other person or (ii) force or require a public employer to recognize for representation purposes an employe organization not certified by the board.
(8) Refusing to comply with the provisions of an arbitration award deemed binding under section 903 of Article IX.
(9) Refusing to comply with the requirements of ‘meet and discuss.’ ”